scholarly journals The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Piredda
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

scholarly journals Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Matt Sims
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Energy Minimisation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Evolution Of Life ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

AbstractA mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive causes of behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required to settle the question of when in the evolution of life cognition first emerged. An answer to this question should however avoid two pitfalls. It should avoid overintellectualising the minds of other organisms, ascribing to them cognitive capacities for which they have no need given the lives they lead within the niches they inhabit. But equally it should do justice to the remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed in the behaviour of microorganisms that do not have a nervous system. We should resist seeking non-cognitive explanations of behaviour simply because an organism fails to exhibit human-like feats of thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. We will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) can serve as the basis for a mark of the cognitive that avoids the twin pitfalls of overintellectualising or underestimating the cognitive achievements of evolutionarily primitive organisms. The FEP purports to describe principles of organisation that any organism must instantiate if it is to remain well-adapted to its environment. Living systems from plants and microorganisms all the way up to humans act in ways that tend in the long run to minimise free energy. If the FEP provides a mark of the cognitive, as we will argue it does, it mandates that cognition should indeed be ascribed to plants, microorganisms and other organisms that lack a nervous system.

scholarly journals Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Area Of Concern ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Brain

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

scholarly journals Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind

2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy Clark
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind

scholarly journals El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 475
Author(s):  
Federico Gabriel Burdman
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Face

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I will firs consider critically a proposal put forth by Rowlands (2010), which identifie the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I fin in this proposal will lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches. I will then discuss the standing of embodied, enactive and extended approaches in the face of the dividing issue concerning functionalism, with an eye on the possibility of divorcing the thesis of the extended mind of its original formulation in functionalist terms. In this way, I shall consider the outlook of overcoming some of the conceptual tensions in post-cognitivism by thinking its theoretical framework as non-functionalist.

The cure for the cure: Networking the extended mind

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Merritt
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind

scholarly journals Poetyka, genetyka, praca. (O sztuce rymotwórczej)

Forum Poetyki ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateusz Antoniuk
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind

Artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, jakie korzyści może zyskać poetyka, wchodząc w metodologiczną kooperację z krytyką genetyczną. Odpowiedź opiera się na definicji, sformułowanej przez Dorotę Korwin-Piotrowską, stwierdzającą, że „pojęcia z zakresu poetyki są zapisem poznawczego wysiłku, by zbadać i opisać pracę ludzkiego umysłu”. W szkicu postawiona zostaje teza, wedle której szczególna (choć rzecz jasna ograniczona) możliwość poznawania „pracy ludzkiego umysłu” pojawia się wówczas, gdy poetyka – współpracując z krytyką genetyczną – zajmuje się nie tylko gotową postacią tekstu, lecz także tekstem in statu nascendi (zapisem procesu tekstotwórczego, jakim jest brulion). Twierdzenie to zostaje następnie zilustrowane za pomocą poglądowej analizy, łączącej opis poetologiczny z genetycznym, a poświęconej pracy nad rymem, wykonywanej przez Czesława Miłosza w trakcie pisania dwu wierszy: Rozmów na Wielkanoc 1620 roku i Na ścięcie damy dworu. W zakończeniu szkicu pojawiają się dalsze uwagi teoretyczne, między innymi odwołujące się do pojęcia extended mind oraz współczesnych, podmiotowych i czynnościowych koncepcji kultury.

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