scholarly journals Climate Ethics

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-70
Author(s):  
Vesak Chi
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Anthropogenic Climate Change ◽  
Individual Action ◽  
Ethical Obligation ◽  
Climate Ethics ◽  
The Commons

Anthropogenic climate change (ACC) has been described as a tragedy of the commons (T of C) by Baylor Johnson. Johnson argues that solutions to T of C scenarios reside in collective action rather than individual action, and that our moral obligation is to advocate for collective solutions to ACC. Marion Hourdequin argues that individual action can serve to promote collective action and in doing so it can also serve as an ethical obligation. I contend that individual action holds intrinsic value in lieu of its ability to counteract our susceptibility to the kind of moral corruption espoused by Stephen Gardiner.

The Effect of Incentives: Diffusion of Responsibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
P Diffusion ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Diffusion Of Responsibility

Diffusion of responsibility refers to the problem that when something is everyone’s job, it in effect ends up being nobody’s job. This explains why many collective problems arise. People face perverse incentives to free ride on others’ actions and not to do their part. As a result, agents often think in short-term rather than long-term ways. Problems such as climate change can be modeled as instances of the tragedy of the commons, one form of a collective action problem that arises due to perverse incentives created by the diffusion of responsibility.

scholarly journals Return to the Isle of Ted: Simulating the Collective Action Problem of Climate Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-555
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Active Learning ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Global Inequality ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Road Map ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Commons

ABSTRACTThis article modifies the classic “Isle of Ted” simulation to teach students about the collective action problems associated with climate change. Modifications include the introduction of a common-pool resource (i.e., fish) and increased pirate attacks to model rising climate threats and unequal distribution of risk. A return to the Isle of Ted enables a deeper engagement with specific collective action problems of climate change, including the tragedy of the commons and issues of global inequality. This article provides a road map for the incorporation of this modified simulation into active-learning classrooms.

Global Warming: More Common Than Tragic

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth R. DeSombre
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Global Warming ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Kyoto Protocol ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Time Horizons ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Process Work

Global warming is indeed a difficult international environmental problem to address: it has tragedy of the commons characteristics, and problems of time horizons and uncertainty. But previous efforts at international cooperation on other environmental issues such as ozone depletion suggest that international cooperation should be possible–though difficult–on climate change. Cooperation on issues that involve long time horizons suggests that the present generation is not calculating utility quite so narrowly as game theorists posit. Experience also suggests that successful cooperation on climate change will start with measures so small as to seem inconsequential, but will set in place an institutional and scientific process that will ultimately result in much more significant cooperative efforts. Rather than representing a tragedy, the Kyoto Protocol (or something much like it) could represent the beginnings of a process in which current generations take the first steps at collective action that dramatically improve the lives of future generations. Those who are concerned about the weakness of the Kyoto Protocol should first focus on persuading the United States to join-since this is the best way to let the process work and avoid a tragedy of the commons.

Commons and Cognition

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 587-616
Author(s):  
Carol M. Rose
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Common Resource ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Full Benefit ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Great Knowledge

Abstract Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons primarily concerns actions rather than thoughts. But he did famously describe the cognitive state of a hypothetical herder on a grassy field. With respect to the field and its other users, Hardin’s herder is both ignorant and indifferent; he coolly calculates that his best option is to take the full benefit of grazing his stock while suffering only a fraction of the cost — an action that contributes to the decimation of a common resource. While Hardin viewed the herder’s attitude as identical to that of actors in many other collective action situations, the work of other commons theorists suggests several different cognitive stances among such actors, largely depending on the scale of the commons issues they face. Thus participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (a very small commons) would appear to be dominated by distrust rather than the hypothetical herder’s ignorance or indifference. Participants in mid-sized commons — such as Hardin’s herders in real life — show some distrust, but also great knowledge and engagement in common pool management. Participants in the largest-scale commons issues are actually those most likely to exhibit the ignorance and indifference that Hardin attributed to the herder. This Article discusses the ways in which these different cognitive stances track the scale of collective action “tragedies” as described by major theorists and concludes with some observations about the cognitive aspects of climate change.

scholarly journals Do No Harm: A Cross-Disciplinary, Cross-Cultural Climate Ethics

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Rentmeester
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Ethical Issue ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Anthropogenic Climate Change ◽  
The Political ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Climate Ethics ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Cultural Climate

Anthropogenic climate change has become a hot button issue in the scientific, economic, political, and ethical sectors. While the science behind climate change is clear, responses in the economic and political realms have been unfulfilling. On the economic front, companies have marketed themselves as pioneers in the quest to go green while simultaneously engaging in environmentally destructive practices and on the political front, politicians have failed to make any significant global progress. I argue that climate change needs to be framed as an ethical issue to make serious progress towards the path to a sustainable human civilization. In an effort to motivate the urgency needed to confront climate change, I argue that climate change seriously affects human beings living here and now, and if one cares about unnecessarily harming fellow innocent living human beings, then one should care about one’s own environmental impact related to climate change. Since this argument does not depend upon any specific philosophical, religious, or ethical tradition but applies regardless of one’s particular background, I hope to induce genuine concern among all human beings regarding this issue.

scholarly journals Caring for the future can turn tragedy into comedy for long-term collective action under risk of collapse

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (23) ◽  
pp. 12915-12922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Barfuss ◽  
Jonathan F. Donges ◽  
Vítor V. Vasconcelos ◽  
Jürgen Kurths ◽  
Simon A. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Experimental Testing ◽  
The Public ◽  
Regime Changes ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Future Outcomes ◽  
The Impact

We will need collective action to avoid catastrophic climate change, and this will require valuing the long term as well as the short term. Shortsightedness and uncertainty have hindered progress in resolving this collective action problem and have been recognized as important barriers to cooperation among humans. Here, we propose a coupled social–ecological dilemma to investigate the interdependence of three well-identified components of this cooperation problem: 1) timescales of collapse and recovery in relation to time preferences regarding future outcomes, 2) the magnitude of the impact of collapse, and 3) the number of actors in the collective. We find that, under a sufficiently severe and time-distant collapse, how much the actors care for the future can transform the game from a tragedy of the commons into one of coordination, and even into a comedy of the commons in which cooperation dominates. Conversely, we also find conditions under which even strong concern for the future still does not transform the problem from tragedy to comedy. For a large number of participating actors, we find that the critical collapse impact, at which these game regime changes happen, converges to a fixed value of collapse impact per actor that is independent of the enhancement factor of the public good, which is usually regarded as the driver of the dilemma. Our results not only call for experimental testing but also help explain why polarization in beliefs about human-caused climate change can threaten global cooperation agreements.

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