scholarly journals La Creazione e la legge naturale a fondamento della morale della vita in Giovanni Paolo II

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Rhonheimer

Giovanni Paolo II nel suo Magistero ha trattato ampiamente il tema della legge naturale, in particolare nell’Enciclica Veritatis Splendor, ove è possibile reperire una trattazione sulla definizione, l’essenza e le caratteristiche di essa secondo l’insegnamento di Tommaso d’Aquino. La legge naturale è una legge propria dell’uomo creato quale essere libero e razionale, la cui ragione, partecipe della ragione divina e ordinatrice, è capace di reperire in se stessa, in base alle inclinazioni naturali della persona umana, i principi primi e, in tal modo, svolgere funzione normativa e di discernimento sul bene e sul male. La legge naturale è la stessa ragione umana in quanto compie questo ruolo normativo nell’unità sostanziale di corpo e anima spirituale. Nella Veritatis Splendor la questione etica si esplica mediante una trattazione sull’oggetto dell’azione, dal quale dipende fondamentalmente la moralità dell’atto umano poiché nell’oggetto viene a trovarsi il fine immediato o proximus di una libera scelta della volontà guidata dalla ragione. Tale insegnamento trova applicazione nell’ambito dell’etica della vita nei tre grandi temi affrontati da Giovanni Paolo II nell’Enciclica Evangelium Vitae: il divieto assoluto di uccidere, che si specifica in particolare nella condanna di atti quali l’uccisione diretta di un innocente, l’aborto e l’eutanasia, deriva da una fondamentale violazione della giustizia, fondata sull’uguaglianza. La scelta deliberata della morte di un soggetto, intesa quale fine o mezzo, con la relativa strumentalizzazione della vita e della persona, è perciò sempre moralmente illecita. Così, Giovanni Paolo II ha presentato una dottrina coerente atta ad evidenziare il nesso fra legge naturale, oggetto morale degli atti umani ed etica della vita. Il divieto di uccidere è un principio primo ed universale della stessa legge naturale che, perseguendo il bene dell’uomo, viene, come diritto naturale, a costituire il fondamento della convivenza umana nella società. ---------- John Paul II broadly dealt with the topic of natural law in his Magisterial teaching, particularly in the Encyclical Veritatis Splendor, where it is possible to retrieve a treatment on the definition, the essence and the characteristics of it according to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Natural law is a law proper of man created as a free and rational being, whose reason, participating of the divine and ordaining reason, is able to retrieve in itself, according to the natural inclinations of the human person, the first principles and, in such way, to develop normative function and of discernment on the good and on the evil. The natural law is the human reason itself as it achieves this normative role in the substantial unity of body and spiritual soul. In Veritatis Splendor the ethical matter is expounded through a treatment on the object of the action, on which the morality of the human act fundamentally depends, since in the object it comes to be the immediate end itself or proximus of a free choice of the will driven by the reason. Such teaching finds application within the ethics of life in the three great themes faced by John Paul II in the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae: the absolute prohibition to kill, that is particularly specified in the condemnation of acts as the direct killing of an innocent, the abortion and the euthanasia, derives from a fundamental violation of the justice, founded upon the equality. The deliberate choice of the death of a subject, intended as end or mean, with the relative exploitation of the life and the person, is therefore always morally illicit. This way, John Paul II presented a coherent doctrine able to underline the connection between natural law, moral object of the human acts and ethics of life. The prohibition to kill is a first and universal principle of the natural law itself that, aiming at the good of man, it comes, as natural right, to constitute the base of the human cohabitation in the society.

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-46
Author(s):  
Irene Alexander

Despite sincere attempts to interpret Evangelium vitae and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) Ethical and Religious Directives (ERDs) of Catholic Health Care on direct versus indirect abortion, Catholic moral theologians docile to the magisterium and to Pope John Paul II’s teaching remain divided on how the ERDs should be interpreted based on the meaning of the word “direct.” The traditional natural law theory holds that the moral object in an indirect abortion involves not only that the abortion is unintended by the subject but also indirectly caused. The second and more novel interpretation referred to as the New Natural Law (NNL) theory is that an indirect abortion refers only to abortions which the acting person does not intend, whether or not he immediately causes them. Because the novel view bases its entire revision of the moral object by considering only “the perspective of the acting person”, a key text in Veritatis splendor no. 78, they argue that they are being faithful to Pope John Paul II’s teaching in Veritatis splendor ( VS) no. 78. In this article I argue that their reasoning is based on a fundamental misreading of Veritatis splendor and that the Pope himself would reject their view, even though they quote him, because their interpretation contradicts the fundamental moral principles that Pope John Paul II himself lays out within the very same chapter of Veritatis splendor. Furthermore, when the foundations of the broader NNL theory are brought to light, it becomes clear that the fundamental mistake at the root of this disputed question is that the NNL theory interprets the magisterial documents of Pope John Paul II through their own philosophical method—a method of moral analysis not shared by Pope John Paul II or the magisterium. When this interpretive error is brought to light, and Pope John Paul II is read on his own terms, it is clear that a direct abortion involves any attack on the unborn child that the acting person immediately and physically causes. Summary: The disputed question in Catholic health care concerning what constitutes a direct and indirect abortion can be resolved by examining the foundational differences of both the New Natural Law theory with the traditional natural law theory. Once these differences are brought to light, it is clear that the NNL has reinterpreted the meaning of the word “direct” based on a meaning that the magisterium has never accepted as a licit one for defining intrinsically evil acts. Furthermore, NNL thinkers misread Pope John Paul in Veritatis splendor 78 by applying their own novel methodology to the text. When this interpretive error is brought to light, it is clear that a direct abortion involves any attack on the unborn child that the acting person immediately and physically causes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Irene Alexander ◽  

This article seeks to demonstrate that the perverted faculty argument is at the foundation of magisterial teaching in sexual ethics. Yet new natural law (NNL) theorists have consistently condemned this argument for decades despite their claim that they support the moral teachings of the Catholic Church. This situation is incongruous. Current scholarship indicates that NNL theorists do not accept the rationale for magisterial teaching in sexual ethics because, despite their opposition to proportionalism, they still hold in common its most critical error—an error that Pope St. John Paul II was at pains to condemn in Veritatis splendor


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-179
Author(s):  
Rudi te Velde

Summary This essay explores Thomas’ thoughts about the virtue of obedience (based on STh II-II, q.104), which is particularly valued as a link between the moral virtues and the theological virtue of charity (love of God). Obedience generates in the human person the moral disposition required for all the other virtues, a disposition which consists in the readiness of the will to submit itself to the rule of God’s will. Reflecting on the question whether one should be obedient to God in every respect, Thomas is confronted with an objection pointing to the story of how God commands Abraham to kill his innocent son, which is prohibited by natural law. I use the scarce but intriguing remarks Thomas made in response to this objection to propose a meaningful interpretation of obedience as a religious virtue, essentially different from its distorted imitation which consists in an immediate identification of one’s own will with the presumed divine will.


2007 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 55
Author(s):  
Josep R. MONCHO I PASCUAL

Aquinas seems to hold following theses on moral autonomy. (1) «Nobody imposes his acts the law»: there is no perfect, no radical autonomy (even in Kant). (2) Natural law is defined as participation in the eternal law. That means «theonomy» which for Kluxen is not primordial, but adventitious metaphysical interpretation. (3) We could speak of «cognitive autonomy»: human reason is competent to formulate norms and moral judgements. (4) But the cognitive acts are accompanied by voluntary consent: which is natural and necessary in first principles; becomes worlds consens in the natural law conclusions (see the general opinion of Spanish Scholastics); and becomes correct desire in prudence and, especially, in «gnome» judgments.


Author(s):  
Matthew A. Shadle

Pope John Paul II wrote his 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus to offer a Catholic vision of political and economic life after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the democratization of many countries in Latin America and Asia. The encyclical provided a stronger defense of the free-market economy than had previous Catholic social teaching, and neoconservative Catholics saw it as a vindication of their views. Centesimus Annus also harshly condemns consumerism, however, and proposes that the state has a greater role in ensuring that the economy serves the common good than do the neoconservatives. John Paul II recognizes the essential role of human creativity and ingenuity in the economy, but balances this by emphasizing that the human person is the recipient of God’s grace.


Author(s):  
Stephen Connelly

The concept of power has been a major feature of natural law theories. It evolved over the course of several centuries and was arguably the defining notion in both Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s doctrines of natural right. Yet Leibniz appears to effect a reversal in this millennium-long trajectory and demotes power to a derivative term of his philosophy. What was the rationale behind this radical change? And what does this reversal mean for the philosophy that follows?


Kant Yearbook ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71
Author(s):  
Mike L. Gregory

Abstract Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend has recently gained more sustained attention for its role in clarifying Kant’s published positions in political philosophy. However, too little attention has been given to the lecture’s relation to Gottfried Achenwall, whose book was the textbook for the course. In this paper, I will examine how Kant rejected and transforms Achenwall’s natural law system in the Feyerabend Lectures. Specifically, I will argue that Kant problematizes Achenwall’s foundational notion of a divine juridical state which opens up a normative gap between objective law (prohibitions, prescriptions and permissions) and subjective rights (moral capacities). In the absence of a divine sovereign, formal natural law is unable to justify subjective natural rights in the state of nature. In the Feyerabend Lectures, Kant, in order to close this gap, replaces the divine will with the “will of society”, making the state necessary for the possibility of rights.


2020 ◽  
pp. 65-101
Author(s):  
Douglas Flippen

John Finnis joins Grisez in providing a new foundation for Thomistic natural law theory. To accomplish this, they closely associate good as perfection with good as to be pursued and have both senses grasped together by the practical intellect independently of the speculative intellect. The practical intellect then presents good to the will and motivates it to act for the first time. Since good as perfection is inherently speculative and since the intellect becomes practical only depending on the will, their notion of the practical intellect is incoherent and their new foundation is deeply flawed.


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