scholarly journals Cognitive diversity promotes social learning - but only when cognitive differences are obscured

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Guilbeault ◽  
Austin van Loon ◽  
Katharina Lix ◽  
Amir Goldberg ◽  
Sameer Srivastava

Cognitive diversity is often assumed to catalyze creativity and innovation by promoting social learning. Yet the learning benefits of cognitive diversity often fail to materialize. Why does cognitive diversity promote social learning in some contexts but not in others? We propose that the answer partly lies in the complex interplay between cognitive diversity and cognitive homophily: The likelihood of individuals learning from one another, and thus changing their views about a substantive issue, depends crucially on whether they are aware of the cognitive similarities and differences that exist between them. When social identities and cognitive associations about concepts related to a focal issue are obscured, we theorize that cognitive diversity will promote social learning by exposing people to novel ideas. When cognitive diversity is instead made salient, we anticipate that a cognitive homophily response is activated that extinguishes cognitive diversity’s learning benefits---even when social identity cues and other categorical distinctions are suppressed. To evaluate these ideas, we introduce a novel experimental paradigm and report the results of four pre-registered studies (N=1,325) that lend support to our theory. We discuss implications for research on social influence, collective intelligence, and cognitive diversity in groups.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wataru Toyokawa ◽  
Andrew Whalen ◽  
Kevin N. Laland

AbstractWhy groups of individuals sometimes exhibit collective ‘wisdom’ and other times maladaptive ‘herding’ is an enduring conundrum. Here we show that this apparent conflict is regulated by the social learning strategies deployed. We examined the patterns of human social learning through an interactive online experiment with 699 participants, varying both task uncertainty and group size, then used hierarchical Bayesian model-ftting to identify the individual learning strategies exhibited by participants. Challenging tasks elicit greater conformity amongst individuals, with rates of copying increasing with group size, leading to high probabilities of herding amongst large groups confronted with uncertainty. Conversely, the reduced social learning of small groups, and the greater probability that social information would be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated ‘wisdom of the crowd’ effects in other circumstances. Our model-based approach provides evidence that the likelihood of collective intelligence versus herding can be predicted, resolving a longstanding puzzle in the literature.


2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1849) ◽  
pp. 20162744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noa Truskanov ◽  
Arnon Lotem

Understanding how humans and other animals learn to perform an act from seeing it done has been a major challenge in the study of social learning. To determine whether this ability is based on ‘true imitation’, many studies have applied the two-action experimental paradigm, examining whether subjects learn to perform the specific action demonstrated to them. Here, we show that the insights gained from animals' success in two-action experiments may be limited, and that a better understanding is achieved by monitoring subjects' entire behavioural repertoire. Hand-reared house sparrows that followed a model of a mother demonstrator were successful in learning to find seeds hidden under a leaf, using the action demonstrated by the mother (either pushing the leaf or pecking it). However, they also produced behaviours that had not been demonstrated but were nevertheless related to the demonstrated act. This finding suggests that while the learners were clearly influenced by the demonstrator, they did not accurately imitate her. Rather, they used their own behavioural repertoire, gradually fitting it to the demonstrated task solution through trial and error. This process is consistent with recent views on how animals learn to imitate, and may contribute to a unified process-level analysis of social learning mechanisms.


Author(s):  
Csilla Dallos

AbstractRecent scholarship has sought to understand culture by studying attributes of social learning. While celebrating the role of pedagogy and other forms of facilitated learning in human cultural uniqueness, these studies have neglected instances of restricted and prolonged knowledge and skill acquisition. This article analyses illustrative cases of such learning in the ethnographic literature to assess their implications for cultural processes and products. Combined evidence from formal apprenticeship and the informal learning of hunter-gatherers indicates that though enhanced facilitation of learning is undeniable, an exclusive focus on it has resulted in a flawed concept of human culture and its social context. The cases cited suggest that mechanisms to extend learning constitute a vital source of cultural creativity and innovation that should be considered in social learning and culture discussions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Matzler ◽  
Andreas Strobl ◽  
Franz Bailom

Purpose – Under certain conditions, a mass of people can be smarter than the best expert – even if the expert is part of the group. In this paper we show how leaders can improve decision making by tapping into the collective intelligence of their organization. Design/methodology/approach – Based on James Surowiecki’s four conditions of collective intelligence (cognitive diversity, independence, utilization of decentralized knowledge, and effective aggregation of dispersed knowledge), we discuss how leaders can tap into the wisdom of the crowd of their organizations. Findings – We show how leaders can increase cognitive diversity in decision making, access decentralized knowledge in their organizations, encourage individuals to contribute their knowledge without interference from peer pressure, conformity or influence from superiors, and how knowledge can effectively be aggregated to make wiser decisions. Originality/value – While various tools exist to reap the collective intelligence of a group, we argue that leaders also must change their attitudes and leadership styles. Using evidence from various studies and several examples we show what leaders can do to make smarter decisions.


Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Ancell

AbstractIn her recent book, Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that, when evaluated epistemically, “a democratic decision procedure is likely to be a better decision procedure than any non-democratic decision procedures, such as a council of experts or a benevolent dictator” (p. 3). Landemore's argument rests heavily on studies of collective intelligence done by Lu Hong and Scott Page. These studies purport to show that cognitive diversity – differences in how people solve problems – is actually more important to overall group performance than average individual ability – how smart the individual members are. Landemore's argument aims to extrapolate from these results to the conclusion that democracy is epistemically better than any non-democratic rival. I argue here that Hong and Page's results actually undermine, rather than support, this conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the results do not show that democracy is better than any non-democratic alternative, and that in fact, they suggest the opposite – that at least some non-democratic alternatives are likely to epistemically outperform democracy.


Author(s):  
Birgitte Graakjær Hjort

The forming of social identity is a process by which the common identifications of an ingroup, which provide members with a sense of belongingness, are being compared with and differentiated from relevant outgroups. Theories within social anthropology and group psychology contribute to explain this process and the functions of its complex interplay between similarities and differences. The making of comparisons  becomes a competitive act of differentiation, the purpose of which is to achieve or maintain values of the ingroup that are held superior to those of the relevant outgroups. The dispute of the letter to the Galatians is an example of the process and its social competition strategy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina McCarthy ◽  
Chao C. Chen ◽  
Robert C. McNamee

Creativity and innovation have become critical organizational capabilities in today’s global environment, and leveraging creative potential of employees across various cultural contexts has become increasingly important. Although recognized among researchers, cross-cultural differences in creativity are not yet well understood. We contribute to this line of research by constructing a theoretical model that focuses on cultural differences in cognition (i.e., holistic vs. analytic thinking) that affect the evaluation of creative ideas. The cultural cognition perspective allows us to theorize about the interrelationship between an idea’s novelty and its usefulness. We propose that to the extent there is a trade-off between an idea’s novelty and usefulness, cultural differences in cognition will systematically influence the trade-off relationship such that Easterners will perceive a stronger trade-off between novelty and usefulness as compared with their Western counterparts. Such effects of cultural cognition, however, can be reduced by contextual factors of multicultural exposure, cognitive team diversity, and organizational climate for innovation. Our cultural cognition perspective complements the extant cultural value and social norms perspectives on cross-cultural differences in creativity and innovation.


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