scholarly journals Operational Decision Model with Carbon Cap Allocation and Carbon Trading Price

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinpyo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Optimality Condition ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Production Decision ◽  
Trade Market

This paper considers a carbon emission cap and trade market, where the carbon emission cap for each entity (either government or firm) is allocated first and then the carbon trading price is decided interdependently in the carbon trading market among the non-cooperative entities which make their production decision. We assume that there are n entities emitting carbon during the production process. After allocating the carbon (emission) cap for each participating entity in the carbon cap and trade market, each participant makes a production decision using the Newsvendor model given carbon trading price determined in the carbon trading market and trades some amount of its carbon emission, if its carbon emission is below or above its own carbon cap. Here, the carbon trading price depends on how carbon caps over the entities are allocated, since the carbon trading price is determined through the carbon (emission) trading market, which considers total amount of carbon emission being equal to total carbon caps over entities and some fraction of total carbon emission should be from each entity participating in the carbon cap and trade market. Thus, we can see the interdependency among the production decision, carbon cap and carbon trading price. We model this as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game in which carbon cap for each entity is allocated in the first stage and each entity’s production quantity is decided in the second stage considering the carbon trading price determined in the carbon trading market. First, we show the monotonic property of the carbon trading price and each entity’s production over the carbon cap allocation. In addition, we show that there exists an optimality condition for the carbon cap allocation. Using this optimality condition, we provide various results for carbon cap and trade market.

scholarly journals Dynamic Spillovers and Asymmetric Spillover Effect between the Carbon Emission Trading Market, Fossil Energy Market, and New Energy Stock Market in China

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (19) ◽  
pp. 6438
Author(s):  
Dan Nie ◽  
Yanbin Li ◽  
Xiyu Li
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Carbon Market ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Fossil Energy ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Coal Market

In 2020, China proposed the goal of achieving carbon emission peaks by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. For China, whose energy consumption structure has long been dominated by fossil energy, carbon trading and new energy are crucial for the realization of the emission target. By establishing a connectedness network model, this paper studies the static and dynamic spillovers between the Hubei carbon trading market, new energy stock market, crude oil market, coal market, and natural gas market in China, and draws the following conclusions: (1) the static spillover index of the carbon–energy–stock system is 3.57% and the dynamic spillover index fluctuates between 7.67% and 22.62%, indicating that the spillover effect of the system is low; (2) for the whole system, whether from a static or dynamic perspective, the carbon market always plays the role of net information receiver, while new energy is the net information transmitter; (3) the new energy stock market and the coal market always act as net information transmitters to the carbon market; and (4) the spillover effect of the system is asymmetric, wherein the system is more sensitive to negative information about price returns, and this asymmetry is much greater when the system is active.

scholarly journals Study of Chinese carbon emission trading market mechanism based on the game theory

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Secondary Carbon

<p>In order to provide corresponding suggestions for the establishment and development of China's carbon trading market mechanism, the three-party game model of the competent government departments, carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution in the initial allocation of carbon emission rights and the rotation bargaining game model in the secondary carbon trading market are solved and analyzed in this paper. The results show that the competent government departments should improve the review efficiency effectively to reduce cost by outsourcing the review work to universities, research institutes and other scientific research units and increasing punishment for the collusion behavior between the carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution. At the same time, the competent government departments should adopt the regular regulatory policies to deal with collusion behavior and reduce the sampling proportion to cut cost of government review. The trading center should directly determine transaction price in combination with the forces of buyers and sellers, and make matchmaking trading directly by selecting the qualified buyers and sellers at the secondary carbon trading market in process of bilateral open bidding.</p>

scholarly journals Impact and Acting Path of Carbon Emission Trading on Carbon Emission Intensity of Construction Land: Evidence from Pilot Areas in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 7843
Author(s):  
Lu Li ◽  
Jie Dong ◽  
Yan Song
Keyword(s):  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Intensity ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Industrial Structure ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Construction Land ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

Recently, the environmental and resource crisis caused by excessive energy consumption has aroused great concern worldwide. China is a major country of energy consumption and carbon emissions, and has attempted to build a carbon emission trading market to reduce carbon emissions. This practice helps to promote the carbon trading projects for both regional carbon emission reduction and sustainable development in the pilot areas, as well as having important theoretical and practical significance for the further improvement of carbon emission trading policies. In this study, we first used the difference-in-difference (DID) model to evaluate the impact of carbon emission trading on the carbon emission intensity of construction land (CEICL). The results showed that the carbon emission trading policy can significantly reduce CEICL in the pilot areas. Furthermore, we adopted the quantile regression model to explore the mechanism and acting path of carbon emission trading on CEICL. The results show that the increase in carbon trading volume (CTV) can effectively reduce the CEICL. However, a high carbon trading price (CTP) tends to reduce the suppressing effect of carbon emission trading on CEICL. Additionally, carbon emission trading also affects CEICL through the indirect acting paths of industrial structure and energy intensity. Finally, we propose to promote regional low-carbon development from the perspective of developing a carbon emission trading market nationwide, rationalizing the carbon quota and trading price mechanism, optimizing the regional industrial structure, and improving the energy consumption structure.

scholarly journals Offline and Online Channel Selection of Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Carbon Trading Market

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Qiang Han ◽  
Zhenlong Yang ◽  
Zheng Zhang ◽  
Liang Shen
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Emission Quota ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the low-carbon product manufacturer’s different decision behavior in the offline traditional retail channel and online e-commerce channel when the carbon trading market has been established. The low-carbon product manufacturer is both in the carbon trading market and product market. In the former market, the manufacturer can gain profits by selling its emission quota. In the latter market, the manufacturer has two sales channel options, the traditional offline retailer and the online e-commerce platform. These two channels make two supply chains, the manufacturer-led offline one and the e-commerce platform-led online one. This paper combines the carbon trading market with the product market, formulates different Stackelberg game models, compares the manufacturer’s decision under two channels and the impact of channels on the carbon emission, does sensitivity analysis, and verifies the conclusions with numerical examples. Our findings are (1) the establishment of the carbon market will help the manufacturer reduce its carbon emission, especially for those sensitive to the carbon price and those with too much emissions; (2) whether the manufacturer turns to the online channel depends on the consumers’ sensitivity to the sales service, and consumers’ attention will guide the way to the online mode; (3) which mode is conducive to carbon emission reduction relies on the product type: the e-commerce platform does well for daily necessities of mass production while the traditional channel is better for experience goods.

scholarly journals Factors Affecting China's Carbon Trading Price—A Case Study Based on Tianjin Carbon Emissions Trading Market

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuwei Du ◽  
Songsheng Chen
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Industrial Development ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Price Index ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Coal Price ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

Abstract Building a carbon emission trading market is an effective way to control carbon emissions. The carbon emission trading price is the key to the carbon trading market, and it will affect the carbon emission reduction behavior of enterprises. This study use the vector autoregression (VAR) model, the cointegration analysis, and the Granger causality test to analyze the influence of industrial development index (Shanghai Stock Exchange Industrial Index (000004.SH)), coal price index (National Coal Price Index), air quality index (AQI), and economic index (Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)) on the carbon emission trading price in Tianjin. Empirical research results based on data from January 2014 to December 2019 show that the Shanghai Stock Exchange Industrial Index and AQI are positively correlated with Tianjin carbon emission trading price, and the National Coal Price Index and PMI are negatively correlated with Tianjin carbon emission trading price. Finally, some suggestions are made to promote the rapid maturity of the national carbon emission trading market of China.

Research on China’s cap-and-trade carbon emission trading scheme: Overview and outlook

2016 ◽  
Vol 178 ◽  
pp. 902-917 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingjing Jiang ◽  
Dejun Xie ◽  
Bin Ye ◽  
Bo Shen ◽  
Zhanming Chen
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Emission Trading Scheme ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Trading Scheme ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

scholarly journals A Flexible Cap-and-Trade Policy and Limited Demand Information Effects on a Sustainable Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10746
Author(s):  
Ying Gao ◽  
Jianteng Xu ◽  
Huixin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Distribution Free ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Limited Demand

Carbon emission reduction is increasingly becoming a public consensus, with governments formulating carbon emission policies, enterprises investing in emission abatement equipment, and consumers having a low-carbon preference. On the other hand, it is difficult for industry managers to obtain all the demand information. Based on this, this paper aims to investigate operations and coordination for a sustainable system with a flexible cap-and-trade policy and limited demand information. Newsvendor and distribution-free newsvendor models are formulated to show the validity of limited information. Stackelberg game is exploited to derive optimal abatement and order quantity solutions under centralized and decentralized systems. The revenue-sharing and two-part tariff contracts are then proposed to coordinate the decentralized system with limited demand information. Numerical analyses complement the theoretical results. We list some major findings. Firstly, we discover that using abatement equipment can effectively reduce emissions and increase profits. Secondly, the distribution-free approach is effective and acceptable for a system where only mean and variance information is informed. Thirdly, the mean parameter has a greater impact on profits and emissions comparing with the other seven parameters. Finally, we show that both contracts may achieve perfect coordination, and the two-part tariff contract is more robust.

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