scholarly journals Wybór prawa dla umowy o pracę. Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej z dnia 15 lipca 2021 r. w sprawach połączonych DG, EH c/a SC Gruber Logistics SRL (C-152/20) oraz Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, TD c/a SC Samidani Trans

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 169-190
Author(s):  
Witold Kurowski

This paper comments on a recent ruling concerning the choice of law to the individual employment contract according to the Rome I Regulation. In the judgement in the joined cases C–152/20 and C–218/20 (DG, EH v. SC Gruber Logistics SRL and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, TD v. SC Samidani Trans SRL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided the interpretation of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation on two issues. At first, the EU Court was asked about the freedom of choice of law applicable to the individual employment contract if (a) national law required the inclusion of a clause into that contract under which the contractual provisions are supplemented by national law and (b) the contractual clause concerning that choice was drafted by the employer. The second issue was connected with the concept of the employee’s protection, under which the choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him (her) by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, under the law that would have been applicable to the contract in the absence of choice. Regarding the first question, the CJEU admitted that the parties to an individual employment contract dispose of freedom to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law under a (relevant) national provision, if “the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to that contract”. Secondly, the Court found that the parties to an individual employment contract were “to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer”. Therefore, the CJEU confirmed the application of the rules concerning the choice of law resulting from Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation to the individual employment contracts. Referring to the second issue of the commented ruling, the CJEU confirmed that Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, where the parties have chosen the law governing the individual employment contract, the application of the law that would apply to the contract in the absence of choice must be excluded, with the exception of “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement”, if those provisions offer the employee concerned greater protection than those of the law chosen by the parties. The EU Court underlined that rules on the minimum wage could be treated as “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement” and the law that, in the absence of choice, would be applicable should decide about it. Unfortunately, it is necessary to follow the commented judgment’s justification to correctly understand the concept of an employee’s protection applied in Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation. The thesis of the ruling in this regard seems to be too laconic, and it can be misinterpreted. 

Author(s):  
Graziano Thomas Kadner ◽  
Garcimartín Francisco ◽  
Van Calster Geert

This chapter evaluates European Union perspectives on the Hague Principles. The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations is the most important instrument for determining the law governing international commercial contracts in the EU. It is a legislative act of the European Union and directly applies in all Member States of the European Union except for Denmark. For many issues, the Rome I Regulation is in conformity with the Hague Principles. Where the Hague Principles cover issues that have not yet been explicitly addressed by the Rome I Regulation, such as choice of law clauses in standard forms in Article 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles, the European legislator may very well take the Hague Principles into consideration when amending the Regulation. In fact, the European legislator regularly takes inspiration from international and foreign law when legislating, amending the law, or covering new issues. In academic commentary, it has been suggested that the next revision of the Rome I Regulation shall, for certain issues, indeed take inspiration from the Hague Principles.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 883-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Reichel

One of the reasons for introducing a “Union” citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was to provide a direct channel between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. In contrast to many other international organizations, the role of the individual has been central to the European project since its inception. In its famous 1962 judgment given inVan Gend en Loos,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) underscored the importance of the “vigilance of individuals concerned” seeking to protect their European rights in the new legal order through judicial control.2 The right to directly vote on the representatives of the European Parliament had already been introduced in the 1970s. The citizens of the Member States were thus equipped with two classic forms of political participation even prior to the introduction of Union citizenship: law making and the legal adjudication of individual cases. Nonetheless, whether these channels are sufficient to guarantee the citizens effective democratic means to influence legislation and exercise control of EU institutions in the rather complex multilevel legal system of the EU has been continuously debated.


Teisė ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 132-137
Author(s):  
Beata Bubilaitytė

The purpose of this paper is to explore and to ana­lyse peculiarities of Lithuanian legal regulation of fixed-term employment agreement. Peculiarities are divided into four groups: peculiarities of concept of fixed-term employment agreement, peculiarities of conclusion, performance and expiry of fixed-term employment agreement. Specific essential conditions for conclusion of a fixed-term employment contract are: the term of an employment contract (if the parties to the contract have used both methods to define the term, one of them must be chosen as a prevailing one) and the circumstance that legal acts must allow to conclude it at all. The performance of a fixed-term employment contract according to Lithuanian labour law is not that specific compared to the performance of other employment contracts. Peculiarities of the expiry of fixed-term employment contract are: firstly, only the will to terminate fixed-term employment contract does end the employment contract at all. Otherwise, the expiry of the term of an employment contract will end only the fixed-term employment contract but not the employment contract itself. Secondly, the law does not make it clear, whether restrictions on the termination of an employment contract must be applicable to fixed-term employment agreements. Lithuanian legal doctrine does believe that they should, but Lithuanian Supreme Court says that they should not.


Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Chapter 3 shows that the confluence of the law of the European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights is a European legal order worthy of the name. It outlines the law of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, setting out its principles and the ways in which competences are shared in the EU post Lisbon, between the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter further sets out the outline of the system of rules of the European Union. Then the chapter turns to the characteristics of what has been termed a Europe of human rights, and how the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in conjunction with domestic courts, police the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, the chapter brings together the law of the European Union and the ECHR.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fathi Hussain ◽  
Mahdi Zahraa

Abstract Dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) are the heart of international organisations without which organisations would be ineffective. The European Union (EU) is probably the most effective regional body whose efficacy is largely due to its powerful judicial organ, the Court of Justice (CJEU). This article also examines the DSM available in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in order to assess its effectiveness. It briefly discusses aspects of the EU and CJEU to help provide suggestions to improve the GCC DSM. This article concludes that the GCC DSM lacks effectiveness due to an inherent defect in its DMS organs. This defect is twofold: first, the GCC has yet to establish an effective judicial organ to deal with its disputes; and, second, there is a lack of political will to establish an organ that is vested with a supranational power that can override the individual will of the Member States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-352
Author(s):  
Balingene Kahombo

Abstract This paper reviews the relevance of the Western Sahara cases brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union to international law. These cases relate to the contestations of the consistency of a number of economic agreements concluded between the European Union (EU) and the Kingdom of Morocco, as well as the EU acts that approved them, with the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The issues arising from these disputes include the legality of the Court’s jurisdiction to review the validity of a treaty which is already in force between parties and the rules of international law that the contested legal instruments have violated, perhaps entailing their invalidity under EU law. While the Court has rightly found that none of the aforementioned agreements is applicable to Western Sahara—since their territorial scope does not extend to a territory which is not subject to Moroccan sovereignty——this paper tries to answer a different question as to whether the Court’s decisions are in line with international law. It is demonstrated that though the Court’s competence to rule on the validity of EU unilateral acts is obvious, the establishment of its power to review the validity of a treaty which is in force, such as the fisheries agreement of 2006, is dubious because of the inconsistency of such power with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In any event, the question which remains to be solved—and which was not submitted to the Court—pertains to the determination of the effects of the illegal application of the EU-Morocco agreements to Western Sahara on the rights of its people. It is concluded that such an application has violated the law of occupation and eventually international human rights law. These violations do not touch upon the validity of the contested legal instruments but relate to the question of responsibility for a wrongful act stemming from the illegal application of those agreements to occupied Western Sahara in a manner which is harmful to the interest of its people.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 731-738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt

On December 21, 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed an action brought by the Front Polisario challenging a decision of the Council of the European Union (EU) approving the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom Morocco on the reciprocal liberalization of certain agricultural products. The CJEU held, based on the relevant rules of international law applicable between the EU and Morocco, that the agreement did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara. Apart from its obvious political overtones, the judgment is significant in further developing the CJEU's approach to the law of treaties and the principle of self-determination in international law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 223-236
Author(s):  
Witold Kurowski

The question of the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims is widely discussed in the doctrinal debates. In common opinion, the existing European conflict-of-laws regulations do not provide for a rule governing this issue. In the case BGL BNP Paribas SA v. TeamBank AG Nürnberg (C‑548/18), the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed this gape of the Rome I Regulation.The gloss presents the justification of the European Union Court’s judgment, the reasons for the lack of the uniform conflict-of-laws regulation, and the consequences of this state. It also analyses briefly the European Commission’s proposal for the EU Regulation concerning the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims (COM(2018) 96 final), as a response to this situation. Finally, it examines the appropriate conflict-of-laws rules for proprietary effects of assignments of claims (the law of the assignor’s habitual residence and the law of the assigned claim).


Author(s):  
Kuijper Pieter Jan

This chapter presents a critical analysis of the case law of the European Court of Justice and of the General Court relating to the application of the international law of treaties. It covers the some forty cases in which the Courts have referred explicitly to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, and a few more where this happened implicitly, during the period 1998–2010. Inevitably the emphasis falls on the application of the rules of treaty interpretation to the international agreements concluded by the European Union (EU), but also to the founding treaties of the EU itself. The Courts have been confronted with great regularity with questions relating to the law of treaties and thus have become increasingly sophisticated in their use of it. The recent accusation that the Court is adverse to international law seems to be based on a few dramatic cases, not on the steady stream of smaller cases in which the law of treaties plays a role.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kadner Graziano

The choice of law-rules for contractual obligations is harmonized in the European Union and the system established by the Rome I-Convention has proved its merits.1 The choice of law rules for tortious or delictual liability, on the contrary, is still largely left to the national legislators and courts2 and they differ very much from one country to the other. Two Hague Conventions cover particular issues.3 Neither of them is in force in the UK.


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