Avoiding the Swine
2021 ◽
Vol 14
(1)
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pp. 115-123
What constitutes a good life? A hedonist’s answer to this question is rather simple— more pleasure, less pain. While hedonism was previously a widely accepted belief, it now suffers from several crucial objections. A challenge particularly vexing to hedonists is the Philosophy of Swine: could it be possible that our lives may be less than that of a theoretical swine? In this essay, I argue that lifetime hedonism, the view of hedonism concerned with one’s total lifelong well-being, does not survive this objection. In particular, I will refute the counterarguments that modern-day hedonist, Ben Bramble, presents against the Philosophy of Swine objection.
Neural correlates of the ‘good life’: eudaimonic well-being is associated with insular cortex volume
2013 ◽
Vol 9
(5)
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pp. 615-618
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2009 ◽
Vol 21
(2)
◽
pp. 251-254
1999 ◽
Vol 16
(1)
◽
pp. 113-142
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2021 ◽
Vol 10
(2)
◽
pp. 59-73
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