scholarly journals Locke’s Theory of Ideas: A Critical Exposition

2019 ◽  
pp. 133-146
Author(s):  
Refat E Rubaia

John Locke, Bishop Berkeley and David Hume are the pioneers of modern British Philosophy during 17th  and 18th  centuries. Among them, John Locke‟s epistemological work is one of the greatest defenses of modern empiricism. He attempts to determine the limits of human understanding and seeks to clear the ground for future developments by providing a theory of knowledge compatible with the study of human nature. In his discussion the term „ideas‟ plays an important role. To understand Locke‟s empiricism, one must realize what he means by „ideas‟. For Locke, ideas are all signs which represent the external world of physical objects and the inner world of consciousness. However, in his book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he discusses „ideas‟ in details but he does not provide a sufficiently clear account of the nature of ideas. This paper is an attempt to give a critical exposition of John Locke‟s theory of ideas in which I will try to show that his explanation about the nature of idea is not sufficient enough to establish the theory of ideas he presented. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 133-146

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.


Author(s):  
Peter Anstey

John Locke was the leading English philosopher of the late seventeenth century. His two major works, An Essay concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government, both published in 1690, have exerted enormous influence on subsequent thought, particularly in metaphysics, theory of knowledge and political philosophy. Locke’s writings were central to the philosophy of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and set the terms of reference for modern liberalism. Educated in the arts at Oxford, a friend of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton, and a close associate of the leading politician the first Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke’s intellectual range was broad. He trained as a physician, dabbled in chemistry and botany and throughout his life kept abreast of developments in natural philosophy. At the same time, he developed theories of natural law and religious toleration, contributed to debates on contemporary economic issues, wrote a primer on the philosophy of education, defended the reasonableness of Christianity and maintained an extensive correspondence and intellectual network. It was not until the publication of the Essay when Locke was in his late 50s, however, that he became a public intellectual. The Essay provides an analysis of the scope and limits of the faculty of human understanding, using a sophisticated theory of ideas. It contains four books, the first of which seeks to refute the view that the mind contains innate metaphysical and moral principles. The second book sets out Locke’s theory of ideas and contains original and penetrating treatments of the nature of the will and motivation and the nature of personal identity. It also contains Locke’s theory of material qualities with his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and discussions of the nature of substance, duration, infinity and the association of ideas. Book Three deals with the nature of language, the theory of essences, and provides an account of the way in which humans divide substances into species. Book Four uses the resources set out in the preceding books to develop a theory of knowledge and belief and to explore the differences between faith and reason. Central to Locke’s project is the view that all knowledge is constructed out of ideas. Knowledge in its most basic form is nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas and ideas can only be acquired through the senses or through introspection on the operations of our minds. Once the understanding is furnished with enough simple ideas from these two sources of experience, it sets about constructing complex ideas, forming propositions out of its various ideas and giving the ideas names. Locke is fundamentally opposed to the view that knowledge and reason begin with a set of basic principles or maxims, such as that the whole is the sum of its parts. This is the motivation for his arguments against the claim that principles are innate. Instead we must construct the principles of all the different sciences from scratch out of our stock of ideas. In the cases of mathematics and morality this can be achieved. In the case of our knowledge of the sorts or species of substances we encounter in the external world, however, we are significantly constrained. This is because our senses are limited and we do not have epistemic access to the inner natures of things. We can see many effects but the underlying causes of those effects, such as magnetism or cohesion, are out of reach. As a result, Locke is pessimistic about the prospects of natural science, though he does believe that the method of experimental philosophy, particularly natural history, gives us the best chance to extend our knowledge of the natural world. Moreover, he believes that of all the speculative systems of natural philosophy, the corpuscular view of matter is the most intelligible. Locke’s political philosophy gives us some insight into his conception of the form that a demonstrative moral philosophy might take. However, the precise relation between the Two Treatises and the Essay remains a controversial issue. The starting point for Locke’s view of the formation of civil society is the natural equality of every human being. We are equal in freedom and equal in both power and obligation with respect to the law of nature. However, in the absence of civil society – that is, in the state of nature – we suffer many inconveniences, particularly with regard to protecting property and applying the law of nature. It is only by consenting to give up our basic power to enforce the law of nature, a power that is common to all, to an authority, that we are able to overcome the inconveniences of the state of nature. In so doing, we secure the integrity of our property, that is, our life, liberty and possessions. The handing over of our basic power does not render us politically impotent however. For, should the government, whether a democracy, oligarchy or monarchy, break the people’s trust, the citizens have a right of resistance and can dissolve the government. Locke’s Two Treatises was published anonymously and did not embroil him in ongoing debate in his own day, though its subsequent influence was profound. The same cannot be said of another anonymous work, his A Letter Concerning Toleration, which argued that religious toleration should be extended to all but atheists and those who submit to foreign authority. The most vigorous reaction to Locke’s writings, however, was to the Essay, particularly to Locke’s account of personal identity as continuity of consciousness and his suggestion that matter fitly disposed might have the power of thought. These two issues are indicative of the rich philosophical resources within the Essay, both in its positive theses and its illustrative material, which have ensured that this work continues to be read and studied with profit today.


Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.


Paragraph ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Daniel Carey

Philosophical antagonism and dispute — by no means confined to the early modern period — nonetheless enjoyed a moment of particular ferment as new methods and orientations on questions of epistemology and ethics developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke played a key part in them with controversies initiated by the Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). This essay develops a wider typology of modes of philosophical quarrelling by focusing on a key debate — the issue of whether human nature came pre-endowed with innate ideas and principles, resulting in a moral consensus across mankind, or remained, on the contrary, dependent on reason to achieve moral insight, and, in practice, divided by diverse and irreconcilable cultural practices as a result of the force of custom and the limited purchase of reason. The essay ultimately concludes on the idea that we should not only attend to the genealogy of disputes but also to the morphology of disputation as a practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-66
Author(s):  
Robert Elliott Allinson ◽  

The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.


rahatulquloob ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 03-20
Author(s):  
Prof.Dr. Saif ul Islam

Spirituality is usually understood as a way of being that flows from a certain profound experience of reality, which is known as ‘mystical’, ‘religious’, or ‘spiritual’ experience. There are numerous descriptions of this experience in the literature of the world’s religions, which tend to agree that it is a direct, non-intellectual experience of reality with some fundamental characteristics that are independent of cultural and historical contexts. Spiritual and scientific quests are two complementary inquiries into reality. Any feeling of antagonism between them is a product of a narrow vision. Science deals with what is measurable; religion is the quest for discovering and understanding the immeasurable. A scientist is not intelligent if he denies the existence of the immeasurable. There is nothing that is anti-science but there is a lot that is beyond science. The two quests have to go hand in hand. We not only need to have an understanding of the laws that govern the phenomena occurring in the external world around us but also we need to discover order and harmony in our consciousness. Human understanding is incomplete unless it covers both aspects of reality: matter as well as consciousness. Indeed the division between the scientific and spiritual quests is itself the creation of the human mind. Reality is one undivided whole which includes both matter and consciousness. Our thoughts, being limited by our experience, divide the external world from the inner world of our consciousness, in much the same way as our mind divides time from space though they are both two aspects of a single continuum۔


Author(s):  
Adam Potkay

The once standard account of rhetoric’s relation to philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that philosophy rejected eloquence as an instrument of deceit and a source of error, and rhetoric accepted the standards of the new philosophy, placing a premium on perspicuity and probable arguments. This account has been complicated, in recent scholarship, by three counter-claims. First, empiricist philosophers like David Hume and John Locke, far from precluding eloquence, employ the tropes of rhetoric not only in their style but, more fundamentally, in their very science of mind, depicting perception and belief as processes involving transference and persuasion. Second, philosophers sometimes admired the figurative eloquence of earlier eras. Third, philosophers and rhetoricians sought to account for the origins of tropes in their speculative histories of primitive culture, with an understanding that the underlying passions that motivate primitive and irrational beliefs are ineradicable elements of human nature.


1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 91-91
Author(s):  
Edward Craig

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.


1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 91-91

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.


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