International Economic Institutions, Institutional Complementarities and Institutionalized Linkages. The International Trade Case

2011 ◽  
pp. 67-90
Author(s):  
Maurizio Mistri
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Procedural Rationality ◽  
Institutional Complementarity

This paper analyses the forces at the base of the formation processes of international economic institutions following the fundamental New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach. In particular, the paper assumes that new international economic institutions respond to a principle of procedural rationality. This principle indicates that the formation of institutions takes place in an environment dominated by the bounded rationality of agents that produce institutions based on procedural knowledge accumulated over time. Particular attention is dedicated to the relationship between institutional innovation and economic growth. Specialized institutions stem from this relation, on par with the real economy, and generate more and more complex institutional systems. Within the institutionalist approach to the formation of institutions, the paper highlights Aoki's concepts on "institutionalized linkages" and "institutional complementarity"; these concepts are then correlated to Schelling's "strategy decomposition" concept; subsequently the forces that lead to institutional changes (Aoki and North) are analyzed. Specifically, in light of North's approach, conditions are analyzed that determine changes in institutions governing international trade relations deriving from changes in some structural dimensions such as relative price systems. These changes are possible since governments can renegotiate original agreements giving rise to compensations.

scholarly journals An Economic Analysis of the Perception of ‘Grief’ in the Letter to Philippians in the Light of New Institutional Economics (NIE)

Scrinium ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19
Author(s):  
Alex Hon Ho Ip
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Textual Evidence ◽  
One Step ◽  
Informal Rules

Abstract Beginning with Paul Holloway’s view that the letter to Philippians is a letter of consolation aimed at comforting the “grief” of the grieving among the Philippi community, this paper argues one step further that the grief in the community is a problem of perception, with the help of new institutional economics (NIE). The primary reason for the divergence in perception is due to living in the Roman colony, the believing community was greatly affected by the values embedded in both formal and informal rules of the economy. In order to justify this view, this paper will, first, demonstrate the textual evidence showing that Paul’s major concern is the perception of believing community. Then, with the help of NIE, I will show how the formal and informal economic institutions of the Roman colony might constitute a perception that is very different from what Paul would expect.

Ideology, interest groups, and institutional change: the case of the British prohibition of wages in kind

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELAINE S. TAN
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Industrial Workers ◽  
Relative Prices ◽  
Social Ideology ◽  
Legislative Changes

The new institutional economics has emphasized the importance of ideology in determining the content and direction of institutional change. Ideology can also determine when interest groups succeed in achieving legislative favor. The case of the regulation of in-kind wages in Britain shows that factors highlighted in mainstream political economy (such as interest group strength and organization, self-interest of legislators, and coalitional partners) were important. However, the interaction between relative price changes and social ideology was also significant in explaining the shape and timing of legislative changes. Changes in relative prices gave labor groups the incentive to seek legal protection from non-monetary wages, but they obtained protection only if they met certain criteria established by the prevailing ideology. Changes to that ideology resulted in further legislative changes granting cash wages to most industrial workers.

scholarly journals Theory of institutions by the New Institutional Economics and institutional economic reforms in Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (Q5) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
An Quoc Chau
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Institutional Economic

Economic institutions play an indispensable role in creating an impetus for economic development. Although the concepts of institutions and economic institutions are not new in Vietnam, their connotation and nature remain controversial. This paper aims to clarity the connotation and the nature of institutions and economic institutions, thereby reflecting their roles in economic development. On the basis of the theoretical background, the study evaluates the qu lity of Vietn m’s e onomi institutions n offers suggestions so as to increase their quality.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

El Prestige: comparativa de los regímenes internacionales de responsabilidad civil

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Raquel Fernández González ◽  
Marcos Íñigo Pérez Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Geographical Area ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Rigorous Analysis ◽  
Judicial Process ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Civil Responsibility ◽  
The One ◽  
High Degree ◽  
The Prestige

The return of institutions to the main research agenda has highlighted the importance of rules in economic analysis. The New Institutional Economics has allowed a better understanding of the case studies that concern different areas of knowledge, also the one concerning the management of natural resources. In this article, the institutional analysis focuses on the maritime domain, where two large civil liability regimes for pollution coexist (OPA 90-IMO), each in a different geographical area (United States - Europe). Therefore, a comparative analysis is made between the two large regimes of civil responsibility assignment applying them to the Prestige catastrophe. In this way, the allocation and distribution of responsibilities in the investigation and subsequent judicial process of the Prestige is compared with an alternative scenario in which the applicable compensation instruments are governed by the provisions of the Oil Polution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), in order to establish a rigorous analysis on the effects that the different norms can have in the same scenario. In the comparative established in the case of the Prestige, where the responsibilities were solved very slowly in a judicial process with high transaction costs, the application of rules governed by the OPA 90 would not count with such a high degree of imperfection. This is so, since by applying the preponderance of the evidence existing in OPA 90 there would be no mitigation for the presumed culprits. On the other hand, the agents involved in the sinking would not be limited only to the owner, but also that operators or shipowners would be responsible as well. In addition, the amount of compensation would increase when counting in the damage count the personal damages, the taxes without perceiving and the ecological damage caused in a broad sense, damages not computable in the IMO.

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