scholarly journals The Seductive Allure of Cargo Cult Computationalism

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Allen

Bruineberg and colleagues report a striking confusion, in which the formal Bayesian notion of a “Markov Blanket” has been frequently misunderstood and misapplied to phenomena of mind and life. I argue that misappropriation of formal concepts is pervasive in the “predictive processing” literature, and echo Richard Feynman in suggesting how we might resist the allure of cargo cult computationalism.

Author(s):  
Wanja Wiese

This chapter presents the regularity account of phenomenal unity (RPU). The basic idea of RPU is that when the brain tracks a regularity that is predictive of different features (or of different objects or events), there will be an experienced connection between those features (or the respective objects or events). We can then say that the regularity connects those features (or objects or events). According to RPU, unity comes in degrees, and in ordinary conscious experience we find a hierarchy of experienced wholes. This chapter provides a preliminary taxonomy of experienced wholes, with many examples. Drawing on formal concepts of the predictive processing framework, a formal description of possible computational underpinnings of experienced wholeness is given. Finally, a rigorous formulation of the mélange model (first proposed in chapter 4) is provided.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina G. Vilas ◽  
Lucia Melloni

Abstract To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing (PP) must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Parr

Abstract This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while “choosing” a Markov blanket.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Laukkonen ◽  
Heleen A Slagter

How profoundly can humans change their own minds? In this paper we offer a unifying account of meditation under the predictive processing view of living organisms. We start from relatively simple axioms. First, the brain is an organ that serves to predict based on past experience, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Second, meditation serves to bring one closer to the here and now by disengaging from anticipatory processes. We propose that practicing meditation therefore gradually reduces predictive processing, in particular counterfactual cognition—the tendency to construct abstract and temporally deep representations—until all conceptual processing falls away. Our Many- to-One account also places three main styles of meditation (focused attention, open monitoring, and non-dual meditation) on a single continuum, where each technique progressively relinquishes increasingly engrained habits of prediction, including the self. This deconstruction can also make the above processes available to introspection, permitting certain insights into one’s mind. Our review suggests that our framework is consistent with the current state of empirical and (neuro)phenomenological evidence in contemplative science, and is ultimately illuminating about the plasticity of the predictive mind. It also serves to highlight that contemplative science can fruitfully go beyond cognitive enhancement, attention, and emotion regulation, to its more traditional goal of removing past conditioning and creating conditions for potentially profound insights. Experimental rigor, neurophenomenology, and no-report paradigms combined with neuroimaging are needed to further our understanding of how different styles of meditation affect predictive processing and the self, and the plasticity of the predictive mind more generally.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
María A. Castellanos Román
Keyword(s):  

Hacia fines de los años cincuenta, la miniaturización estaba en boga y el acomodar unos cuantos componentes en un chip ----disco pequeño de un material semiconductor que sirve de base para un circuito integrado---- o almacenar información en un microfilm era todo un reto. Por esas fechas, el 29 de diciembre de 1959, el extraordinario físico Richard Feynman, cuya fotografía se presenta en la figura 1, en su célebre plática: Hay mucho espacio en el fondo (Theres Plenty of Room at the Bottom) planteó el problema de manipular y controlar cosas a muy pequeña escala, más allá de la miniaturización...


Author(s):  
Lauren Swiney

Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.


Author(s):  
Kaoutar Sefrioui Boujemaa ◽  
Ismail Berrada ◽  
Khalid Fardousse ◽  
Othmane Naggar ◽  
Francois Bourzeix

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Sims ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo

AbstractPredictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjerk T. Dercksen ◽  
Maria V. Stuckenberg ◽  
Erich Schröger ◽  
Nicole Wetzel ◽  
Andreas Widmann

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