scholarly journals Finite in Infinity

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Hannah Laurens
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Close Connection ◽  
Metaphysical Theory

One of the main themes in Spinoza’s Ethics is the issue of human freedom: What does it consist in and how may it be attained? Spinoza’s ethical views crucially depend on his metaphysical theory, and this close connection provides the answer to several central questions concerning Spinoza’s conception of human freedom. Firstly, how can we accommodate human freedom within Spinoza’s necessitarianism—in the context of which Spinoza rejects the notion of a free will? Secondly, how can humans, as merely finite beings, genuinely attain freedom? Can Spinoza defend his claim that we may even attain blessedness? I will argue that these questions are answered by appeal to a twofold in human nature. According to Spinoza, we are finite in infinity.

Jansenist Augustinianism and the Springs of Pastoral Rigorism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Palmer
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Divine Grace ◽  
Human Liberty

The central controversy surrounding Jansenism concerned its alleged heterodoxy in respect to divine grace and human liberty. Five propositions regarding fallen human nature, the operation of grace, and the ability of man to cooperate with it were extracted from Jansen’s Augustinus, and condemned by Innocent X in 1653. The Jansenists denied that they maintained the propositions in the condemned sense. Their position was framed against a teaching developed by Molina and other Jesuits (analysed in section II), which, they claimed, attributed so much power to fallen nature as to fall into Pelagianism. The chapter balances accounts which relate the Jansenists’ moral rigorism wholly to their pessimistic assessment of human nature and their predestinarianism. They aimed to establish human freedom and the responsibility of each individual for his own conversion, and the counterpoint to their view of the fall was a mystical optimism regarding the destiny of nature under grace.

scholarly journals "Sufficient to Have Stood, Though Free to Fall": Free Will in John Milton's Paradise Lost

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
John Milton ◽  
Paradise Lost ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Garden Of Eden ◽  
Adam And Eve ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Book Of Genesis ◽  
The Way

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.

Bernard Lonergan e a Probabilidade Emergente

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1727-1742
Author(s):  
Mendo Castro Henriques
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Bernard Lonergan ◽  
Heuristic Model ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Generalized Probability ◽  
The Way

In Insight, an essay on human understanding, (1957, 1st edition) Lonergan presents a heuristic model of emerging probability in order to define, explain and extract norms from the dynamism common to all nature, including human nature, a dynamism that mirrors the reality of intellection. Continuity between different levels of nature discloses a directed, upward, but indeterminate dynamism of the emerging generalized probability. In addition to the ethical consequences that he elaborates, Lonergan remains in an open hermeneutic framework, beyond being proportionate to discursive reason; he opens the way for a surprising final manifestation of this universal dynamism through what he calls transcendent conjugated forms of generalized probability emerging – faith, hope and charity – that are proposed to human freedom.

Looping effects of neurolaw, and the precarious marriage between neuroscience and the law

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toma Strle ◽  
Olga Markič ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Legal Decision ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Law ◽  
Legal Contexts

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience’s mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples’ beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public’s and legal decision-makers’ endorsement of and trust in neuroscience’s view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.

Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (8) ◽  
pp. 1563-1570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azim F. Shariff ◽  
Joshua D. Greene ◽  
Johan C. Karremans ◽  
Jamie B. Luguri ◽  
Cory J. Clark ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Mechanistic View

Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Wee
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Face ◽  
Best Possible World ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Both Descartes and Leibniz are on record as maintaining that acting freely requires that the agent ‘could have done otherwise.’ However, it is not clear how they could maintain this, given their other metaphysical commitments. In Leibniz's case, the arguments connected with this are well-rehearsed: it is argued, for example, that Leibnizian doctrines such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the thesis that God must will the best possible world preclude that the human could ever do other than she did. The question of whether Descartes can maintain that the agent is able to do otherwise in the face of his wider metaphysical commitments has received comparatively little attention. However, Chappell has recently noted that Descartes's thesis that God is the ‘total cause’ of everything seems to preclude the possibility of human freedom (where this includes the ability to do otherwise).

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