The Influence of Political Culture upon Cross-Cultural Misperceptions and Foreign Policy: The United States and Germany

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kalberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Technology Products ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Middle Range ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
The Military

The disagreement between Germany and the United States over thewar in Iraq was massive. During the winter of 2002, many observersspoke of a long-term rift between these longstanding allies and atotal loss of credibility on both sides. No one can doubt, regardlessof recent healing overtures,1 that the German-American partnershiphas been altered and significantly weakened. It has suffered a blowfar more damaging than those that accompanied past conflicts over,for example, Ostpolitik, the neutron bomb, the Soviet gas pipeline,the flow of high technology products to the Soviet Union, the impositionof trade sanctions in 1980 against the military government inPoland, the stationing in the late 1970s of middle-range missiles onGerman soil, and the modernization of short-range missiles in 1989.

Military Technology Races

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Technology ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Distribution ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Military

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.

The United States and Southeast Asia: A Case of Strategic Surrender

1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leszek Buszynski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
United States Policy ◽  
Global Context ◽  
The Soviet Union

Southeast Asia in United States policy fell from a region of high priority during the Vietnam war to become, after the fall of Indochina, an area of relatively minor interest. For the United States, Southeast Asia evoked memories of misperception, intensified over-commitment, and simplistic assumptions that characterized the American effort to defeat local Vietnamese national communism. Since the formulation of the Nixon doctrine of disengagement in 1969, United States policy towards Southeast Asia has been undergoing a process of long-term readjustment in recognition of the exaggerated significance that the region had assumed in American thinking. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was a major stimulus to this readjustment as it gave the Americans compelling reasons to anticipate a reassertion of Soviet influence in the region. Successive American administrations attempted to place the region in a wider global context to avoid the dangers of extreme reaction to local national communism while developing the flexibility to coordinate a response to the Soviet Union at a global level. The main concern of American policy was to remove the basis for direct United States involvement in the region in a way that would satisfy post-Vietnam war public and congressional opinion and the demands of strategic planners for greater freedom of manoeuvre against the Soviet Union.

The Origins of the Cold War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter traces the deterioration of Soviet-American relations at the end of World War II and into the beginning of the cold war. While the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause during World War II in defeating Hitler’s Germany, their relationship began to deteriorate as the eventual defeat of Germany became more certain. The chapter emphasizes that it was growing beliefs about malign Soviet intentions, rather than changes in Soviet capabilities, that fuelled the origins of the cold war. In particular, the chapter details crises in Iran, Turkey, and Germany that contributed to U.S. beliefs about long-term Soviet intentions. As uncertainty evaporated, the enmity of the cold war took hold.

Deterrence in 1939

1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Alexandroff ◽  
Richard Rosecrance
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Time Perspectives ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Time Perceptions

Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the same time perceptions. Britain felt impelled to deter Germany after Prague, but could offer only a long-term deterrent. Germany's short term appeared so favorable that the long-term uncertainties posed by Britain and France failed to restrain her. The experience of 1939 also underlines the importance of political factors, particularly realignment in mutual deterrence. The Russo-German Pact tipped the balance toward war. In the contemporary setting, calculations of time perspectives between the Soviet Union and the United States are important for mutual deterrence, especially in Europe. Changes in the Sino-Soviet split hold further implications for contemporary deterrence.

Demilitarization and Democratization in the Post–World War II World

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Trombley Averill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
United States Occupation ◽  
The Military

This chapter looks at how, in the former Axis powers of Japan and Germany, the United States occupation authorities initially pursued policies that treated democratization and demilitarization as virtually synonymous. They believed a democracy could not flourish in either Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany until the military traditions had been purged from their national character and consciousness. The former aggressors faced total disarmament. Initial plans—embodied most drastically by the Morgenthau Plan to turn Germany into a pastoral country—were severe and uncompromising. However, once the Soviet Union had successfully acquired the atomic bomb, the United States concluded that measured rearmament in both countries was essential for the defense of democracy and the free world.

Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss ◽  
James USN (Ret.) Stavridis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
White House ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Environment ◽  
Effective Instrument ◽  
The 1960S

The changing international environment of the 1960s made it possible to attain détente, a relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Back-channel diplomacy—confidential contacts between the White House and the Kremlin, mainly between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin—transformed that possibility into reality. This book argues that although back-channel diplomacy was useful in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the short term by acting as a safety valve and giving policy-actors a personal stake in improved relations, it provided a weak foundation for long-term détente. This book traces the evolution of confidential channels during the Nixon administration and examines certain flashpoints in U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis, Sino-American rapprochement, and the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Moscow’s support for Hanoi remained constant irritants in U.S.-Soviet relations. The back-channel relationships allowed both sides to agree to disagree and paved the way for the Moscow Summit of May 1972. This focused examination of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy mitigates some of criticisms levied against Nixon and Kissinger in their secretive conduct of diplomacy by showing that back channels were both necessary and an effective instrument of policy. However, back channels worked best when they supplemented rather than replaced more traditional diplomacy.

scholarly journals INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 2(13)/2019 (2(13)/2019) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Adam KUŹ
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Interwar Period ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Right

The purpose of the paper is to answer the question: what is the main reason why the Central and Eastern Europe countries did not enter into fruitful and long-term cooperation both in the interwar period and after the collapse of the Soviet Union despite a far-reaching commonality of interests? Conflicts between these countries are not decisive factors in their lack of integration. The degree of integration is proportional to the degree of involvement in Central and Eastern Europe of powers that could act as an external hegemony. In the interwar period, the United States, England and France, and after 1989, the United States had the right potential to undertake such a task in its interest. None of them, however, took up such a role in the long run. Attempts to integrate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to date, starting from the Versailles conference, indicate that the American protectorate is a necessary factor for implementing closer forms of cooperation between these countries.

scholarly journals POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN 1979-1989 AD AS A MODEL

2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (07) ◽  
pp. 215-225
Author(s):  
Alghalia Salim AL-MUGHAIRI
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
The United States ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
Soviet Occupation ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Military

The research deals with the study of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the period from 1979 to 1989 as an example of the political relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, where the world witnessed the outbreak of the Cold War between the two poles: the Soviet Union and the United States of America after the end of World War II in 1945 AD, and both of these two great powers were keen to highlight Its dominance in various aspects, especially the military, and this war received strong and strict international reactions, and the United States of America was one of the most prominent countries that condemned this war and demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. The research aims to shed light on the roots of the interest of Russia and then the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and focus on the reasons that prompted the Soviet Union to launch war on Afghanistan and follow the events of the war and its escalation between 1979 and 1989 and focus on some international attitudes towards the war, especially the United States of America, and also clarify the reasons for the withdrawal of forces The Soviet Union of Afghanistan and its consequences. The research adopts the descriptive historical method, which was employed in deriving historical facts and talking about all aspects covered by the study, and the analytical method that was used in analyzing the information of documents and texts, and comparing them to reach information related to the subject of the study.

Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Don Ward
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Marked Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Continuous Time Model ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Time Model ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
The Military

This article presents a model of arms expenditures and arms accumulation for the Soviet Union and United States from 1952 through 1978. It argues that contemporary superpowers do not react solely to the military budgets of one another in assessing the potential threat against which they must allocate military resources, i.e., in deciding upon the military budget. Rather, they respond primary to the relative balance of strategic and conventional military forces. A continuous time model of this process is developed and estimated. If one examines only the budgets of these two nations, it would appear that no race is occurring; rather, the Soviets are simply increasing their arms expenditures irrespective of what the United States does. However, when one examines the relative stocks of military capabilities, it appears that the USSR is racing to catch up to the United States. Finally, the dynamics governing arms competition between the United States and the USSR appear to be undergoing marked change.

scholarly journals Polish Peculiarities? Military Loyalty During the 1980-1981 Solidarity Crisis

1999 ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Elizabeth P. Coughlan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Martial Law ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

On December 13, 1981, the Polish military under the leadership of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law, effectively ending sixteen months of popular protest and bargaining between the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and the independent trade union Solidarity. In the West, and particularly in the United States, martial law was interpreted as the Polish military declaring war on its own people on the orders of the Soviet Union. It was assumed and repeatedly asserted that the military was loyal to the Communist Party and to the Soviet high command, that they were little more than communists in uniform.  Such an assertion, however, leaves one hard pressed to explain the acquiescence of the militaries across Eastern Europe to the changes of 1989 and the ability of those militaries to adapt to noncommunist regimes to the point of being willing and even eager to join NATO.

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