Part VIII Cooperation in Antirust Enforcement, 19 Cooperation Within the ECN and Strengthening of National Competition Authorities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arsenidou Elisavet ◽  
Capiau Jeroen ◽  
Sinclair Ailsa ◽  
Stanciute Jurga
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Mutual Assistance ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Decentralised System ◽  
The Eu

This chapter assesses the cooperation between the European Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) in a decentralised system of antitrust enforcement. The recent adoption of a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) aims at ensuring more effective enforcement and mutual assistance among NCAs throughout the EU by putting in place minimum guarantees and powers to detect and tackle infringements. The chapter then explains the role of the European Competition Network (ECN), how it is organised and governed. The ECN was created in conjunction with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. It consists of the NCAs and the Commission forming together a network of public authorities applying the EU competition rules in close cooperation.

2. The Competition Law and Institutions of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
The Public ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Eu

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.

Abuse of Dominance: How Far are the EU and the US?

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Alberto Heimler
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Discussion Paper ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent years economic analysis has become more and more important in antitrust enforcement in Europe. First in merger control, then in vertical agreements the case by case approach based on a substantive appreciation of the restrictions of competition is becoming more and more prevalent. On abuse of dominance the difference between the US and the EU is still relevant. However, especially after the December 2005 publication by the European Commission of the Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses the gap has been reduced, at least in terms of the general approach to abuse cases. In practice, even though the role of economic analysis is much more refined and relevant than in the past, the European Commission continues to be more interventionist than US antitrust enforcers. This outcome depends very much on the widespread use of presumptions and truncated analysis on both sides of die Atlantic. A number of examples are provided on predation, discounts, refusal to deal, tying and bundling.

Part III Outcomes of an Investigation, 10 Handling and Rejecting Complaints

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawes Anthony ◽  
Rousseva Ekaterina
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explores the grounds for, and the process of, rejecting complaints, and outlines complainants’ rights. Complaints are crucial for effective antitrust enforcement. They are a tool to trigger cases and help the European Commission to focus on markets and practices that matter to EU citizens. The Commission therefore encourages the submission of complaints. At the same time, the Commission, as any administrative body, has limited resources. To this effect, the EU Courts have on many occasions acknowledged the Commission’s discretion to give differing degrees of priority to the examination of complaints and to choose the criteria for rejecting complaints. The EU competition rules take into account the fact that complaints are better dealt with by the competition authority which is closer to the facts. Moreover, once an allegedly anticompetitive practice is being reviewed or has been already reviewed by a competition authority, Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that other competition authorities can rely on this review to reject the same allegations if brought to their attention. The approach to complaints also takes into account that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and that persons affected by allegedly anticompetitive practices may seek redress before national courts.

scholarly journals The European Committee of the Regions as a watchdog of the principle of subsidiarity

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-301
Author(s):  
Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi ◽  
Lisette Mustert
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
European Committee ◽  
Legislative Proposal ◽  
The Right ◽  
Committee Of The Regions ◽  
Regional Funds ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
The Eu

In a resolution adopted on 1 February 2018, the European Committee of the Regions noted that a legislative proposal of the European Commission concerning a Regulation that changes the rules governing the EU regional funds for 2014-2020 did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Accordingly, the Committee considered challenging the legislative proposal before the Court of Justice if the proposal was formally agreed upon. Although at a later stage the European Commission decided to take into account the Committee’s argument and amended the proposal accordingly, such a context offers the chance to investigate more in detail the role of the Committee of the Regions in the legislative process of the EU and, more in particular, its role as a watchdog of the principle of subsidiarity. This paper aims to shed light on a rather neglected aspect of the EU constitutional practice, such as the potential of the Committee of the Regions to contribute to the legislative process, and answer the question of whether this Committee is the right body to guarantee compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

scholarly journals Limits to the European Commission – Managing Services of General Interests

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerzy Ząbkowicz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Services Of General Interest ◽  
The Eu

Services of general interest form an essential element of the European model of society as a way to increase quality of life and to overcome social exclusion and isolation. They are also at the core of the public debate touching the central question of the role public authorities and the institutions of the European Union play in a market economy. The competencies and responsibilities conferred by the Treaty, the EU regulations and directives lay emphasis on the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local authorities in defining, organizing, financing and monitoring services of general interest. The same time the EU Law provide the European Commission with a wide range of means of action to ensure the compliance of the process of organizing and financing such services according to a comprehensive regulatory regime at Community level to make them compatible with the internal market and to prevent a distortion of the competition rules. The paper indicates divergences of the points of view of public authorities and the Commission on their role, shared responsibility and powers in that process.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

COLLECTIVE REDRESS PROCEDURES–EUROPEAN DEBATES

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Geraint Howells
Keyword(s):  
Policy Development ◽  
National Level ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Member States ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Consumer Organizations ◽  
Civil Procedures ◽  
The Eu

AbstractCollective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.

The Agri-Environment Regulation EU 2078/92: The Role of the European Commission in Policy Shaping and Setting

1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Jones ◽  
J R A Clark
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Policy Network ◽  
Policy Area ◽  
Environmental Considerations ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Policy Communities ◽  
Environment Regulation ◽  
The Eu

We examine the role of the European Commission in the formulation and negotiation of a Council regulation on agri-environmental policy (EU 2078/92). We show how this regulation was shaped largely by political opportunism and financial and administrative realities, rather than by stringent environmental considerations and targets, We also reveal how the debate over EU 2078/92 has been dominated by only a few actors at supranational and national levels, and identify the key role played by the European Commission at all stages of the progress of the regulation through the route ways of the European Union's (EU) decisionmaking process. Of further interest is the way in which well-established agricultural policy communities have attempted to keep a tight rein on the development of the regulation in order to prevent this new policy area from being infiltrated by nonagricultural interests. For such interests, the regulation provided an opportunity to penetrate the long-established policy network surrounding agriculture in the EU.

scholarly journals Roma Expulsions and Discrimination: The Elephant in Brussels

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen O’Nions
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The Political ◽  
Full Participation ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This article will critically examine the treatment of migrant Roma in Western Europe, particularly Italy and France, in the light of the obligations under the EU Citizenship Directive 2004/38. The role of the political institutions will be considered, especially the European Commission, who have yet to take a decisive position on the Roma expulsions and on the wider issue of Roma discrimination in Europe. It is argued that the focus on non-discrimination cannot address the entrenched inequality which characterises the Roma’s situation in Europe. Furthermore, that the comparative disadvantage experienced by Europe’s Roma communities constitutes a major human rights crisis which has so far been sidelined by Brussels. A European strategy is urgently required, which demands leadership from the Commission and the full participation of Roma representatives.

scholarly journals Representative Bureaucracy and the Role of Expertise in Politics

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarle Trondal ◽  
Zuzana Murdoch ◽  
Benny Geys
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Representative Bureaucracy ◽  
Role Perception ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Bureaucratic Representation ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Organizational Affiliation

The vast majority of existing studies on bureaucratic representation focus on bureaucracies’ permanent and internal staff. Yet, the rising sophistication of modern democracies and the technocratization of political life are gradually inducing an increased reliance on external experts to assist in the development and implementation of policy decisions. This trend, we argue, raises the need to extend studies of bureaucratic representation to such external and non-permanent experts in governmental affairs. In this article, we take a first step in this direction using seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission as our empirical laboratory. Our results highlight that Commission SNEs do not appear representative of their constituent population (i.e., the EU-27 population) along a number of socio-demographic dimensions. Moreover, we find that the role perception of “experts” is primarily explained by organizational affiliation, and only secondarily by demographic characteristics (except, of course, education).

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