Impact of Consequence Information on Insurance Choice

Abstract Given the threat of natural disasters to Cultural Heritage, this paper aims to investigate how the use of the insurance instrument contributes to the definition of an adequate risk management strategy. The analysis focuses on the role that insurance can play both by supplying policies covering damage and proactively stimulating prevention behaviors, taking into consideration information imperfections (i.e., adverse selection, moral hazard and charity hazard). Through a survey among Italian Dioceses, data about the diffusion of insurance contracts were collected together with other qualitative and quantitative elements linked to the decisional process of insuring Italian Cathedrals. The empirical analysis shows that the administrators of the Dioceses are aware of the economic value of the cultural assets and in safeguarding the Cathedrals they identify in the insurance system a useful and efficient risk management instrument.

Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand

Journal of Risk & Insurance ◽

10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01335.x ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 77 (1) ◽

pp. 129-144 ◽

Cited By ~ 15

Author(s):

Richard Dusansky ◽

Çağatay Koç

Keyword(s):

Medical Care ◽

Insurance Choice

Health and Mortality Delta: Assessing the Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1714491 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Ralph S. J. Koijen ◽

Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh ◽

Motohiro Yogo

Keyword(s):

Welfare Cost ◽

Insurance Choice ◽

Health And Mortality

Modelling Different Types of Bundled Automobile Insurance Choice Behaviour: The Case of Taiwan

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice ◽

10.1057/gpp.2010.5 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 35 (2) ◽

pp. 290-308 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Ming-Jyh Wang ◽

Chieh-Hua Wen ◽

Lawrence W Lan

Keyword(s):

Automobile Insurance ◽

Choice Behaviour ◽

Insurance Choice ◽

Different Types

Health Insurance Choice with Flexible Spending Accounts

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review ◽

10.1057/grir.2011.9 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 37 (2) ◽

pp. 208-222 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

James H Cardon

Keyword(s):

Health Insurance ◽

Insurance Choice ◽

Flexible Spending Accounts

The Role of Wealth and Health in Insurance Choice: Bivariate Probit Analysis in China

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2014/658205 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-9 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Yiding Yue ◽

Jinyou Zou

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Health Status ◽

Care Program ◽

Pension Plans ◽

Bivariate Probit ◽

Commercial Insurance ◽

Health Care Program ◽

Pension Program ◽

Insurance Choice

This paper captures the correlation between the choices of health insurance and pension insurance using the bivariate probit model and then studies the effect of wealth and health on insurance choice. Our empirical evidence shows that people who participate in a health care program are more likely to participate in a pension plan at the same time, while wealth and health have different effects on the choices of the health care program and the pension program. Generally, the higher an individual’s wealth level is, the more likelihood he will participate in a health care program; but wealth has no effect on the participation of pension. Health status has opposite effects on choices of health care programs and pension plans; the poorer an individual’s health is, the more likely he is to participate in health care programs, while the better health he enjoys, the more likely he is to participate in pension plans. When the investigation scope narrows down to commercial insurance, there is only a significant effect of health status on commercial health insurance. The commercial insurance choice and the insurance choice of the agricultural population are more complicated.

The Effect of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 on Health Care Utilization of Employment Separators

The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy ◽

10.2202/1935-1682.1840 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

David M. Zimmer

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

Health Care Utilization ◽

Medical Expenditure Panel Survey ◽

Simultaneous Equations ◽

Medical Expenditure ◽

Care Utilization ◽

Panel Survey ◽

Maximum Simulated Likelihood ◽

Simulated Likelihood ◽

Insurance Choice

Abstract This paper uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to estimate the effect of COBRA on health care utilization among a sample of individuals who experience employment separation. The empirical specification employs a structural simultaneous equations model of insurance choice and utilization that is estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood. Results indicate that employment separators who elect COBRA appear to consume more health care compared to individuals who become temporarily uninsured. In addition, results do not indicate adverse selection into COBRA. Although COBRA enrollees consume more health care than temporary insurance losers, election appears to exhibit favorable selection with respect to physician utilization.

Putting Health Back into Health Insurance Choice

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e519682015-049 ◽

2012 ◽

Author(s):

Pavel Atanasov ◽

Tom Baker

Keyword(s):

Health Insurance ◽

Insurance Choice

Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design

Annual Review of Economics ◽

10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-111716 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Nathaniel Hendren ◽

Camille Landais ◽

Johannes Spinnewijn

Keyword(s):

Adverse Selection ◽

Unemployment Insurance ◽

Social Insurance ◽

Insurance Markets ◽

Annual Review ◽

Publication Date ◽

Uncompensated Care ◽

Regulatory Policies ◽

The Social ◽

Insurance Choice

Should choice be offered in social insurance programs? This review presents a conceptual framework that identifies the key forces determining the social value of offering choice. We show that the value of offering choice is higher the larger the variation in individual valuations for extra insurance is, but it gets reduced by both selection on risk and selection on moral hazard. Besides adverse selection, the implementation of choice-based policies is further challenged by the presence of choice frictions or the obligation to offer basic uncompensated care. All these inefficiencies can be seen as externalities that do not rationalize the absence of providing choice per se but point to the need for regulatory policies and suggest the potential value of corrective pricing à la Pigou. Applying this framework to the existing evidence on these forces in the context of unemployment insurance, we find that offering insurance choice can be valuable even in the presence of significant adverse selection. We conclude by showing how this framework can constitute a fruitful guide for further empirical research in different insurance domains. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.