Organizational visualization of electronic commerce

2000 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
Shouhong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Electronic Commerce ◽  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Organizational Development ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Organizational Analysis ◽  
Visualization Method ◽  
Network Organizations ◽  
Development And Management

In the age of electronic commerce, the development of new network organizational forms has brought into practice transaction cost economics, inter-organizational collaborations, and strategic alliance. The development and management of network organizations are assisted by organizational analysis. This paper proposes an organizational visualization method for organizational analysis. The organizational visualization method is comprehensive in modeling a formal organizational structure for electronic commerce. It can be a practical technique for structural and process approaches to organizational development for electronic commerce.

scholarly journals THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE (ISA): AN ASSESSMENT OF TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND ALLIANCE OUTCOMES

2016 ◽  
pp. 178-187
Author(s):  
А. VASICHEVA.
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Statistical Methods ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Key Factors

One way to achieve successful functioning of strategic alliance is to ensure that partner firms are satisfied. The main task of this research is to measure the interrelationship and correlations between strategic alliance motivations, transaction cost economics, and its strategic alliance outcomes. The main goal is to identify the key factors that influence the economics of strategic alliance. Four hypotheses were tested. The data was assessed using different statistical methods. The positive outcomes significantly outweigh the negative ones.

From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-81
Author(s):  
D. P. Frolov
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Transactional Analysis ◽  
Transaction Sector ◽  
Transaction Value

The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

Governance of supplier-customer relations: An empirical review

2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Customer Relations ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Forest Industry ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Relational Exchange ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Relational Exchange Theory

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.

Ronald Coase and the Difference between Markets and Firms

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham A. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Tabular Form ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Marginal Revolution ◽  
The Way

This chapter reviews the development of transaction cost economics and unpacks its theory of the firm. The chapter begins with the marginal revolution in economics and how it altered the way economists understood the corporation. It then reviews the work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, explaining how they provided a novel account of firms. Transaction cost economics emphasizes how firms use hierarchy and bureaucracy to overcome problems of opportunism and asset-specific investment to coordinate some types of economic activity more efficiently than markets can. The transaction cost account of the corporation’s productivity component is shown in tabular form in comparison with its historical forerunners reviewed in the previous chapter.

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