scholarly journals Adaptive behavior in variable games requires theory of mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenhao Qi ◽  
Edward Vul
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Adaptive Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Clear Advantage ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Is Theory

People seem to infer each others’ beliefs and desires when navigating social interactions, perhaps because such a “theory of mind” can guide cooperation and coordination. However, such strategic, altruistic interactions fall naturally out of evolutionary game theory without invoking any theory of mind; so why is theory of mind useful? Here we show that the interactions studied in game theory have been too impoverished to require theory of mind, but when interacting in variable games, agents with theory of mind have a clear advantage. We use simulated tournaments to demonstrate that traditional action-level strategies such as tit-for-tat fare miserably in variable games, that goal-based agents can adapt to new games instantly, and that having a theory of mind is increasingly helpful for coping with a variety of opponents as the variability in games increases. Our work suggests that variable games merit further investigation in game theory and social sciences.

Corpus-Based Intention Recognition in Cooperation Dilemmas

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Francisco C. Santos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
Intention Recognition ◽  
New Strategy ◽  
Cognitive Cost

Intention recognition is ubiquitous in most social interactions among humans and other primates. Despite this, the role of intention recognition in the emergence of cooperative actions remains elusive. Resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory, herein we describe a computational model showing how intention recognition coevolves with cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping some individuals with the capacity of assessing the intentions of others in the course of a prototypical dilemma of cooperation—the repeated prisoner's dilemma—we show how intention recognition is favored by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive. We introduce a new strategy (IR) that is able to assign an intention to the actions of opponents, on the basis of an acquired corpus consisting of possible plans achieving that intention, as well as to then make decisions on the basis of such recognized intentions. The success of IR is grounded on the free exploitation of unconditional cooperators while remaining robust against unconditional defectors. In addition, we show how intention recognizers do indeed prevail against the best-known successful strategies of iterated dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of errors and reduction of fitness associated with a small cognitive cost for performing intention recognition.

Extending the behavioral sciences framework: Clarification of methods, predictions, and concepts

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mesoudi ◽  
Kevin N. Laland
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cultural Evolutionary

We applaud Gintis's attempt to provide an evolutionary-based framework for the behavioral sciences, and note a number of similarities with our own recent cultural evolutionary structure for the social sciences. Gintis's proposal would be further strengthened by a greater emphasis on additional methods to evolutionary game theory, clearer empirical predictions, and a broader consideration of cultural transmission.

scholarly journals Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 202186
Author(s):  
Masahiko Ueda
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Linear Relationships ◽  
Previous Round ◽  
Tit For Tat

Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favourable in a one-shot game in the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have substantially been investigated in evolutionary game theory. The original memory-one ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relationships between average pay-offs of players. Here, we extend the concept of ZD strategies to memory-two strategies in repeated games. Memory-two ZD strategies unilaterally enforce linear relationships between correlation functions of pay-offs and pay-offs of the previous round. Examples of memory-two ZD strategy in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game are provided, some of which generalize the tit-for-tat strategy to a memory-two case. Extension of ZD strategies to memory- n case with n ≥ ̃2 is also straightforward.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

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