scholarly journals Introduction to the special section: the extended mind and the foundations of cognitive science

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
John Sutton
2015 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Froese

AbstractPessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Łukasz Afeltowicz ◽  
Witold Wachowski

Abstract The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.


Author(s):  
David Eck ◽  
Stephen Turner

Approaches to cognitive science can be divided into two large groups: the standard model of the computational mind, usually associated with the idea of modularization, and extended to include a theory of mind, and rival and not-so-well-integrated approaches that replace its explanations with other mechanisms, the 4Es of cognition: the embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive movements, to which can be added the ecological approach based on Gibsonian affordances and Mark Bickhard’s interactivism. These approaches fit with very different social theories: the standard model with the social as understood by Durkheim, Parsons, and the early Bourdieu. The alternative, especially the idea of the extended mind, fits with a conception of society that replaces “the social” with a conception in which substitutable parts—routines and technology, take over its explanatory burdens.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Geertz

AbstractThis article is a critical examination of Dennett's book Breaking the Spell. The main argument is that there are good and effective ways of doing the cognitive science of religion and there are poor and ineffective ways of doing it. Dennett's book is poorly done on a number of fronts: it is exceedingly hostile and rhetorical, thus missing the public audience he wishes to persuade, it is arrogant towards and shows clear ignorance of the professional study of religion, and it poorly represents serious cognitive science of religion. Furthermore, Dennett ignores the vast amount of literature on the very subjects that worry him the most, namely, fundamentalism, terror, violence, bigotry, deception, oppression, rape, child abuse, and false beliefs—all of which are not necessarily related to religion, on which he is silent. He also leaves untouched the literature on a number of subjects highly relevant to his evolutionary scenario, such as the evolution of consciousness, theories of memory, the role of narrative, the development of persons and selves, embodied cognition, extended mind, etc.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tjeerd van de Laar ◽  
Herman de Regt

Author(s):  
David Borgo

One of the particular joys of improvising music together is not knowing precisely the relationship between one’s own actions and thoughts (one has to surprise oneself, after all) or between one’s actions and those of other improvisers (did you do that because I did that? Or did I do that because you did that?). Drawing on research in social psychology, actor-network theory, and the extended mind thesis in cognitive science, this chapter argues that one’s experience of musical “authorship” can be enhanced or undermined rather easily by social, material, and technological forms of agency in the environment. It concludes that musical improvisation offers simultaneously a situated practice for exploring interagency—and thereby exorcising the humanistic ghost of a “self-luminous” will—and the possibility of creating some provisional closure, some fleeting reduction of complexity, in a world increasingly characterized by relentless machinic heterogenesis.


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