scholarly journals Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Nathan Dhaliwal ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
Social Partners

Sometimes people intervene in others’ conflicts—so called “third-party responding”. In some cases, third parties punish perpetrators; in others, they aid victims. Across 22 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the consequences of this choice between punishment and compensation. What do people infer from, and how do they respond to, the choice of punishment versus compensation? We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.

scholarly journals Why we don’t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heffner ◽  
Oriel FeldmanHall
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Perceived Severity ◽  
Unfair Treatment ◽  
The Social

Abstract While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may also be preferred. Across five studies (N = 1,010) we examine non-punitive methods for restoring justice. We find that in the wake of a fairness violation, compensation is preferred to punishment, and once maximal compensation is available, punishment is no longer the favored response. Furthermore, compensating the victim—as a method for restoring justice—also generalizes to judgments of more severe crimes: participants allocate more compensation to the victim as perceived severity of the crime increases. Why might someone refrain from punishing a perpetrator? We investigate one possible explanation, finding that punishment acts as a conduit for different moral signals depending on the social context in which it arises. When choosing partners for social exchange, there are stronger preferences for those who previously punished as third-party observers but not those who punished as victims. This is in part because third-parties are perceived as relatively more moral when they punish, while victims are not. Together, these findings demonstrate that non-punitive alternatives can act as effective avenues for restoring justice, while also highlighting that moral reputation hinges on whether punishment is enacted by victims or third-parties.

I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATION

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik W. Thulin ◽  
Cristina Bicchieri
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Moral Outrage ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Victim Compensation

Abstract:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated.

scholarly journals The role of perceptual access in infants' third party evaluations of imitation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsey J Powell ◽  
Elizabeth Spelke
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Current Experiment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Partners ◽  
Preverbal Infants

Previous research has demonstrated that preverbal infants have a preference for individuals who imitate their social partners over those who do not. It is unknown, however, if this preference is dependent upon infants’ inference that the imitation reflected an intentional response to the imitator’s social partner. The current experiment addresses this question by asking if infants only prefer individuals who copy their social partner to those who do not when these responding individuals had perceptual access to the partner’s initial behavior. Consistent with this hypothesis, infants were more likely to reach for an imitator than a non-imitator when both had perceptual access to the movements of the social partner to whom they were responding, whereas preferential reaching to the imitator over the non-imitator did not differ from chance when the responders’ access to the partner’s initial behavior was blocked. However, the likelihood of reaching to the imitator did not reliably differ between the two conditions, so the experiment fell short of providing strong evidence that the imitator’s perceptual access to its social partner affects the elicitation of infants’ preferences. We discuss reasons for this potential weakness and ways to remedy it in future experiments.

scholarly journals Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

2022 ◽  
Vol 289 (1966) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Batistoni ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Nichola J. Raihani
Keyword(s):  
Relative Strength ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Direct Test ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Punishment Condition ◽  
Clear Effect ◽  
Experimental Game

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

scholarly journals Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 20140388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bone ◽  
Antonio S. Silva ◽  
Nichola J. Raihani
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Alternative Possibility ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Typical Behaviour ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Number Of Individuals ◽  
Proximate Explanation

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

Let all social partners in the social support process count: New perspectives on classical theory

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu-Qin Yang ◽  
Robert R. Wright ◽  
Liu-Qin Yang ◽  
Lisa M. Kath ◽  
Michael T. Ford ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Support ◽  
Classical Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Partners

Cláusulas de franquicia o deducible en seguros de responsabilidad civil en el Derecho español: Naturaleza y efectos respecto de terceros perjudicados

2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liability ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Insurance Contracts ◽  
Spanish Law ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Legal Nature

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.

Formation of Contract and Third Parties in Cambodia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng
Keyword(s):  
Academic Writing ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Formal Requirements

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.

Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

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