State-owned company: Detection Zone of Government Failure or market Failure?

2015 ◽  
pp. 45-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Radygin ◽  
Y. Simachev ◽  
R. Entov
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Detection Zone ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Owned Company ◽  
Direct Government

This article analyzes state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market interactions in the context of modern approaches to the study of government failures and market failures, as well as the conditions of the system of private property rights rooting. Besides the general theoretical consideration of the costs of functioning of state-owned companies, the authors refer to the specific experience of the Russian economy, consistently analyzing the opportunities and palliatives of the current privatization policy, the experience of establishment and the risks of functioning of state corporations. Particular attention is paid to the problem of limited motivation to improve the institutional environment in general and, on the contrary, the expansion of the practice of direct government intervention in order to solve the problems of economic development. The authors also consider specific areas where there is a restriction of private property rights in connection with the expansion of the public sector, de jure and de facto.

scholarly journals Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Jankovic ◽  
Walter Block
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Central Planning ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Failure Theories

Abstract We develop a critique of government interventionism based on the Misesian calculation argument against socialism. If private property rights and relative prices based on supply and demand are necessary for successful economic coordination, then conventional market failure theories cannot be sustained. Government interventionism based on the idea of correcting “market failures” is analytically just a milder form of socialist central planning. Between the two, there are only differences in degree, not in kind. We criticize several public choice and law and economics scholars for disregarding this Misesian angle in their market failure theories. In our view they are reducible to arguments based on a fallacious political economy while perpetuating false neoclassical economic analysis of market failure theorists. We claim that government interventionism is just a milder form of socialist central planning. Therefore, the traditional arguments against the efficiency of central planning also apply to government interventions aiming at fixing market failures. In particular, we maintain that governments face the “knowledge problem”, which means that they cannot determine the optimal allocation of resources. In section two of this paper we discuss market failure and economic calculation. Section three is given over to our claim that the “Nirvana fallacy” is itself fallacious. The burden of section four is to address Coase and consequences. We conclude in section five.

scholarly journals Private Property Rights, Dynamic Efficiency and Economic Development: An Austrian Reply to Neo-Marxist Scholars Nieto and Mateo on Cyber-Communism and Market Process

Economies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
William Hongsong Wang ◽  
Victor I. Espinosa ◽  
José Antonio Peña-Ramos
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Information And Communication Technologies ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Market Process ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Austrian Theory

The Austrian school economics and neo-Marxist theories both have been reviving in recent years. However, the current academic discussion lacks a debate between two schools of economics with diametrically opposed views. This paper is the first and an initial Austrian challenge to Neo-Marxist scholars Nieto and Mateo’s argumentation that cyber-communism and the Austrian theory of dynamic efficiency are consistent to enhance economic development. Their argument focuses on two issues: (a) the existence of circular reasoning in the Austrian theory of dynamic efficiency, and (b) dynamic efficiency and full economic development could be strongly promoted in a socialist system through new information and communication technologies (ICT) and the democratization of all economic life. While cyber-communism refers to cyber-planning without private property rights through ICT, dynamic efficiency refers to the entrepreneurs’ creative and coordinative natures. In this paper, first, we argue that the hypothesis that dynamic efficiency and cyber-communism is not compatible. Contrary to the above cyber-communist criteria, the Austrian theory of dynamic efficiency argues that to impede private property rights is to remove the most powerful entrepreneurial incentive to create and coordinate profit opportunities, the entrepreneurial incentives to create and coordinate profit opportunities are removed to identify human problems and the ability and willingness to solve them. Second, we argue that the cyber-communism system is inconsistent with economic development. In this regard, we explain how the institutional environment can cultivate or stifle dynamic efficiency and economic development. Having briefly outlined the central argument of Nieto and Mateo, we examine the institutional arrangement supporting cyber-communism. After that, we evaluate the implications of cyber-communism in the dynamic efficiency process. It becomes manifest that Nieto and Mateo’s accounts are too general to recognize the complexity of how economic development works.

Equità, efficienza e diritti di proprietà

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-190
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Clerico
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Right

Abstract Because of the market failures private property rights not always are such to obtain socially acceptable outcomes through the exchange. To guarantee social welfare the policy maker usually limits the property rights. Such limitations concern: the existence of the private property rights in itself; the right of transferring and exchanging the above mentioned; the right of discretionary use of the private property.The restrictions to private property rights are motivated by efficiency and equity. On the efficiency side the public policy can be set up by three reasons: presence of externalities; existence of imperfect information; difficulties to coordinate economic activity and exchange.Efficiency and equity are obviously affected by any restriction of the property rights. We face the fact that often the equity aim is not a universal aim but instead a particular one restricted to some social group. On the equity side public policy claims its right to intervene particularly when the right holder earns pure profits limitative of the consumer welfare and exploits his market power.Any restriction to private property rights is either a source of benefits for people not paying the relative cost or a cause of cost for people not enjoying any benefit. Ideally it would be necessary either to levy a tax or to give a subsidy in order to bring back the initial welfare conditions. This rarely happens above all because of tangled effects and transaction costs.

Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, and Institutional Change

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Clark
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Relative Prices ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Land Owners ◽  
The Rich

Common property rights were widespread in English agriculture for at least 600 years. Since privatizing common fields allegedly produced huge profits in the eighteenth century, common land owners seemingly squandered 15 percent of potential income for generations. Ingenious explanations have been produced for this market failure. This article argues for a simple, brutal resolution. Common fields survived because enclosure was generally unprofitable before 1750, when changing relative prices made private property rights marginally more efficient. Then people responded quickly to modest profits. The rich gains from enclosure existed only in the imaginings of wild-eyed eighteenth century agrarian reformers.

LAND PLOT AS AN OBJECT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav Vovk
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Land Management ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Land Plot ◽  
Government Supervision

Russia is a resource-rich country, and great changes are being made today in order that land and its resources are used for the benefit of any citizen of our state. Under the circumstances government supervision (control) over the optimal use of territories gets the essential role. The rights that are contained in land reform give owners, landowners, land users, and employers extensive powers concerning independent land management.

Konsep Distribusi Pendapatan Dalam Islam

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Moh. Ah. Subhan ZA
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
The State ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Distribution Of Income

The main problem of social life in the community is about how to make the allocation and distribution of income well. Inequality and poverty basically arise not because of the difference of anyone’s strength and weakness in getting livelihood, but because of inappropriate distribution mechanism. With the result that wealth treasure just turns on the rich wealthy, which is in turn, results in the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.Therefore, a discussion on distribution becomes main focus of theory of Islamic economics. Moreover, the discussion of the distribution is not only related to economic issues, but also social and political aspects. On the other side, the economic vision of Islam gives priority to the guarantee of the fulfillment of a better life. Islam emphasizes distributive justice and encloses, in its system, a program for the redistribution of wealth and prosperity, so that each individual is guaranteed with a respectable and friendly standard of living. Islam recognizes private property rights, but the private property rights must be properly distributed. The personal property is used for self and family livelihood, for investment of the working capital, so that it can provide job opportunities for others, for help of the others through zakat, infaq, and shodaqoh. In this way, the wealth not only rotates on the rich, bringing on gap in social life.The problem of wealth distribution is closely related to the welfare of society. Therefore, the state has a duty to regulate the distribution of income in order that the distribution can be fair and reaches appropriate target. The state could at least attempt it by optimizing the role of BAZ (Badan Amil Zakat) and LAZ (Lembaga Amil Zakat) which has all this time been slack. If BAZ and LAZ can be optimized, author believes that inequality and poverty over time will vanish. This is because the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim.

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