scholarly journals Network Creation Games with Traceroute-Based Strategies

Algorithms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Davide Bilò ◽  
Luciano Gualà ◽  
Stefano Leucci ◽  
Guido Proietti

Network creation games have been extensively used as mathematical models to capture the key aspects of the decentralized process that leads to the formation of interconnected communication networks by selfish agents. In these games, each user of the network is identified by a node and selects which link to activate by strategically balancing his/her building cost with his/her usage cost (which is a function of the distances towards the other player in the network to be built). In these games, a widespread assumption is that players have a common and complete information about the evolving network topology. This is only realistic for small-scale networks as, when the network size grows, it quickly becomes impractical for the single users to gather such a global and fine-grained knowledge of the network in which they are embedded. In this work, we weaken this assumption, by only allowing players to have a partial view of the network. To this aim, we borrow three popular traceroute-based knowledge models used in network discovery: (i) distance vector, (ii) shortest-path tree view, and (iii) layered view. We settle many of the classical game theoretic questions in all of the above models. More precisely, we introduce a suitable (and unifying) equilibrium concept which we then use to study the convergence of improving and best response dynamics, the computational complexity of computing a best response, and to provide matching upper and lower bounds to the price of anarchy.

Author(s):  
Hagen Echzell ◽  
Tobias Friedrich ◽  
Pascal Lenzner ◽  
Anna Melnichenko

Network Creation Games(NCGs) model the creation of decentralized communication networks like the Internet. In such games strategic agents corresponding to network nodes selfishly decide with whom to connect to optimize some objective function. Past research intensively analyzed models where the agents strive for a central position in the network. This models agents optimizing the network for low-latency applications like VoIP. However, with today's abundance of streaming services it is important to ensure that the created network can satisfy the increased bandwidth demand. To the best of our knowledge, this natural problem of the decentralized strategic creation of networks with sufficient bandwidth has not yet been studied. We introduce Flow-Based NCGs where the selfish agents focus on bandwidth instead of latency. In essence, budget-constrained agents create network links to maximize their minimum or average network flow value to all other network nodes. Equivalently, this can also be understood as agents who create links to increase their connectivity and thus also the robustness of the network. For this novel type of NCG we prove that pure Nash equilibria exist, we give a simple algorithm for computing optimal networks, we show that the Price of Stability is 1 and we prove an (almost) tight bound of 2 on the Price of Anarchy. Last but not least, we show that our models do not admit a potential function.


Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (24) ◽  
pp. 7336
Author(s):  
Mincheol Paik ◽  
Haneul Ko

Frequent location updates of individual Internet of Things (IoT) devices can cause several problems (e.g., signaling overhead in networks and energy depletion of IoT devices) in massive machine type communication (mMTC) systems. To alleviate these problems, we design a distributed group location update algorithm (DGLU) in which geographically proximate IoT devices determine whether to conduct the location update in a distributed manner. To maximize the accuracy of the locations of IoT devices while maintaining a sufficiently small energy outage probability, we formulate a constrained stochastic game model. We then introduce a best response dynamics-based algorithm to obtain a multi-policy constrained Nash equilibrium. From the evaluation results, it is demonstrated that DGLU can achieve an accuracy of location information that is comparable with that of the individual location update scheme, with a sufficiently small energy outage probability.


Author(s):  
Nikhil Karamchandani ◽  
Massimo Franceschetti

The throughput of delay-sensitive traffic in a Rayleigh fading network is studied by adopting a scaling limit approach. The case of the study is that of a pair of nodes establishing a data stream that has routing priority over all the remaining traffic in the network. For every delay constraint, upper and lower bounds on the achievable information rate between the two endpoints of the stream are obtained as the network size grows. The analysis concerns decentralized schemes , in the sense that all nodes make next-hop decisions based only on local information, namely their channel strength to other nodes in the network and the position of the destination node. This is particularly important in a fading scenario, where the channel strength varies with time and hence pre-computing routes can be of little help. Natural applications are remote surveillance using sensor networks and communication in emergency scenarios.


2017 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 61-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Ismael Martínez-Martínez

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1974-1981
Author(s):  
Susobhan Ghosh ◽  
Sujit Gujar ◽  
Praveen Paruchuri ◽  
Easwar Subramanian ◽  
Sanjay Bhat

Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e.g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.


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