scholarly journals Intelligent Environment Monitoring System for University Laboratories

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linbo Zhai ◽  
Wenwen Jiang

In recent years, the laboratory security of universities has become an important issue for students and devices. To solve this security issue, this paper proposes an intelligent monitoring system to realize environment detection in university laboratories. The main purpose of this system is to monitor the laboratory environment data in time and improve the laboratory inspection efficiency. The system consists of a single chip microcomputer, which is the core of this system, a sensor function module and GPRS wireless communication, realizing data monitoring and short message warning. Therefore, three features, front-end data acquisition, data wireless transmission and a security alarm, are achieved by the proposed system. The real experiments show that front-end data acquisition is effective, data transmission is reliable, and the alarm message is received in time. Furthermore, the system, with the modified function modules, can be used in other scenarios to detect environments, and thus has a significant applied value in other areas.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1750 ◽  
pp. 012037
Author(s):  
Yong Chen ◽  
Shudong Wang ◽  
Hao Wang ◽  
Shen Liu ◽  
Runqing Li

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (23) ◽  
pp. 13984-13998
Author(s):  
Jinghan Du ◽  
Minghua Hu ◽  
Weining Zhang

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 3667-3677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Liu ◽  
Qiang Li ◽  
Yihu Li ◽  
Xiao-Dong Deng ◽  
Hailin Tang ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Farlee

ABSTRACT: Disclosure and monitoring policy are studied, where disclosure relates to information about the monitoring system. A moral hazard model is presented where employee monitoring occurs with some exogenous probability and the owner privately learns whether he will be monitoring before the employee chooses his productive action. Disclosure policy is an owner choice between revealing to the employee whether he will be monitoring before the action (Disclosure) or remaining silent (Secrecy). The results rely on the joint presence of risk aversion and limited liability. Risk aversion creates an efficiency/risk tradeoff where secrecy obtains risk-sharing benefits. Limited liability reduces these benefits, allowing preference for disclosure. Lower monitoring probabilities increase the risk premium required to obtain effort with secrecy. For small monitoring probabilities, disclosure is preferred even though less efficient production is achieved, because disclosure provides a greater risk-sharing benefit. For high monitoring probabilities, secrecy is preferred because it leads to greater efficiency despite a greater risk premium.


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