Philosophy A: History of Philosophy, spring semester 1927

2021 ◽  
pp. 408-413
Author(s):  
Brian G. Henning ◽  
Joseph Petek ◽  
George Lucas

Notes taken by Winthrop Pickard Bell, Robert Underhill, Sinclair Kerby-Miller, and George Perrigo Conger during the introductory class ‘Philosophy A: History of Philosophy’, which Whitehead taught for four sessions. In these four lectures, he discusses the formation of modern science, with a particular focus on Isaac Newton, but also Galileo, Kepler, Descartes.

1905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Светлана Платонова ◽  
Svetlana Platonova

The tutorial discusses the main parts of philosophy: theory of being and matter, theory of conscious and the unconscious, philosophy of knowledge, the problem of person and his being in the world, the nature and dynamics of society, global problems. The author presents philosophical questions, based on the history of philosophy and modern science. The essence of society is analyzed in accordance with the modern social-philosophical theories. The book combines the actual tutorial, issues, topics abstracts, bibliography to each chapter, philosophical dictionary. The book is recommended for students of higher educational institutions, as well as all interested readers.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Kanke

The textbook is a sequential course in the history of philosophy. The history of philosophical innovations from antiquity to the present day is considered. The content of the philosophy of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Modern times, and the XIX century is presented. Special attention is paid to the main philosophical trends of the twentieth century, as well as Russian philosophy, including the Soviet period. The course is based on the achievements of modern science, as well as analytical philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, poststructuralism and other major philosophical trends of our time. The theory of conceptual transduction is used. It is intended for bachelors studying in the enlarged group of training areas 47.00.00 "Philosophy, Ethics and Religious Studies" and other training areas. It is of considerable interest to a wide range of readers interested in the development of philosophical knowledge.


1949 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. I. Tomkeieff

As a river in its seaward course gathers volume and momentum from its tributaries, so does a science, from its inception to its attainment of maturity and beyond, increase its strength, scope and depth by incorporating into itself its historical past, built up by the contributions of those scientists and philosophers whose work marks stages in its progress. A history of science, to fulfil its purpose, must unravel the intricate strands of ideas and facts which form the fabric of modern science and trace them back to their inspiration and source. Such a history would be almost beyond the bounds of human endeavour, and its only practicable substitute tends to degenerate into a mere collection of names of scientists, combined with a review of their individual contributions to the development of science. Science, however, is neither an assemblage of facts nor of ideas. It is a co-ordinated system of facts linked by theories—with the emphasis, generally speaking, on the ideas—and within our limited capacity it can best be interpreted by reconstructing the lives and reliving the thoughts of those men who have done most to fashion it. Such a man was Isaac Newton and such also was James Hutton. It is of little profit to argue as to which was the greater mind. What Newton achieved in the field of astronomy and mathematics Hutton achieved in the field of geology. It was he who provided geology with a theory: and here we must take theory, not as something remote and opposed to fact, but in its original meaning in Greek, namely, comprehension.


Author(s):  
Matt Waldschlagel

This paper examines an important episode in the history of early modern physics – the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence of 1715-16, an exchange that occurred at the intersection of physics, metaphysics and theology – before turning to questions of interpretation in the historiography of physics.  Samuel Clarke, a disciple of Isaac Newton, engaged in a dispute over Newton’s commitment to absolute space and absolute time with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who criticized Newton’s views and advanced a rival account.  I clarify the positions at stake in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, define a variety of terms – absolute space, absolute time, substantivalism, and relationalism – endogenous to the exchange, and reconstruct key elements in the philosophical dimension of the dispute.  I then use the Leibniz-Clarke exchange as a springboard from which to examine interpretive considerations in the historiography of physics.  I argue that the history of physics can benefit from reassessing its historiographical commitments by borrowing or appropriating some of the intellectual resources used by philosophers working in the history of philosophy.  This historiographical reassessment, I contend, will not only shed new light on the Leibniz-Clarke exchange but may also reinvigorate the history of physics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
William Lynch ◽  

It has been widely noted that rules for scientific method fail to produce results consistent with those rules. Daniel Garber goes further by showing not only that there is a gap between Francis Bacon’s methodological rules, outlined in the Novum organum, and his natural philosophical conclusions, but that his conception of natural forms informs the method in the first place. What needs further examination is why Bacon’s application of his method manifestly violates his rules. Garber appeals to the spirit of Bacon’s method, rather its letter, which allows him to reconcile an appreciation of Bacon’s impact on modern science with a contextualist approach to the history of philosophy. A better approach looks at the larger significance of mythological accounts of scientific method, that understand seventeenthcentury methodological doctrines as ideologies naturalizing scientific culture and outlining news ambitions for the control of nature. By examining Bacon’s followers in the Royal Society, we can see how Bacon’s “temporary” use of hypotheses helped secure support with the promise of future utility. The history of philosophy of science should focus on the conditions leading to emergence of certain kinds of distinctively modern discourses, practices, and ambitions going beyond the internal history of science.


It is a great honour to be invited to propose the toast of this famous Society; doubly so when, as in my case, one is not a scientist but has been trained in the humanities. Historians, of course, have always found the origins of the Royal Society exceptionally interesting, one of those felicitous cases of a combination of Oxford and London which seems in this case to have prospered from the beginning. I say this not simply because it makes you the oldest scientific society still in existence but because the moment at which the Royal Society was born was indeed the happiest it could possibly have been. If the Society had been formed 100 years before then, Mr President, you would have had the pleasure of presiding at the 413th anniversary of the Society. Nonetheless, I think it would have been a loss; 1660 was exactly the right moment, because it meant that the Society was born just when the wave was rising of the scientific revolution which gave birth to modern science. So the Society was able, within eleven years after it had been founded, to elect Isaac Newton to the Fellowship at the age of 28, and later to have him as its President for twenty-four years. It is, in fact, a society, not only 300 years old but, more to the point, coterminous with the history of modern science. Instead of having to break away from an earlier history, which would have been the case if it had been founded 100 or 200 years earlier, right from the beginning the objectives of the Society, the advancement of knowledge by observation and experiment, were easily recognizable by any scientist since as acceptable to him.


Humaniora ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 108
Author(s):  
Frederikus Fios

We have entered the 21st century that is popularly known as the era of the development of modern science and technology. Philosophy provides naming for contemporary era as postmodern era. But do we suddenly come to this day and age? No! Because humans are homo viator, persona that does pilgrimage in history, space and time. Philosophy has expanded periodically in the long course of history. Since the days of classical antiquity, philosophy comes with a patterned metaphysical paradigm. This paradigm survives very long in the stage history of philosophy as maintained by many philosophers who hold fast to the philosophical-epistemic claim that philosophy should be (das sollen) metaphysical. Classical Greek philosopher, Aristotle was a philosopher who claims metaphysics as the initial philosophy. Then, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Marx even Habermas offer appropriate shades of metaphysical philosophy versus spirit of the age. Modern philosophers offer a new paradigm in the way of doing philosophy. The new spirit of modern philosophers declared as if giving criticism on traditional western metaphysics (since Aristotle) that are considered irrelevant. This paper intends to show the argument between traditional metaphysical and modern philosophers who criticize metaphysics. The author will make a philosophical synthesis to obtain enlightenment to the position of human beings in the space of time. Using the method of Hegelian dialectic (thesis-antiteses-synthesis), this topic will be developed and assessed in accordance with the interests of this paper. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-207
Author(s):  
Ibragim M. Melikov ◽  
Olga B. Skorodumova ◽  
Svetlana E. Kryuchkova ◽  
Salavat F. Yakupov

The aim of the study is to develop an idea of alternative science based on ideas in the history of philosophy. The novelty of the work lies in the creation of an idea of an alternative model of science, which allows solving the existing problems of modern science. The main research methods are hermeneutic and axiological, as well as a systems approach. The conclusion reached by the authors is that alternative science should not describe existing empirical realities but develop a scientific ideal. In turn, this scientific ideal must have a spiritual content, i.e. to be spiritualized. It must be recognized as the highest truth, and all other ideas that have their manifestation in our world, science must consider through comparison with a scientific spiritualized ideal.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document