scholarly journals Why Do Children Who Solve False Belief Tasks Begin to Find True Belief Control Tasks Difficult? A Test of Pragmatic Performance Factors in Theory of Mind Tasks

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lydia P. Schidelko ◽  
Michael Huemer ◽  
Lara M. Schröder ◽  
Anna S. Lueb ◽  
Josef Perner ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
True Belief ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Test Question ◽  
Performance Factors ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Pragmatic Account ◽  
Litmus Test ◽  
Performance Pattern ◽  
Pragmatic Performance

The litmus test for the development of a metarepresentational Theory of Mind is the false belief (FB) task in which children have to represent how another agent misrepresents the world. Children typically start mastering this task around age four. Recently, however, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. Pragmatic accounts assume that the TB task is pragmatically confusing because it poses a trivial academic test question about a rational agent’s perspective; and we do not normally engage in such discourse about subjective mental perspectives unless there is at least the possibility of error or deviance. The lack of such an obvious possibility in the TB task implicates that there might be some hidden perspective difference and thus makes the task confusing. In the present study, we test the pragmatic account by administering to 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 88) TB and FB tasks and structurally analogous true and false sign (TS/FS) tasks. The belief and sign tasks are matched in terms of representational and metarepresentational complexity; the crucial difference is that TS tasks do not implicate an alternative non-mental perspective and should thus be less pragmatically confusing than TB tasks. The results show parallel and correlated development in FB and FS tasks, replicate the puzzling performance pattern in TB tasks, but show no trace of this in TS tasks. Taken together, these results speak in favor of the pragmatic performance account.

Temporo-parietal Junction Activity in Theory-of-Mind Tasks: Falseness, Beliefs, or Attention

2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 1179-1192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Aichhorn ◽  
Josef Perner ◽  
Benjamin Weiss ◽  
Martin Kronbichler ◽  
Wolfgang Staffen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Test Question ◽  
Teleological Reasoning ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Lack Of Information ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
The Right

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally responsible for FBs as well as FSs. Measuring BOLD at two time points in each vignette, at the time the FB-inducing information (or lack of information) is presented and at the time the test question is processed, made clear that the FB is processed spontaneously as soon as the relevant information is presented and not on demand for answering the question in contrast to extant behavioral data. Finally, a fourth, true belief vignette (TB) required teleological reasoning, that is, prediction of a rational action without any doubts being raised about the adequacy of the actor's information about reality. Activation by this vignette supported claims that the TPJ-R is activated by TBs as well as FBs.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Abilities and Social Competence in Preschool Children

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 09-11
Author(s):  
Shrunga Manchanapura Shivalingaiah ◽  
Fathimath Ramseena ◽  
Nafeesath Shareen
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Life ◽  
True Belief ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
Typically Developing Children ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Objective Theory ◽  
Mixed Responses

Abstract Background and Objective Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability that can be attributed to mental status beliefs, intents, emotions, proficiency, etc., to oneself and to others, and the understanding that others also have intentions, conceptions, desires, and perspectives that are different from one’s own. Daily social life depends on the ability to evaluate the behavior of other people on the basis of their mental state such as their beliefs, intentions, compassions, and goals. This study was conducted to explore the ToM abilities in preschoolers. Methods A total of 36 preschoolers participated in the study. Two stories were narrated to the children, the classic Sally-Anne Task and the Smarty’s Task. In both the tasks, the responses of the children were scored as either true belief or false belief. Results The results of the present study revealed mixed responses among the preschoolers. It was found that 3- to 4-year-old children had more false beliefs for both the tasks when compared with 4- to 5-year-old. Conclusion This study highlights the importance of ToM abilities in typically growing children and other clinical population. It can be concluded that the ToM abilities were improved in typically developing children. Future studies are required to explore the higher levels of embedding of ToM, and also to incorporate it in the clinical population.

Understanding minds and evidence for belief: A study of Mofu children in Cameroon

2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 445-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Penelope G. Vinden
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
True Belief ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Better Than

This study explores young children’s understanding of mind and their ability to give evidence for belief. Mofu children of Cameroon were chosen as participants as they provide a unique opportunity to compare the development of an understanding of minds and evidence in schooled and nonschooled populations. A series of standard theory-of-mind tasks were given to 154 children, as well as a novel evidence task. Results suggest that children who have attended school develop an understanding of minds earlier than nonattenders. School attenders did not show superior understanding of evidence for false belief. They did perform better than the nonschooled sample, however, on a question concerning evidence for a subsequent true belief, although performance on this question for both groups was poor.

Do children understand desires before they understand beliefs? A comparison of 3-year-olds’ grasp of incompatible desires, competitive games and false beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Proft ◽  
Cornelia Hoss ◽  
Katharina Manfredini Paredes ◽  
hannes rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Active Choice ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Competitive Games ◽  
Cognitive Attitudes

A long-standing dispute in theory of mind research concerns the development of understanding different kinds of propositional attitudes. The asymmetry view suggests that children understand conative attitudes (e.g., desires) before they understand cognitive attitudes (e.g., beliefs). The symmetry view suggests that notions of cognitive and conative attitudes develop simultaneously. Relevant studies to date have produced inconsistent results, yet with different methods and dependent measures. To test between the two accounts more systematically, we thus combined different forms of desire tasks (incompatible desires and competition) with different forms of measurement (verbal ascription and active choice) in a single design. Additionally, children’s performance in the desire tasks was compared to their false-belief understanding. Results revealed that 3-year-olds were better at ascribing desires than at ascribing beliefs for both desire tasks whereas they had difficulties actively choosing the more desired option in the competition task. The present findings thus favor the asymmetry theory.

scholarly journals Reading and Theory of Mind in Adolescents with Cochlear Implant

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-223
Author(s):  
Mario Figueroa ◽  
Sònia Darbra ◽  
Núria Silvestre
Keyword(s):  
Reading Comprehension ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cochlear Implant ◽  
Cochlear Implants ◽  
Group Performance ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task

Abstract Previous research has shown a possible link between reading comprehension and theory of mind (ToM), but these findings are unclear in adolescents with cochlear implants (CI). In the present study, reading comprehension and ToM were assessed in adolescents with CI and the relation between both skills was also studied. Two sessions were performed on two groups of adolescents aged between 12 and 16 years of age (36 adolescents with CI and 54 participants with typical hearing, TH). They were evaluated by means of a standardized reading battery, a false belief task, and Faux Pas stories. The results indicated that reading and cognitive ToM were more developed in the TH group than in adolescents with CI. However, early-CI and binaural group performance were close to the TH group in narrative and expository comprehension and cognitive ToM. The results also indicated that cognitive ToM and reading comprehension appear to be related in deaf adolescents.

scholarly journals Children's understanding of homonymy: metalinguistic awareness and false belief

2000 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN J. DOHERTY
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Chronological Age ◽  
Metalinguistic Awareness ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Mental Age ◽  
And Control ◽  
Selection Of

The aim of this study was to explain why children have difficulty with homonymy. Two experiments were conducted with forty-eight children (Experiment 1) and twenty-four children (Experiment 2). Three- and four-year-old children had to either select or judge another person's selection of a different object with the same name, avoiding identical objects and misnomers. Older children were successful, but despite possessing the necessary vocabulary, younger children failed these tasks. Understanding of homonymy was strongly and significantly associated to understanding of synonymy, and more importantly, understanding of false belief, even when verbal mental age, chronological age, and control measures were partialled out. This indicates that children's ability to understand homonymy results from their ability to make a distinction characteristic of representation, a distinction fundamental to both metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind.

Deception and false belief in paranoia: Modelling Theory of Mind stories

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick M. Shryane ◽  
Rhiannon Corcoran ◽  
Georgina Rowse ◽  
Rosanne Moore ◽  
Sinead Cummins ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
False Belief
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