Leibniz: A Contribution to the Archaeology of Power

Author(s):  
Stephen Connelly

The concept of power has been a major feature of natural law theories. It evolved over the course of several centuries and was arguably the defining notion in both Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s doctrines of natural right. Yet Leibniz appears to effect a reversal in this millennium-long trajectory and demotes power to a derivative term of his philosophy. What was the rationale behind this radical change? And what does this reversal mean for the philosophy that follows?

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Rhonheimer

Giovanni Paolo II nel suo Magistero ha trattato ampiamente il tema della legge naturale, in particolare nell’Enciclica Veritatis Splendor, ove è possibile reperire una trattazione sulla definizione, l’essenza e le caratteristiche di essa secondo l’insegnamento di Tommaso d’Aquino. La legge naturale è una legge propria dell’uomo creato quale essere libero e razionale, la cui ragione, partecipe della ragione divina e ordinatrice, è capace di reperire in se stessa, in base alle inclinazioni naturali della persona umana, i principi primi e, in tal modo, svolgere funzione normativa e di discernimento sul bene e sul male. La legge naturale è la stessa ragione umana in quanto compie questo ruolo normativo nell’unità sostanziale di corpo e anima spirituale. Nella Veritatis Splendor la questione etica si esplica mediante una trattazione sull’oggetto dell’azione, dal quale dipende fondamentalmente la moralità dell’atto umano poiché nell’oggetto viene a trovarsi il fine immediato o proximus di una libera scelta della volontà guidata dalla ragione. Tale insegnamento trova applicazione nell’ambito dell’etica della vita nei tre grandi temi affrontati da Giovanni Paolo II nell’Enciclica Evangelium Vitae: il divieto assoluto di uccidere, che si specifica in particolare nella condanna di atti quali l’uccisione diretta di un innocente, l’aborto e l’eutanasia, deriva da una fondamentale violazione della giustizia, fondata sull’uguaglianza. La scelta deliberata della morte di un soggetto, intesa quale fine o mezzo, con la relativa strumentalizzazione della vita e della persona, è perciò sempre moralmente illecita. Così, Giovanni Paolo II ha presentato una dottrina coerente atta ad evidenziare il nesso fra legge naturale, oggetto morale degli atti umani ed etica della vita. Il divieto di uccidere è un principio primo ed universale della stessa legge naturale che, perseguendo il bene dell’uomo, viene, come diritto naturale, a costituire il fondamento della convivenza umana nella società. ---------- John Paul II broadly dealt with the topic of natural law in his Magisterial teaching, particularly in the Encyclical Veritatis Splendor, where it is possible to retrieve a treatment on the definition, the essence and the characteristics of it according to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Natural law is a law proper of man created as a free and rational being, whose reason, participating of the divine and ordaining reason, is able to retrieve in itself, according to the natural inclinations of the human person, the first principles and, in such way, to develop normative function and of discernment on the good and on the evil. The natural law is the human reason itself as it achieves this normative role in the substantial unity of body and spiritual soul. In Veritatis Splendor the ethical matter is expounded through a treatment on the object of the action, on which the morality of the human act fundamentally depends, since in the object it comes to be the immediate end itself or proximus of a free choice of the will driven by the reason. Such teaching finds application within the ethics of life in the three great themes faced by John Paul II in the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae: the absolute prohibition to kill, that is particularly specified in the condemnation of acts as the direct killing of an innocent, the abortion and the euthanasia, derives from a fundamental violation of the justice, founded upon the equality. The deliberate choice of the death of a subject, intended as end or mean, with the relative exploitation of the life and the person, is therefore always morally illicit. This way, John Paul II presented a coherent doctrine able to underline the connection between natural law, moral object of the human acts and ethics of life. The prohibition to kill is a first and universal principle of the natural law itself that, aiming at the good of man, it comes, as natural right, to constitute the base of the human cohabitation in the society.


Author(s):  
О. Рыбаков ◽  
O. Rybakov ◽  
С. Тихонова ◽  
S. Tikhonova

<p>The article deals with analysis of transhumanist prospects for the philosophy of law. Modern transhumanists consider morphological freedom as a concept, revealing the natural right to happiness. The authors take this idea as a starting point and consider the logic of the convergent biotechnology development. They believe that the extension of natural law has the character of a dialectical strategy of assumptions and tactics of the local bans in the sphere of human reproduction. This situation is typical of biomedical technology in general. The legislator authorizes a technology by endorsing forms of reproductive relationships and blocking technologies that support immoral forms. As a result, it gradually enhances understanding of how technology must be applied to ensure the human natural rights. Convergence of technologies makes real a hypothetical design of rights to reproduction, while the conflict of morality and the imperatives of technological development can be resolved from the standpoint of the primacy of natural law.</p>


1989 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Zuckert

The treatment of the natural law in the Roman law is puzzling because the relationship between jus naturale and the two other forms of law, jus gentium and jus civile, is far from clear in the texts. Moreover, the jus naturale does not appear to have the dignity most readers expect it to have. This article attempts to sort out the relationships among the three types of jus by showing that the various classifications the jurists use are based on their perceptions of the complexities of nature as a source of right and on the attempt to work out a political embodiment of natural right.


Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.


1959 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-18
Author(s):  
Odon Lottin ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Dan Taylor

Chapter 2 approaches on the problem of ‘nature’ and natural right, exploring what human beings are according to nature, and how conflicting views of nature impede or inspire human power. It begins with an exposition on the Dutch “Golden Age” and slavery, with an excursus on the colony of Brazil. Natural law and contextual justifications of slavery are introduced as a backdrop to Spinoza’s approach. It discusses the hitherto-underappreciated significance of the three political laws of TTP’s Chapter 16, before raising wider questions of the status of the free man and the slave, and Spinoza’s various formulations of freedom and slavery, before relating these back to the contested areas of nature and naturalism, the historical context of slavery in the Dutch colony of “New Holland” in Brazil, and the broader avenues of conflict and cooperation between individuals.


Author(s):  
Susan James

Spinoza grounds his political philosophy on a highly counter-intuitive conception of natural right as the right to do anything in your power. Just as big fish eat little fish by the right of nature, so humans act by natural right, regardless of what they do. In this essay I explain what leads Spinoza to hold this view and show how, in doing so, he contentiously rejects some of the most central assumptions of the natural law tradition. Finally, I consider whether Spinoza’s view can contribute anything of value to current discussions of natural right. I argue that he draws our attention to prerequisites of a cooperative way of life that contemporary theorists frequently neglect.


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