Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

To harass or to respect: the economy of male persistence despite female refusal in a damselfly with scramble mate competition

In sexual conflict, males are often thought to gain fitness benefits from harassing females over mating. Yet when harassment itself incurs costs to males and if alternative, receptive females are available in a local population, theory predicts that when confronted with a female refusal, a male’s choice of persisting or retreating is determined in part by the likelihood of achieving a mating. We tested that prediction in the damselfly Enallagma hageni, whose males compete by intense scramble competition, resulting in widespread mating harassment toward females, which have a high level of control over mating. Using captive individuals of E. hageni in outdoor insectaries, we quantified male persistence in mating after refusals by pre- and post-oviposition focal females whose egg content we quantified after observations. We documented a novel, context-dependent head-turning refusal signal of sexual non-receptivity, most often displayed in tandem pairs by post-oviposition females that typically carried few mature eggs for males to fertilize. Male persistence was less likely to result in mating with post-oviposition females compared with pre-oviposition females carrying a clutch of mature eggs. Accordingly, males were less likely to persist following refusal signals given by post-oviposition females, supporting the theoretical prediction. Compared with a refusal signal known as wing spread, head-turning was significantly more effective in deterring harassing males. Our results suggest that despite on-going sexual conflict over mating, cooperation benefits both sexes when females use the honest signal of non-receptivity because they carry few mature eggs that males could fertilize.

Nest-Building Effort is Not An Indicator of Male Quality In Bonelli’s Eagles, Aquila fasciata

Raptors often use a variety of materials to build their nests (natural, such as branches, but also non-natural objects), presumably due to their insulating properties, their suitability to advertise occupancy of the nest, and to decrease pathogen and parasite loads. The amount of branches used in a nest is an indicator of parental quality and is often associated with increased breeding success. However, in raptors where both sexes collaborate in nest construction, it is unclear whether the effort expended by males (taking the amount of material carried to the nest as the potential predictor) could constitute an honest signal of parental quality to female conspecifics. We examined data on sex, type of material brought to the nest, breeding experience, timing, and nest-building investment prior to egg-laying from 32 identifiable Bonelli’s Eagles (Aquila fasciata) during the pre-laying period to investigate the relative contribution of the sexes to the amount of nest material gathered. We asked: (1) whether the nest-building investment of males could provide information to the females about their quality; and (2) whether the amount of material delivered to the nest by the male was related to breeding success. Despite the considerable investment of males in nest-building during the pre-laying period, our results indicate that this effort is not a consistent indicator of male quality to the female. Therefore, male nest-building behaviour and investment by Bonelli’s Eagles cannot be considered as an extended expression of their phenotype (an extended phenotypic signal). Nest-building behaviour by males in the early and late stages of nest-building, and the fact that males were not significantly more active builders, are discussed in the contexts of signaling nest occupancy to conspecifics and competitors, the decrease of parasite loads, and the strengthening of the pair-bond during the pre-laying period.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Development and genetics of red coloration in the zebrafish relative Danio albolineatus

Animal pigment patterns play important roles in behavior and, in many species, red coloration serves as an honest signal of individual quality in mate choice. Among Danio fishes, some species develop erythrophores, pigment cells that contain red ketocarotenoids, whereas other species, like zebrafish (D. rerio) only have yellow xanthophores. Here, we use pearl danio (D. albolineatus) to assess the developmental origin of erythrophores and their mechanisms of differentiation. We show that erythrophores in the fin of D. albolineatus share a common progenitor with xanthophores and maintain plasticity in cell fate even after differentiation. We further identify the predominant ketocarotenoids that confer red coloration to erythrophores and use reverse genetics to pinpoint genes required for the differentiation and maintenance of these cells. Our analyses are a first step toward defining the mechanisms underlying the development of erythrophore-mediated red coloration in Danio and reveal striking parallels with the mechanism of red coloration in birds.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners

Third-party punishment has been hypothesised to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent. Previous theoretical and empirical work has shown that individuals might escalate signals of cooperative intent when there is competition to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate the hypothesis that competition to be chosen as a social partner leads to escalating investment in third-party punishment. In the same scenario, we also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Investments in third-party helping were higher than investments in third-party punishment – and also exhibited a more robust positive association with audience effects. We did not find a clear effect of partner choice (over and above simply being observed) on either punishment or helping investments. Third-parties who invested more in helping were preferred as partners and were sent more money in a subsequent trust game. Third-party punishers were slightly preferred as interaction partners but less so than third-party helpers. In addition, we found that the amount invested in third-party punishment or helping was a reliable indicator of the individual’s trustworthiness: those who invested more returned a higher proportion of any entrusted amount. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy, but the same was not true for individuals who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of help as a less ambiguous signal of cooperative intent.

Development and genetics of red coloration in the zebrafish relative Danio albolineatus

Animal pigment patterns play important roles in behavior and, in many species, red coloration serves as an honest signal of individual quality in mate choice. Among Danio fishes, some species develop erythrophores, pigment cells that contain red ketocarotenoids, whereas other species, like zebrafish (D. rerio) only have yellow xanthophores. Here, we use pearl danio (D. albolineatus) to assess the developmental origin of erythrophores and their mechanisms of differentiation. We show that erythrophores in the fin of D. albolineatus share a common progenitor with xanthophores and maintain plasticity in cell fate even after differentiation. We further identify the predominant ketocarotenoids that confer red coloration to erythrophores and use reverse genetics to pinpoint genes required for the differentiation and maintenance of these cells. Our analyses are a first step towards defining the mechanisms underlying the development of erythrophore-mediated red coloration in Danio and reveal striking parallels with the mechanism of red coloration in birds.

Males perceive honest information from female released sex pheromone in a moth

There is accumulating evidence that male insects advertise their quality to conspecific females through pheromones. However, most studies of female released sex pheromone assume information transfer regarding merely the species of the female and her mating status. We show that more and precise information is conveyed through the female sex pheromone, positioning it as an honest sexual trait. We demonstrate that females in bad physical conditions (small, starved or old) lay significantly fewer eggs than females in good conditions (large, fed or young). The ratio of the sex pheromone blend in gland extracts of female pink bollworm moths accurately describes the female phenotypic condition whereas the pheromone amount in the glands fails to provide an honest signal of quality. Moreover, males use the female released pheromone blend to choose their mates and approach females that signal higher reproductive potential. In addition, surrogating the female effect, using synthetic pheromone blend that represents that of higher quality females (0.6:0.4 ZZ:ZE) more males were attracted to this blend than to the blend representing the population mean (0.5:0.5 ZZ:ZE). Both, female advertisement for males and the male choosiness, suggest that pheromones have evolved as sexual traits under directional, sexual selection.

Chest beats as an honest signal of body size in male mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei)

Acoustic signals that reliably indicate body size, which usually determines competitive ability, are of particular interest for understanding how animals assess rivals and choose mates. Whereas body size tends to be negatively associated with formant dispersion in animal vocalizations, non-vocal signals have received little attention. Among the most emblematic sounds in the animal kingdom is the chest beat of gorillas, a non-vocal signal that is thought to be important in intra and inter-sexual competition, yet it is unclear whether it reliably indicates body size. We examined the relationship among body size (back breadth), peak frequency, and three temporal characteristics of the chest beat: duration, number of beats and beat rate from sound recordings of wild adult male mountain gorillas. Using linear mixed models, we found that larger males had significantly lower peak frequencies than smaller ones, but we found no consistent relationship between body size and the temporal characteristics measured. Taken together with earlier findings of positive correlations among male body size, dominance rank and reproductive success, we conclude that the gorilla chest beat is an honest signal of competitive ability. These results emphasize the potential of non-vocal signals to convey important information in mammal communication.

Bullshit Ability as an Honest Signal of Intelligence

Navigating social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has formed to meet the unique challenges that emerge for highly social species. Bullshitting, communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies ( N = 1,017), we assess participants’ ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit as an honest signal of their intelligence. We find that bullshit ability is associated with an individual’s intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be more intelligent. We interpret these results as adding evidence for intelligence being geared towards the navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of intelligence.