scholarly journals Unmixing the mixed questions: a framework for distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law in contractual interpretation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Bertolini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Cognitive Task ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, the Supreme Court of Canada established that contractual interpretation generally involves questions of mixed fact and law subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error, unless an extricable error of law is identified. The Court confirmed and specified this holding in a number of subsequent decisions. The new approach to appellate deference has sparked criticism from various parties in the legal community. A tension has emerged between the Supreme Court shifting away from the historical common law approach to deference and the appellate courts’ attempts to restore it. This article examines the theoretical foundations of this new case law development and proposes a methodological framework for distinguishing between questions of law and question of fact in contractual interpretation. The ultimate goal is to provide guidance on the choice of the appropriate standard of appellate review in this area. First, it is argued that the recent case law development introduced by the Supreme Court lacks rigorous analytical foundations and fails to provide adequate guidance on choosing the appropriate degree of deference on appeal. Second, it is contended that a useful methodological approach for distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law is 1) to identify the cognitive task performed by the judge when adjudicating the contended issue, and 2) to assess the relative advantage of adjudicating actors in performing that cognitive task. Cognitive task refers to the type of judicial reasoning, or inferential activity, the judge performs when deciding an issue.

scholarly journals Unmixing the mixed questions: a framework for distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law in contractual interpretation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Bertolini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Cognitive Task ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Relative Advantage ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, the Supreme Court of Canada established that contractual interpretation generally involves questions of mixed fact and law subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error, unless an extricable error of law is identified. The Court confirmed and specified this holding in a number of subsequent decisions. The new approach to appellate deference has sparked criticism from various parties in the legal community. A tension has emerged between the Supreme Court shifting away from the historical common law approach to deference and the appellate courts’ attempts to restore it. This article examines the theoretical foundations of this new case law development and proposes a methodological framework for distinguishing between questions of law and question of fact in contractual interpretation. The ultimate goal is to provide guidance on the choice of the appropriate standard of appellate review in this area. First, it is argued that the recent case law development introduced by the Supreme Court lacks rigorous analytical foundations and fails to provide adequate guidance on choosing the appropriate degree of deference on appeal. Second, it is contended that a useful methodological approach for distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law is 1) to identify the cognitive task performed by the judge when adjudicating the contended issue, and 2) to assess the relative advantage of adjudicating actors in performing that cognitive task. Cognitive task refers to the type of judicial reasoning, or inferential activity, the judge performs when deciding an issue.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

Recent Developments in Canadian Aboriginal Law: Overview of Case Law and of Certain Principles of Aboriginal Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-350
Author(s):  
Patricia Ochman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Treaty Rights ◽  
Aboriginal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Aboriginal Law

AbstractThe author reviews the most recent judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and certain provincial courts, in order to provide an update in the sphere of Aboriginal law practice in Canada, destined mainly for foreign lawyers and academics. Throughout the review of those recent judgments, the author provides an overview of certain key principles and concepts of Canadian Aboriginal law. Besides providing an overview of recent judgments in the sphere of Aboriginal law, the author seeks to illustrate how meaningful the protection and recognition of Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are in practice, through the overview of key concepts and principles of Canadian Aboriginal law and how they were recently interpreted by Canadian courts. The author briefly addresses Canada's vote against the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

scholarly journals Commentary on Papers Delivered on the Supreme Court of Canada and the Law of Obligations

1969 ◽  
pp. 160
Author(s):  
D. C. McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Cost

The speaker noted that the Hon. Emmett Hall, for whom he was substituting, had had experience as trial judge, quality he considers desirable in the appellate courts. He then commented on some of the very early cases of the S.C.C., before proceeding to discussion of Dean Friaman's paper. The speaker discussed aspects in the development of the law relating to trespassers and occupier's liability. He was of the opinion that the S.C.C. was not as mechanistic in its approach to the law of tort as Dean Fridman thought it to be. In commenting on Dr. Beaudoin's presentation, Mr. Justice McDonald noted that the blame for the lack of weight given to French decisions in matters concerning the Quebec Civil Code droit de delits should not be attributed to the S.C.C. but to the Privy Council. In concluding, His Lordship observed that the process of applying for have to appeal to the S.C.C. deserves further study, since the present requirement that the Court dispose of applications for leave which are not accompanied by an oral submis sion increases the cost of appeal particularly for Western cases.

Explaining Dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald R Songer ◽  
John Szmer ◽  
Susan W Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Nous Avons ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Leadership Style ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us

Abstract.While there is an extensive literature on the causes of dissensus on appellate courts in the US, few empirical studies exist of the causes of dissent in Canadian Supreme Court. The current study seeks to close that gap in the literature, proposing and then testing what we call a Canadian model of dissent. We find that the likelihood of dissent is strongly related to four broad factors that appear to exert independent influence on whether the Court is consensual or divided: political conflict, institutional structure, legal ambiguity in the law and variations in the leadership style of the chief justice.Résumé.Les causes de dissension dans les cours d'appel aux États-Unis font l'objet de nombreux articles et publications, mais il existe très peu d'études empiriques sur les causes de dissidence à la Cour suprême du Canada. La présente étude vise à combler cette lacune en proposant, un modèle canadien de dissension, puis en le mettant à l'épreuve. Nous avons constaté que le risque de dissension est fortement lié à quatre facteurs genéraux qui semblent exercer une influence indépendante, que la Cour soit en accord ou divisée. Ces facteurs sont le conflit politique, la structure institutionnelle, la présence d'une ambiguité juridique dans la loi et le style de direction du juge en chef.

scholarly journals The Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and Administrative Law

1969 ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
D. H. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Mumbo Jumbo ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual

The Supreme Court of Canada's contribution to the jurisprudence of administra tive law has been weak and fitful, erratic and lacking in attention to the principles of its own previous decisions. Failure to articulate points of distinction between its decisions has led to uncertainty in the law. The speaker suggested that the insufficiency of the Court's reasoning and the inadequacy of its citation might be reduced if judgments were more often delivered by more members of the Court thus increasing the individual research and writing of the Court so that its earlier fcmons would be kept in view and the case law developed more coherently. Furthermore, the Court should foUow the House of Lords in not considering itself bound by ds own decisions. The speaker regretted the Court's tendency to take mechanically conceptualise approach to substantive administrative law issues- if Canadian courts are to keep pace with those of other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Canada cannot continue to use outworn mumbo-jumbo as substitute for identifyltZtJ «»*"*»* societal interests that are the stuff of /hefPe?kfr aho discussed and compared the contributions of the House of Lords and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Although it has fewer members the House of Lords has more dissenters in administrative law decisions than the Supreme Court of Canada, (whereas the Privy Council until 1966 could not have dissent). While the S.C.C. has been inconsistent and weak, the Privy Council has been consistent and weak. Although there have been occasional achievements, between 1951 and 1971 the Privy Council rendered series of regressive decisions that impaired coherent development of the administrative law in England and in the Commonwealth. ReidZhh^ i*' f" H0USe °f Lof* under the influenc* of the late Lord h^'^nuJf has enjoyed as most creative °n TegreSSiVe period inPrivy relation Council to public decisions> law si™ However *• earlyhaknZd 1960's mnnt rxiicc ft ££Icrt has*eenperfo

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

scholarly journals Back to Burgess: The Impact of the White Burgess Expert Evidence Regime in Alberta Decisions

2019 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Lisa A. Silver
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Expert Evidence ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Agent Of Change ◽  
The Impact

The law on the admissibility of expert evidence was refined in the Supreme Court of Canada’s White Burgess decision. While still retaining the Mohan criteria, the Supreme Court further defined the trial judge as an agent of change through an enhanced gatekeeper function. However, all stakeholders in the justice system have a gatekeeper function and must work together when determining the use to be made of evidence. Through surveying Alberta cases involving expert evidence, the author identifies areas where lower courts are applying the new approach and where they do not fully embrace the new approach, but revert back to the traditional Mohan criteria. The author discusses notable themes from recent case law to identify potential future issues involving expert evidence. Although slowly, Alberta courts are applying the new regime, and the focus and direction of expert evidence continue to develop.

scholarly journals Le contrôle judiciaire des erreurs de droit en présence d'une clause privative

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant ◽  
Sylvio Normand
Keyword(s):  
New Brunswick ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court

Administrative Tribunals have jurisdiction to deal with questions of law. In the exercise of such jurisdiction they may sometimes make mistakes in the construction of the statutes, regulations or other instruments. Even in the presence of a privative clause, an inferior tribunal should not be the supreme interpret of the law. It is one of the requirements of the « rule of law » that the Superior Court should have a supervisory « droit de regard ». Traditionally, only errors of law going to jurisdiction were out of the shield of the privative clause ; the Superior Courts used to restrain their intervention only after charactarizing the alleged error as « jurisdictional error of law ». Two difficulties came to arise from the approach about whether there exists an error of jurisdiction or one « merely » of law. Firstly, who can tell whether there is a genuine error of law. Secondly, what criteria transmute in the minds of Superior Court Judges an error into one of jurisdiction. The recent case law convinces us of the necessity of a different approach in order to achieve some clarity in this field of Administrative law. Mr. Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada hints at it in the Nispawin and the New Brunswick Liquor Corporation cases. This approach would put an end to the confusion that still prevail in other Supreme Court cases like Blanco or Labrecque. The distinction between errors of law going to jurisdiction and « merely » errors of law is unrational and so unpracticable that it should be abandoned and replaced by what we suggest in the following lines... Mr. Justice Robert Reid of the Ontario Divisional Court has also expressed the same concern in a remarquable judgment.

scholarly journals Oppression or Derivative? Greater Clarity Through the Requirement for Direct Harm

2020 ◽  
pp. 817
Author(s):  
Jordon Magico
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Direct Injury ◽  
Personal Action

In this article, the author seeks to discern the limits of the broadly scoped oppression action. The author first discusses the oppression and derivative actions and their purposes, and then argues that the oppression provision does not embrace derivative harm. Using the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Brunette, the author reinforces the requirement of direct injury distinct from that suffered by the corporation, when bringing a personal action. The author then examines case law in pursuit of clarity about what constitutes direct harm and whether it is difficult to demonstrate. The author concludes by recommending that the Supreme Court clarify the distinction between oppression and derivative actions by integrating the direct harm requirement into the test for oppression.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document