scholarly journals Seven- and eight-year-old children’s deception in the conflict situation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryoichi Watanabe

Six-year-olds will deceive in the individual condition, only if a competitor exists; but not in the conflict condition, when a competitor and a cooperator both exist. Seven- and eight-year-olds acquire the second-order theory of mind (ToM2) related to sophisticated deception. However, it is not known whether children and adults resort to deception in the conflict condition; and if a relationship exists between deception and ToM2. Children (N = 34, range = [6; 7-8; 5]) and adults (N = 38, range = [18-24]) participated in two deception tasks: for self-benefit and for the other person’s benefit. Children also participated in a ToM2 task. Although adults deceived above chance levels, children deceived only for self-benefit. Furthermore, although there was no relationship between children’s deception and ToM2; children who passed the ToM2 task tended to deceive by denying or not responding. These findings suggest that 7- and 8-year-olds can deceive for self-benefit in the conflict condition without ToM2.


1978 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 209-236
Author(s):  
S. Ferraz-Mello

AbstractThe theory of the motion of the Galilean satellites of Jupiter is developed up to the second-order terms. The disturbing forces are those due to mutual attractions, to the non-symmetrical internal mass distribution of Jupiter and to the attraction from the Sun. The mean equator of Jupiter is taken as the reference plane and its motion is considered. The integration of the equations is performed. The geometric equations are solved for the case in which the amplitude of libration is zero. The perturbation method is shortly commented on the grounds of some recent advances in non-linear mechanics.In a previous paper (Ferraz-Mello, 1974) one perturbation theory has been constructed with special regard to the problem of the motion of the Galilean satellites of Jupiter. In this problem, the motions are nearly circular and coplanar; on the other hand the quasi-resonances lead to strong perturbations. The main characteristic of the theory is that it allows the main frequencies to be kept fixed from the earlier stages, and so, to have a purely trigonometric solution.



2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hajimu Hayashi ◽  
Yuki Shiomi

This study examined whether children understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion depending upon the context. We prepared two contexts for a verbal display task for 70 first-graders, 80 third-graders, 64 fifth-graders, and 71 adults. In both contexts, protagonists had negative feelings because of the behavior of the other character. In the prosocial context, children were instructed that the protagonist wished to spare the other character’s feelings. In contrast, in the real-emotion context, children were told that the protagonist was fed up with the other character’s behavior. Participants were asked to imagine what the protagonists would say. Adults selected utterances with positive or neutral emotion in the prosocial context but chose utterances with negative emotion in the real-emotion context, whereas first-graders selected utterances with negative emotion in both contexts. In the prosocial context, the proportion of utterances with negative emotion decreased from first-graders to adults, whereas in the real-emotion context the proportion was U-shaped, decreasing from first- to third-graders and increasing from fifth-graders to adults. Further, performance on both contexts was associated with second-order false beliefs as well as second-order intention understanding. These results indicate that children begin to understand that people selectively conceal or express emotion depending upon context after 8 to 9 years. This ability is also related to second-order theory of mind.



2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (8) ◽  
pp. 2085-2092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Genyue Fu ◽  
Wen S. Xiao ◽  
Melanie Killen ◽  
Kang Lee


1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuri Gurevich ◽  
Menachem Magidor ◽  
Saharon Shelah

AbstractAssume ZFC + “There is a weakly compact cardinal” is consistent. Then:(i) For every S ⊆ ω, ZFC + “S and the monadic theory of ω2 are recursive each in the other” is consistent; and(ii) ZFC + “The full second-order theory of ω2 is interpretable in the monadic theory of ω2” is consistent.



2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
Suzanne T.M. Bogaerds-Hazenberg ◽  
Petra Hendriks

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.



2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marga Reimer

Recent experimental studies appear to discredit Gricean accounts of irony and metaphor. I argue that appearances are decidedly misleading here and that Gricean accounts of these figures of speech are actually confirmed by the studies in question. However, my primary aim is not so much to defend Gricean accounts of irony and metaphor as it is to motivate two related points: one substantive and one methodological. The substantive point concerns something Grice suggests in his brief remarks on irony: that the interpretation of an ironical (vs. metaphorical) utterance requires two distinct applications of second-order theory of mind (ToM). I argue that such a view has considerable explanatory power. It can explain an intuitive contrast between irony and metaphor, some interesting data on the ToM abilities of patients with schizophrenia, and some intuitive similarities between irony on the one hand and hyperbole and meiosis on the other. The methodological point concerns the relationship between the empirical psychologist’s (or experimental philosopher’s) experimental studies and the armchair philosopher’s thought-experiments. I suggest that the credibility of an experimentally supported claim is enhanced when it captures the reflective judgments captured in the armchair philosopher’s thought-experiments.



1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 672-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. T. Bateman ◽  
C. G. Jockusch ◽  
A. R. Woods

AbstractIt is shown, assuming the linear case of Schinzel's Hypothesis, that the first-order theory of the structure 〈ω; +, P〉, where P is the set of primes, is undecidable and, in fact, that multiplication of natural numbers is first-order definable in this structure. In the other direction, it is shown, from the same hypothesis, that the monadic second-order theory of 〈ω S, P〉 is decidable, where S is the successor function. The latter result is proved using a general result of A. L. Semënov on decidability of monadic theories, and a proof of Semënov's result is presented.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document