The National Courts and the Uniform Application of EC Competition Rules. Preliminary Observations on Council Regulation 1/2003

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Council Regulation

5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

This chapter discusses the enforcement of EU competition law. EU competition law is primarily enforced through a system of ‘public enforcement’, where specialized administrative institutions initiate, decide, and terminate cases. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced by competition authorities at both the European—by the Commission—and national levels—by national competition authorities (NCAs). Since the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission and the NCAs form a ‘network’ of competition authorities called the European Competition Network (ECN). A set of specific legal mechanisms have been adopted to ensure a harmonious and effective enforcement of EU competition rules amongst the ECN. In addition, national courts also offer a remedial avenue for plaintiffs seeking to invoke EU competition rules. The chapter then looks at how the Commission and NCAs process competition cases. In general, a competition case goes through four stages: detection, investigation, evaluation, and decision.

The New Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 721-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Müller
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Courts ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Direct Applicability ◽  
European Competition Law

AbstractThe new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 2004, brings fundamental changes in the application of European competition law. It replaces the Antitrust-Regulation No. 17 which has been in force for more than 40 years. Regulation No. 1/2003 establishes a system of direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC-Treaty, which abandons the requirement of notification as a key element of the old system under Regulation No. 17. Under the new scheme set up by Regulation No. 1/2003 Article 81(3) will be directly applicable. This enables national competition authorities and national courts to apply Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty in their entirety, including paragraph 3 of Article 81. Although the new regulation is to be considered as an important step in strengthening and reinforcing European competition policy, in particular in view of the enlargement of the European Union, the numerous changes involve uncertainties which call for adjustment. The following article gives an overview of the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, set up by Regulation No. 1/2003.

scholarly journals 2000 m. gegužės 29 d. Europos Tarybos reglamentas (EB) Nr. 1346/2000 dėl bankroto bylų: taikytinos teisės nustatymo ypatumai

Teisė ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
Radvilė Čiricaitė
Keyword(s):  
Choice Of Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Insolvency Proceedings

Straipsnyje analizuojamos 2000 m. gegužės 29 d. Europos Tarybos Reglamente (EB) Nr. 1346/2000 dėl bankroto bylų įtvirtintos taikytinos teisės taisyklės, šių nuostatų turinys, reglamentavimo trūkumui. Taip pat nagrinėjami probleminiai taisyklių taikymo klausimai, su kuriais gali susidurti nacionalinių valstybių teismai tiesiogiai taikydami šį reglamentą. This article contains analysis of choice of law rules established in the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings as well as shortcomings of their regulation. Moreover, problematic aspects of application of rules which might be faced by the national courts while directly applying the regulation are examined in this article.

The Interface Between Competition Law and Private Law: Article 81, Illegality and Unjustified Enrichment

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243
Author(s):  
Barry J Rodger
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
General Question ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Unjustified Enrichment ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Private enforcement through private party litigation is to play a central role in the enforcement of the European Community competition rules. However, there has so far been little case-law in the national courts to explore in detail the range of issues concerning the award of remedies for breach of the competition rules, principally arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. This article considers the particular position of a cocontractor seeking to claim damages in unjustified enrichment in respect of a contract which is prohibited by art 81 and illegal. The Scots law position on the general question of recovery of damages with regard to an illegal contract is discussed, together with some recent English cases involving a breach of art 81. The article looks at the development of Community jurisprudence laying down the requirement for national courts to provide legal redress and to ensure the effectiveness of Community law. Finally, it considers the recent ruling by the European Court of Justice in Courage v Crehan on a reference from the Court of Appeal.

A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (8) ◽  
pp. 1173-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Wurmnest
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
German Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
New Era ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Injunctive Relief ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules

On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to sue infringers for injunctive relief or damages. To stimulate private enforcement, Regulation 1/2003 inter alia abolished the European Commission's exclusive power to exempt practices which are prohibited pursuant to Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty and entitled national competition authorities and courts to apply Art. 81 (3) EC Treaty. Moreover, it empowered the European Commission to make written submissions in antitrust cases pending before national courts. In line with the new European approach, the German legislature has overhauled the hitherto existing rules of German competition law considerably. This article will briefly describe the general changes brought by the reform and take a closer look at the amended rules relating to private antitrust litigation before German courts.

The Echr Implications of the Investigation Provisions of the Draft Competition Regulation

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Riley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Notification System ◽  
National Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Draft Regulation

In September 2000 the European Commission published its long-awaited proposed replacement for Regulation 17, the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereafter the draft regulation).1 The debate on the draft regulation has focused on the abolition of the notification system, the role of the national courts, and the role of the national competition authorities (hereafter the NCAs). However, there is one significant overlooked issue, namely the extent to which the investigation provisions of the draft regulation comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR).2 Given the paucity of the ECtHR's case law in 1961 it is understandable that the implications of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) for the investigative provisions of what was to become Regulation 17 were not at that time given any great consideration by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. However, there is now an extensive human rights case law, developed by the Strasbourg authorities which, it is argued, casts a major shadow over the Commission's existing and proposed investigative powers. It is further argued that the case law of the European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (hereafter CFI) in respect of fundamental rights as general principles of law, does not provide an equivalent standard of protection to that offered by the ECtHR.

Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 20 Cooperation Between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holzwarth Johannes
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
National Level ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules

This chapter explores the cooperation between the European Commission and Member States’ courts that apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The risk of inconsistent interpretations of EU competition rules renders cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts crucial, particularly due to the role that such courts play when it comes to the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level: in the era of decentralisation, it is the national courts that will ultimately be called upon to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU either directly, or when reviewing national authorities’ decisions based on those provisions. The central role that the Commission retains for the enforcement of EU competition law means that it has a particularly strong interest in ensuring effective cooperation with national courts. Moreover, the importance of cooperation between the Commission and Member State courts is further increasing due to the rise of private enforcement. This type of enforcement is generally associated with civil actions and damages awarded by national courts or tribunals.

Part III Outcomes of an Investigation, 10 Handling and Rejecting Complaints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawes Anthony ◽  
Rousseva Ekaterina
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explores the grounds for, and the process of, rejecting complaints, and outlines complainants’ rights. Complaints are crucial for effective antitrust enforcement. They are a tool to trigger cases and help the European Commission to focus on markets and practices that matter to EU citizens. The Commission therefore encourages the submission of complaints. At the same time, the Commission, as any administrative body, has limited resources. To this effect, the EU Courts have on many occasions acknowledged the Commission’s discretion to give differing degrees of priority to the examination of complaints and to choose the criteria for rejecting complaints. The EU competition rules take into account the fact that complaints are better dealt with by the competition authority which is closer to the facts. Moreover, once an allegedly anticompetitive practice is being reviewed or has been already reviewed by a competition authority, Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that other competition authorities can rely on this review to reject the same allegations if brought to their attention. The approach to complaints also takes into account that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and that persons affected by allegedly anticompetitive practices may seek redress before national courts.

8. EU competition law: Article 101 and 102 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 170-204
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Abusive Behaviour

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. It then looks at the two Treaty provisions in detail. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States whilst Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade.

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