scholarly journals Application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Establishing Perchlorate and Goitrogen Risk Mitigation Strategies

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 10374-10390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Crawford-Brown
Author(s):  
Lorna Harron ◽  
Rick Barlow ◽  
Ted Farquhar

Increasing concerns and attention to pipeline safety have engaged pipeline companies and regulatory agencies to extend their approaches to pipeline integrity. The implementation of High Consequence Areas (HCAs) has in particular had an impact on the development of integrity management protocols (IMPs) for pipelines. These IMPs can require that a risk based assessment of integrity issues be applied to specific HCA risk factors. This paper addresses the development of an operational risk assessment approach for pipeline leak detection requirements for HCAs. A detailed risk assessment algorithm that includes 25 risk variables and 28 consequence variables was developed for application to all HCA areas. The significant likelihood and consequence factors were chosen through discussions with the Leak Detection Risk Assessment Model Working Group and subject matter experts throughout Enbridge. The leak detection algorithm focuses on sections of pipe from flow meter to flow meter, as these are the locations that impact the leak detection system used by Enbridge. Each section of pipe is evaluated for likelihood, consequence and risk. When a high or medium risk area has been identified, an evaluation of potential Preventive and Mitigative (P&M) measures will be undertaken. A P & M Matrix has been developed to identify potential mitigation strategies to be considered for higher risk variables, called risk drivers, in the model. The matrix has been developed to identify potential risk mitigation strategies to consider for each variable used in the HCA Leak Detection Risk Assessment. The purpose of the matrix is to guide the user to consider actions identified for variables that drive the risk for the particular location. Upon review of the matrix, the user determines feasibility of the risk mitigation strategies being considered to identify an action. The paper will describe the consultative process that was used to workshop the development of this algorithm. Included in this description is how the process addressed various methods of leak detection across a wide variety of pipelines. The paper closes with “development challenges” and future steps in applying operation risk assessment techniques to mainline leak detection risk management.


Author(s):  
Anna Hopper

This paper develops a risk assessment framework for airport development projects. It discusses the major types of inherent development risk, including political risk, environmental risk, financial risk, airline risk, forecast risk, and regulatory or operational risk, and it offers suggestions for risk mitigation strategies. Furthermore, it identifies and analyzes relative risk determinants, which affect the magnitude and type of risk that development projects will likely face. These include the presence of a dominant airline, the airport’s rate structure, the airport’s ownership and operating structure, local demand, and geopolitical events. These factors and their interconnected relationships are illustrated through case studies of relevant airport development projects.


Author(s):  
Ryan Phillips ◽  
Tony King ◽  
Jim Bruce

The Pipeline Ice Risk Assessment & Mitigation JIP (PIRAM) developed a set of engineering models and design procedures for implementation into industry best practices for risk mitigation and protection of pipeline infrastructure from ice keel loading. The models established the pipeline mechanical behaviour in response to ice keel load events, and assessed engineering concepts for protection and risk mitigation strategies. Improved methodologies for contact frequency and ice keel loads determination formed part of the integrated model. This paper presents an overview of this multiyear program and examples of the application of the models in pipeline burial depth assessment in pressure ridge ice gouged seabeds.


Author(s):  
Robert E. Chapman ◽  
Jeffrey T. Fong ◽  
David T. Butry ◽  
Douglas S. Thomas ◽  
James J. Filliben ◽  
...  

This paper is built around ASTM E 2506, Standard Guide for Developing a Cost-Effective Risk Mitigation Plan for New and Existing Constructed Facilities. E 2506 establishes a three-step protocol—perform risk assessment, specify combinations of risk mitigation strategies for evaluation, and perform economic evaluation—to insure that the decision maker is provided the requisite information to choose the most cost effective combination of risk mitigation strategies. Because decisions associated with low-probability, high-consequence events involve uncertainty both in terms of appropriate evaluation procedures and event-related measures of likelihood and consequence, NIST developed a Risk Mitigation Toolkit. This paper uses (a) a data center undergoing renovation for improved security, and (b) a PVP-related failure event to illustrate how to perform the E 2506 three-step protocol with particular emphasis on the third step—perform economic evaluation. The third step is built around the Cost-Effectiveness Tool for Capital Asset Protection (CET), which was developed by NIST. Version 4.0 of CET is used to analyze the security- or failure-related event with a focus on consequence estimation and consequence assessment via Monte Carlo techniques. CET 4.0 includes detailed analysis and reporting features designed to identify key cost drivers, measure their impacts, and deliver estimated consequence parameters with uncertainty bounds. Significance of this economics-based intelligence (EI) tool is presented and discussed for security- or failure-consequence estimation to risk assessment of failure of critical structures or components.


Author(s):  
Curtis Smith

A key area of the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) use is in the development of methodologies and tools that will be used to predict the safety, security, safeguards, performance, and deployment viability of SMR systems starting in the design process through the operation phase. Recently, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) set out to develop quantitative methods and tools and the associated analysis framework for assessing a variety of SMR risks. Development and implementation of SMR-focused safety assessment methods may require new analytic methods or adaptation of traditional methods to the advanced design and operational features of SMRs. The development of SMR-specific safety models for margin determination will provide a safety case that describes potential accidents, design options (including postulated controls), and supports licensing activities by providing a technical basis for the safety envelope. INL has proposed an approach to expand and advance the state-of-the-practice in PRA. Specifically we will develop a framework for applying modern computational tools to create advanced risk-based methods for identifying design vulnerabilities in SMRs. This framework will require the fusion of state-of-the-art PRA methods, advanced 3D visualization methods, and highperformance optimization. The approach has several defining attributes focused within three general areas: 1. Models – A single 3D representation of all key systems, structures, and components (SSCs) will be defined for a particular facility. We will be able to simulate — by understanding how each SSC interacts with other parts of the facility — the hazard-induced susceptibilities of each SSC. 2. Phenomena – An approach to effectively representing hazards and their effect on physical behavior at a facility will need to be determined. In many cases, multiple models of a specific phenomenon may be available, but this ensemble of models will need to be intelligently managed. 3. Integration – Any advanced risk-informed decision support approach will rely on a variety of probabilistic and mechanistic information. The safety, security, and economic drivers will need to be integrated in order to determine the effectiveness of proposed mitigation strategies. We will need to be able to manage all (important) hazards for all (important) scenarios all of the time the facility is in operation. The focus of the paper will be on discussing the features of the proposed advanced SMR PRA Framework and providing an status update of the development activities.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kennedy ◽  
Brian K. Flemming ◽  
David G. Devoy ◽  
Daniel F. Huantes ◽  
Matthew D. Flowers

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