THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE: THE GROWING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-51
Author(s):  
N.V. Kravchuk ◽  

The review is focused to the problem of reducing the legitimacy of the EU Court, which is noted in the works of a number of scientists. In this context, the review analyzes court cases concerning the extraterritorial effect of EU law, as well as the observance and protection of human rights, considered by the EU Court in recent years. The positions of the EU Court cause not only criticism of representatives of the academic community, but also resistance of national constitutional courts.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1343-1374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Martinico

Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond “judicial dialogues” and “conflict-and-power” approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a “too welcoming an approach by national constitutional courts to EU law”; on the other hand, it is possible to criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what Komárek calls “parallel references” can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of alternative (or hidden) dialogue, that has favored a sort of “remote dialogue” over the years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komárek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere resistance or to “‘cold’ strategic considerations,” in this work I am going to adopt a much broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere “conflicts and power games.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-302
Author(s):  
Fisnik Korenica ◽  
Dren Doli

The European Union (eu) accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (echr) has been a hot topic in the European legal discourse in this decade. Ruling on the compliance of the Draft Agreement on eu accession to the echr with the eu Treaties, the Court of Justice of the eu (cjeu) came up with a rather controversial Opinion. It ruled that the Draft Agreement is incompliant with the eu Treaties in several respects. One of the core concerns in Opinion 2/13 relates to the management of horizontal relationship between the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR) and echr, namely Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr. The article examines the Opinion 2/13’s specific concerns on the relationship between Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr from a post-accession perspective. It starts by considering the question of the two 53s’ relationship from the eu-law autonomy viewpoint, indicating the main gaps that may present a danger to the latter. While questioning from a number of perspectives the plausibility of the cjeu’s arguments in relation to the two 53s, the article argues that the Court was both controversial and argued against itself when it drew harshly upon these concerns. The article also presents three options to address the cjeu’s requirements on this issue. The article concludes that the cjeu’s statements on the two 53s will seriously hurt the accession project, while critically limiting the possibility of Member States to provide broader protection.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Lieven

Abstract The European Court of Justice clarified through this judgment the way in which the overloading of a Member States’ asylum system affects the EU arrangements for determining the Member State responsible for asylum applications lodged in the EU and thereby drastically reduced the possibility granted to Member States to transfer asylum applicants. The Member States now have an obligation to verify that no serious risk of violation of the Charter rights of the applicant exits in the receiving country before being allowed to transfer the person. The practical consequences of this ruling are still uncertain but further cooperation between Member States should be able to enhance the level of protection of human rights within the Common European Asylum System.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1591-1622
Author(s):  
Mihail Vatsov

The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.


Laws ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Riaan Eksteen

Central to EU law and policies is the protection of human rights. For the European Union (EU), these rights are sacrosanct. Over the years, more substance to the protection of fundamental rights emerged. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is notably entrusted with the protection of human rights and has always deemed it imperative that fundamental rights must be protected within the scope of EU law. The Court has always relied on strong European traditions and values and is guided by the inalienable principle of the rule of law. In the human rights record of the EU, the Kadi cases occupy a special place. The scope of the application of Article 46 is limited, and the application of the Charter is still not used to its full potential, and too few citizens are even aware of it. The Commission intends to present a strategy that would improve the use and awareness of the Charter. By the middle of 2020, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU had become acrimonious. One issue that still begs the conclusion is the status of and protection available to EU citizens living in the UK beyond 31 December 2020. These basic rights of its citizens are not negotiable for the EU.


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