Civility, Education, and the Embodied Mind—Three Approaches

In this paper I explore conceptions of the embodied mind or heart-mind in three major global traditions: the Chinese (Confucian and Daoist) teachings on inner cultivation, especially the integration of hot and cold cognition (Slingerland 2014); the idea of sophrosyne or self-regulation in accord with wisdom that has long been the chief educational ideal of the Greek cultural cosmos; and the Buddhist-inspired idea of mindfulness which is now finding increasing applications in education. All three, I suggest, agree on a for our contemporary debates crucial point: that the reliably “civil” person is one whose moral development has matured to a point where their intellectual and moral capacities, their heart and mind (or “heart-mind”), achieve a degree of balanced integration. As the commonalities of these traditions are coming into view to a global community of education, we have a perhaps a new opportunity to recover a deeper sense of education that goes beyond the mere technical and instrumental competence that now preoccupies educational thought in many national and international influential reform projects.

The Mind Is a DJ: Rhythmic Entrainment in Beatmatching and Embodied Temporal Processing

In music, rhythmic entrainment occurs when the attention and body movements of listeners, dancers and musicians become synchronized with the beat. This synchronization occurs due to the mechanisms of phase and period correction. Here, I describe what happens to these mechanisms during beatmatching—a central skill in DJing that involves synchronizing the beats of two records on a set of turntables. Via the enactivist approach to the embodied mind, I argue that beatmatching affords a different form of entrainment that requires more conscious control of and embodied operationalization of temporal error correction, and thus provides a vivid model of the embodied distribution of rhythmic entrainment.

Human Synchronization Maps—The Hybrid Consciousness of the Embodied Mind

We examine the theoretical implications of empirical studies developed over recent years. These experiments have explored the biosemiotic nature of communication streams from emotional neuroscience and embodied mind perspectives. Information combinatorics analysis enabled a deeper understanding of the coupling and decoupling dynamics of biosemiotics streams. We investigated intraindividual and interpersonal relations as coevolution dynamics of hybrid couplings, synchronizations, and desynchronizations. Cluster analysis and Markov chains produced evidence of chimaera states and phase transitions. A probabilistic and nondeterministic approach clarified the properties of these hybrid dynamics. Thus, multidimensional theoretical models can represent the hybrid nature of human interactions.

Boltanski’s dilemma: Mimetics, distance and spectating suffering

Working from the Crucifixion episode or pageant from the York Corpus Christi Play, two questions were asked of the spectator: <list list-type="simple"> <list-item><label>1.</label>How do they look at such a theatre (scene) from their own time and culture and experiences?</list-item> <list-item><label>2.</label>How do we look at such a theatre (scene) from our own time and culture and experiences?</list-item></list>A third question may now be asked by following what we may call ‘Boltanski’s dilemma’: what sort of pity can we really feel for an imaginary scene on the stage? This article will revisit the earlier piece (2010) as archive material to develop key themes now encapsulated by Boltanski’s question and challenge. The article will draw on current neuro-cognitive research that challenges and re-grounds our understanding of empathy and projection of self in the embodied mind. This informs the spectatorial experience, the spectator’s ability to see and accept the ‘double reality’ of the theatre and other visual (mimetic) experience, and the issues of ‘moral distance’ represented by Boltanski, Bandura and others. Boltanski’s dilemma confronts us as knowing spectators with the inherent ethical paradox of any and all representations of suffering in any given cultural and social context. The article will draw on case studies from theatre(s), film and art to illustrate and exemplify the position of the spectator: in the spirit of ethos, a series of musings, of questions and signposts as well as arguments.

‘The Opium-Eater Boasteth Himself to be a Philosopher’: Bodily Subjection and Intellectual Self-fashioning in De Quincey's 1821 ‘Confessions’

De Quincey's assertion in the 1821 ‘Confessions’ that the effects of opium were ‘always, and in the highest degree, to excite and stimulate the system’, establishes him in contemporary medical discourse as a follower of Brunonianism. Yet, against this indubitably pharmacological and bodily strain, the ‘Confessions’ also insists upon an intellectual aspect to the opium-eater's dreaming, his ability to dream imaginatively. This essay seeks to relate these discursive tensions in De Quincey, rooted in Enlightenment ideas of the human nervous system held in equilibrium, to his self-presentation as an addict and a philosopher in his autobiographical writings, and to his critical thinking. As I argue, the physiological theory of Brunonianism in the ‘Confessions’ is complemented by an equal emphasis on moral and intellectual development embedded in the ideas of Hartleian psychology which provide a balancing view of body and (embodied) mind in De Quincey's thinking.

Withering Minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia

A prominent view on personal identity over time, Jeff McMahan’s ‘Embodied Mind Account’ (2002) holds that we cease to exist only once our brains can no longer sustain the basic capacity to uphold consciousness. One of the many implications of this view on identity persistence is that we continue to exist throughout even the most severe cases of dementia, until our consciousness irreversibly shuts down. In this paper, I argue that, while the most convincing of prominent accounts of personal identity over time, McMahan’s account faces serious challenges in explanatory power of dementias and related neurodegenerative conditions. Particularly, this becomes visible in the face of emerging methods for neural tissue regeneration, and the possibility of ‘re-emerging patients’. I argue that medical professionals’ neglecting qualitative aspects of identity risks resulting in grave misunderstandings in decision-making processes, and ethically objectionable outcomes in future practices. Finally, I propose revisions which could potentially salvage the great benefits that Embodied Mind Theory still can bring to the field of dementia care in terms of understanding life, death, and identity across the lifespan.

Leib, Seele und Subjektivität nach Nietzsche. Internationale Perspektiven auf ein Problem im Wandel

Nietzsche’s reflection on the constitution of human subjectivity is an essential moment of his philosophy. As historical and academic conditions change, distinct interpretations of this reflection often contradict each other. This review essay aims to offer an insight into this situation. The anthology edited by Dries, which focuses on the concepts of “consciousness” and the “embodied mind,” presents innovative readings from the perspective of the philosophy of mind. However, this collection is marred by an insufficient comparison with the embodiment debate. Second, Benne and Muller’s volume shows how the concepts of “person” and “personality” are used by Nietzsche to describe the complexity of human subjectivity after the dissolution of the metaphysical subject. Third, Papparo’s monograph denotes with clarity the positive and productive aspects of the concept of soul in Nietzsche, but it is unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. Finally, Scandella’s book succeeds on the contrary in highlighting some significant themes that have been overlooked in previous contributions. From a theoretical point of view, this review points out some shortcomings of the naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche, which seem inadequate not only to grasp the complexity of his conception of human subjectivity, but also to show its actuality.

Edith Stein (1891–1942)

In this chapter, Edith Stein offers an analysis of empathy with others, which she sees as a fundamental trait of the human being. In her view, empathy is a condition of possibility for sociality and sympathy, rather than the other way around. She grounds empathy in human embodiment, more precisely in the way in which the human being is embodied mind and minded body. Stein’s work on empathy represents a pathbreaking contribution to phenomenology and shows how she makes active use of and goes beyond the works of Edmund Husserl, Alexander Pfänder, and others.

Leib, Seele und Subjektivität nach Nietzsche. Internationale Perspektiven auf ein Problem im Wandel

Nietzsche’s reflection on the constitution of human subjectivity is an essential moment of his philosophy. As historical and academic conditions change, distinct interpretations of this reflection often contradict each other. This review essay aims to offer an insight into this situation. The anthology edited by Dries, which focuses on the concepts of “consciousness” and the “embodied mind,” presents innovative readings from the perspective of the philosophy of mind. However, this collection is marred by an insufficient comparison with the embodiment debate. Second, Benne and Müller’s volume shows how the concepts of “person” and “personality” are used by Nietzsche to describe the complexity of human subjectivity after the dissolution of the metaphysical subject. Third, Papparo’s monograph denotes with clarity the positive and productive aspects of the concept of soul in Nietzsche, but it is unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. Finally, Scandella’s book succeeds on the contrary in highlighting some significant themes that have been overlooked in previous contributions. From a theoretical point of view, this review points out some shortcomings of the naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche, which seem inadequate not only to grasp the complexity of his conception of human subjectivity, but also to show its actuality.

The Non-identity Problem and the Psychological Account of Personal Identity

According to the psychological account of personal identity, our identity is based on the continuity of psychological connections, and so we do not begin to exist until these are possible, some months after conception. This entails the psychological account faces a challenge from the non-identity problem—our intuition that someone cannot be harmed by actions that are responsible for their existence, even if these actions seem clearly to cause them harm. It is usually discussed with regard to preconception harms, but in the context of the psychological account, it is also applicable to prenatal harms. Inflicting prenatal injury is widely thought to be morally impermissible, but if the injury is identity-determining on the psychological account, then no-one seems to be harmed—rather, the injury is responsible for bringing them into existence. Here, I argue that identity-determining injuries can routinely occur on the psychological account, and that this undermines the account. I assess Nicola Williams’ proposal to salvage the account based on a trans-world account of personal identity, and show that it is unsuccessful. I then show that Jeff McMahan’s embodied mind account of personal identity is also susceptible. I conclude that identity-determining prenatal injuries pose a significant challenge for the psychological account and its variants, and provide a reason for supporting alternative accounts that fix personal identity at conception.