scholarly journals Enativismo e conhecimento prático

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa Gomes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
Hubert Dreyfus

Em Ser e Tempo (1927), Heidegger argumenta que o conhecimento primordial do Dasein se dá no manuseio de entes mundanos. Merleau-Ponty, por sua vez, descreve na Fenomenologia da Percepção (1945) que o conhecimento é, antes de tudo, uma intencionalidade corporal intraduzível em termos proposicionais. Mais tarde, em What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Hubert Dreyfus usa a obra de ambos para apontar os equívocos do paradigma cognitivista, isto é, a abordagem dominante do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Finalmente, em The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991), a noção de enativismo - elaborada por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosch - surge como uma tentativa de tomar do cognitivismo e do conexionismo a hegemonia nas ciências cognitivas. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em descrever o enativismo e apontar sua herança fenomenológica.

scholarly journals Mindfulness y la intersubjetividad normada como dos productos disímiles del pensamiento autopoiético

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano Esteban Saulig
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Mindfulness Practice ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
Biological Efficacy ◽  
Common Basis ◽  
Palabras Clave

Resumen Se analizarán comparativamente los planteos y bases filosóficas de Samaja y Varela, Thompson y Rosch con el objetivo de señalar los diversos caminos de reflexión que ambas perspectivas delinean a pesar de tener una base común en el pensamiento autopoiético desarrollado por Maturana y Varela. En esta dirección, el autor argentino se centra en la importancia de la subjetividad normada en tanto herramienta para liberar a las sociedades de la eficacia biológica, mientras que los autores de De cuerpo presente se enfocan en la práctica mindfulness como instrumento para corporizar a la falta de fundamento. Palabras Clave: autopoiesis – enacción - mindfulness Abstract The different theoretical positions to which Samaja and Varela, Thompson and Rosch arrive, despite having a common basis in the autopoietic approach proposed by Maturana and Varela, will be analyzed comparatively. In this direction, the argentine author focuses on the importance of normative subjectivity as a tool to liberate societies from biological efficacy, whereas the authors of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience direct their attention to mindfulness practice as a way to embody groundlessness. Keywords: autopoiesis – enaction - mindfulness  

scholarly journals The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Basu
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Embodied Mind

A review of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, by Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, 1991. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 308pp. ISBN 0262720213. $30.00 USD.

Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Leonardo ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 337
Author(s):  
Simon Penny ◽  
Francisco J. Varela ◽  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Eleanor Rosch
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Embodied Mind

scholarly journals PERCEPÇÃO E ENATIVISMO EM MERLEAU-PONTY E FRANCISCO VARELA

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa Gomes
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Embodied Mind

A percepção, argumenta Merleau-Ponty, deve ser entendida menos como uma representação de inputs desassociados e mais como uma apreensão corporal irrefletida de Gestalten. Tal formulação encontra continuidade no contexto das ciências cognitivas na crítica ao representacionismo efetivada pelo paradigma do enativismo, assim formulado por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosche em Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991). Demonstrar e examinar a abordagem enativista, apontando sua harmonia com a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty, constitui o objetivo do presente artigo.

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

1993 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Dennett ◽  
Francisco J. Varela ◽  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Eleanor Rosch
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Embodied Mind

What Do We Mean “Human Experience”?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco J. Varela ◽  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Eleanor Rosch
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Human Activities ◽  
Mindfulness Meditation ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
The Self ◽  
Direct Experience ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Buddhist Doctrine ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
Human Embodiment

This chapter examines human experience. It is necessary to have a disciplined perspective on human experience that can enlarge the domain of cognitive science to include direct experience. Such a perspective already exists in the form of mindfulness/awareness meditation. Mindfulness/awareness practice, phenomenological philosophy, and science are human activities; each is an expression of human embodiment. The chapter then looks at the Buddhist method of examining experience called mindfulness meditation. Mindfulness/awareness meditation can provide a natural bridge between cognitive science and human experience. Particularly impressive is the convergence among some of the main themes of Buddhist doctrine, phenomenology, and cognitive science—themes concerning the self and the relation between subject and object.

scholarly journals A Body of Knowledge: The Role of Human Experience and the Living Body in Knowing

2020 ◽  
pp. 002216782097450
Author(s):  
Magali Ollagnier-Beldame
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Ways Of Knowing ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Major Topic ◽  
Living Body ◽  
Knowledge Processes ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Experiential Research

The study of ways of knowing is a major topic in psychology and cognitive science. However, one might argue that subjectivity and human experience as roots of knowing are seldom addressed, despite the perspectives that they may offer. Our work investigates the epistemic status of experience and the living body in knowledge processes. It asserts that human experience contains a myriad richness and argues that a first-person epistemology and precise methods are needed to genuinely conduct experiential research. The stakes of such a proposal are not only epistemological but also nourish an ethical and societal goal.

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