A Lens Analysis of the Effects of Memory Load and Time Pressure on Static Judgment

1993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Byrne ◽  
David A. Rettinger
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Bago ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

What role does deliberation play in susceptibility to political misinformation and “fake news”? The “Motivated System 2 Reasoning” account posits that deliberation causes people to fall for fake news because reasoning facilitates identity-protective cognition and is therefore used to rationalize content that is consistent with one’s political ideology. The classical account of reasoning instead posits that people ineffectively discern between true and false news headlines when they fail to deliberate (and instead rely on intuition). To distinguish between these competing accounts, we investigated the causal effect of reasoning on media truth discernment using a two-response paradigm. Participants (N= 1635 MTurkers) were presented with a series of headlines. For each, they were first asked to give an initial, intuitive response under time pressure and concurrent working memory load. They were then given an opportunity to re-think their response with no constraints, thereby permitting more deliberation. We also compared these responses to a (deliberative) one-response baseline condition where participants made a single choice with no constraints. Consistent with the classical account, we found that deliberation corrected intuitive mistakes: subjects believed false headlines (but not true headlines) more in initial responses than in either final responses or the unconstrained 1-response baseline. In contrast – and inconsistent with the Motivated System 2 Reasoning account – we found that political polarization was equivalent across responses. Our data suggest that, in the context of fake news, deliberation facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias.


1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morris K. Holland ◽  
Gerald Tarlow

The rate of blinking is related to certain mental activities. One common feature of states associated with low blink rates is the presence of concentrated cognitive activity. The purpose of the present study was to determine how blinking is affected by variations in mental load; it was hypothesized that, for a given nonvisual task, blinking would decrease as mental load increased. The first study reported here manipulated memory load by requiring Ss to retain a sequence of 4, 6, or 8 digits. The second study involved mental arithmetic under time pressure; half the trials contained zeros in the sequence of numbers to be summed. In both studies the rate of blinking was low when mental load was high and the rate was high when mental load was low. It is speculated that blinking may disrupt certain cognitive processes and may therefore be inhibited when these processes are active. When mental load is increased, the inhibition of blinking may be an adaptive mechanism which protects vulnerable cognitive processes from interference.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Marc Wittmann ◽  
Nathalie Mella

Abstract A widely reproduced finding across numerous studies of different cultures is that adults perceive the most recent 10 years of their lives to have passed particularly fast, and that this perceived speed increases as they grow older. Potential explanatory factors for this effect are believed to be more routines in life as we age as well as an increase in time pressure during middle adult age, both factors that would lead to a reduced autobiographical memory load. Fewer contextual changes in life are known to cause the passage of time to be perceived as faster. Taking advantage of the database created for the study that first captured this age effect on subjective time (Wittmann & Lehnhoff, 2005), we investigated the role that having children plays in the subjective speeding of time. Adults aged between 20 and 59 who had children reported that time over the last 10 years passed subjectively more quickly than adults of the same age group without children. Factors such as education or gender did not influence subjective time. A small correlation effect could be seen in the fact that parents with more children reported that time passed more quickly. Experienced time pressure was not a differentiating factor between the two groups, as time pressure was associated with a faster passage of time in all adults. Future systematic studies will have to reveal what factors on autobiographical memory and time might be accountable for this clear effect that raising children has on perceived time.


1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-22
Author(s):  
R. Esteve ◽  
A. Godoy

The aim of the present paper was to test the effects of response mode (choice vs. judgment) on decision-making strategies when subjects were faced with the task of deciding the adequacy of a set of tests for a specific assessment situation. Compared with choice, judgment was predicted to lead to more information sought, more time spent on the task, a less variable pattern of search, and a greater amount of interdimensional search. Three variables hypothesized as potential moderators of the response mode effects are also studied: time pressure, information load and decision importance. Using an information board, 300 subjects made decisions (choices and judgments) on tests for a concrete assessment situation, under high or low time pressure, high or low information load, and high or low decision importance. Response mode produced strong effects on all measures of decision behavior except for pattern of search. Moderator effects occurred for time pressure and information load.


2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Krumm ◽  
Lothar Schmidt-Atzert ◽  
Kurt Michalczyk ◽  
Vanessa Danthiir

Mental speed (MS) and sustained attention (SA) are theoretically distinct constructs. However, tests of MS are very similar to SA tests that use time pressure as an impeding condition. The performance in such tasks largely relies on the participants’ speed of task processing (i.e., how quickly and correctly one can perform the simple cognitive tasks). The present study examined whether SA and MS are empirically the same or different constructs. To this end, 24 paper-pencil and computerized tests were administered to 199 students. SA turned out to be highly related to MS task classes: substitution and perceptual speed. Furthermore, SA showed a very close relationship with the paper-pencil MS factor. The correlation between SA and computerized speed was considerably lower but still high. In a higher-order general speed factor model, SA had the highest loading on the higher-order factor; the higher-order factor explained 88% of SA variance. It is argued that SA (as operationalized with tests using time pressure as an impeding condition) and MS cannot be differentiated, at the level of broad constructs. Implications for neuropsychological assessment and future research are discussed.


Author(s):  
Angela A. Manginelli ◽  
Franziska Geringswald ◽  
Stefan Pollmann

When distractor configurations are repeated over time, visual search becomes more efficient, even if participants are unaware of the repetition. This contextual cueing is a form of incidental, implicit learning. One might therefore expect that contextual cueing does not (or only minimally) rely on working memory resources. This, however, is debated in the literature. We investigated contextual cueing under either a visuospatial or a nonspatial (color) visual working memory load. We found that contextual cueing was disrupted by the concurrent visuospatial, but not by the color working memory load. A control experiment ruled out that unspecific attentional factors of the dual-task situation disrupted contextual cueing. Visuospatial working memory may be needed to match current display items with long-term memory traces of previously learned displays.


Author(s):  
Patrick Bonin ◽  
Margaux Gelin ◽  
Betty Laroche ◽  
Alain Méot ◽  
Aurélia Bugaiska

Abstract. Animates are better remembered than inanimates. According to the adaptive view of human memory ( Nairne, 2010 ; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010a , 2010b ), this observation results from the fact that animates are more important for survival than inanimates. This ultimate explanation of animacy effects has to be complemented by proximate explanations. Moreover, animacy currently represents an uncontrolled word characteristic in most cognitive research ( VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Cogdill, 2015 ). In four studies, we therefore investigated the “how” of animacy effects. Study 1 revealed that words denoting animates were recalled better than those referring to inanimates in an intentional memory task. Study 2 revealed that adding a concurrent memory load when processing words for the animacy dimension did not impede the animacy effect on recall rates. Study 3A was an exact replication of Study 2 and Study 3B used a higher concurrent memory load. In these two follow-up studies, animacy effects on recall performance were again not altered by a concurrent memory load. Finally, Study 4 showed that using interactive imagery to encode animate and inanimate words did not alter the recall rate of animate words but did increase the recall of inanimate words. Taken together, the findings suggest that imagery processes contribute to these effects.


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