scholarly journals Applications of Game Theory in Project Management: A Structured Review and Analysis

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahendra Piraveenan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Project Management ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
Citation Network ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Management Scenarios ◽  
Dimensional Classification ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

This paper provides a structured literature review and analysis of using game theory to model project management scenarios. We select and review thirty-two papers from Scopus, present a complex three-dimensional classification of the selected papers, and analyse the resultant citation network. According to the industry-based classification, the surveyed literature can be classified in terms of construction industry, ICT industry or unspecified industry. Based on the types of players, the literature can be classified into papers that use government-contractor games, contractor–contractor games, contractor-subcontractor games, subcontractor–subcontractor games or games involving other types of players. Based on the type of games used, papers using normal-form non-cooperative games, normal-form cooperative games, extensive-form non-cooperative games or extensive-form cooperative games are present. Also, we show that each of the above classifications plays a role in influencing which papers are likely to cite a particular paper, though the strongest influence is exerted by the type-of-game classification. Overall, the citation network in this field is sparse, implying that the awareness of authors in this field about studies by other academics is suboptimal. Our review suggests that game theory is a very useful tool for modelling project management scenarios, and that more work needs to be done focusing on project management in ICT domain, as well as by using extensive-form cooperative games where relevant.

scholarly journals Non-altruistic Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 185-195
Author(s):  
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
The Other ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Extensive Form Games ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, that is, one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal-form games and extensive-form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive-form games as equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.

Learning Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games

2011 ◽  
pp. 1018-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfredo Garro
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Applied Mathematics ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Sciences ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

Game Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) is a branch of applied mathematics and economics that studies situations (games) where self-interested interacting players act for maximizing their returns; therefore, the return of each player depends on his behaviour and on the behaviours of the other players. Game Theory, which plays an important role in the social and political sciences, has recently drawn attention in new academic fields which go from algorithmic mechanism design to cybernetics. However, a fundamental problem to solve for effectively applying Game Theory in real word applications is the definition of well-founded solution concepts of a game and the design of efficient algorithms for their computation. A widely accepted solution concept of a game in which any cooperation among the players must be selfenforcing (non-cooperative game) is represented by the Nash Equilibrium. In particular, a Nash Equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player of the game, such that no player can benefit by changing his strategy unilaterally, i.e. while the other players keep their strategies unchanged (Nash, 1951). The problem of computing Nash Equilibria in non-cooperative games is considered one of the most important open problem in Complexity Theory (Papadimitriou, 2001). Daskalakis, Goldbergy, and Papadimitriou (2005), showed that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with four or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD-Polynomial Parity Argument Directed version (Papadimitriou, 1991), moreover, Chen and Deng extended this result for 2-player games (Chen & Deng, 2005). However, even in the two players case, the best algorithm known has an exponential worst-case running time (Savani & von Stengel, 2004); furthermore, if the computation of equilibria with simple additional properties is required, the problem immediately becomes NP-hard (Bonifaci, Di Iorio, & Laura, 2005) (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2003) (Gilboa & Zemel, 1989) (Gottlob, Greco, & Scarcello, 2003). Motivated by these results, recent studies have dealt with the problem of efficiently computing Nash Equilibria by exploiting approaches based on the concepts of learning and evolution (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998) (Maynard Smith, 1982). In these approaches the Nash Equilibria of a game are not statically computed but are the result of the evolution of a system composed by agents playing the game. In particular, each agent after different rounds will learn to play a strategy that, under the hypothesis of agent’s rationality, will be one of the Nash equilibria of the game (Benaim & Hirsch, 1999) (Carmel & Markovitch, 1996). This article presents SALENE, a Multi-Agent System (MAS) for learning Nash Equilibria in noncooperative games, which is based on the above mentioned concepts.

An intersubjective model of agency for game theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-382
Author(s):  
Vivienne Brown
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Matching Pennies ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Shared Context ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThis paper proposes a new interpretation of non-cooperative games that shows why the unilateralism of best-reply reasoning fails to capture the mutuality of strategic interdependence. Drawing on an intersubjective approach to theorizing individual agency in shared context, including a non-individualistic model of common belief without infinite regress, the paper develops a general model of a 2 × 2 simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game and applies it to games including Hi-Lo, Stag Hunt, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, BoS and Matching Pennies. Results include High as the rational choice in Hi-Lo, and Cooperate as a possible rational choice in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

scholarly journals Game theory for resource sharing in large distributed systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Riahi ◽  
Azzeddine Riahi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Distributed Systems ◽  
Resource Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Cooperative Approach ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

<span lang="EN-US">In game theory, cooperative and non-cooperative approaches are distinguished in terms of two elements. The first refers to the player's ability to engage: in a non-cooperative context, they are entirely free to make decisions when they make their choices; However, in a cooperative context, they have the opportunity to engage contractually the strategies that should be adopted during the game, that during a phase of discussions held before the game and during combinations which may be formed.In this context, the problem is not so much to predict the outcome of the game between players to leave the benefit of cooperation. To achieve this, and this is the second major difference with the non-cooperative approach, it adopts an axiomatic approach (or normative) by which we set upstream properties a priori reasonable (or desirable) on the outcome of the game. The purpose of this paper is to present briefly the main types of non-cooperative games and the tools that allow them to be analyzed in a complete information context where all aspects of the game are well known to decision makers.</span>

Computing Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Alfredo Garro
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Non Cooperative Games ◽  
Computation Of Equilibria

Game Theory has recently drawn attention in new fields which go from algorithmic mechanism design to cybernetics. However, a fundamental problem to solve for effectively applying Game Theory in real word applications is the definition of well-founded solution concepts of a game and the design of efficient algorithms for their computation. A widely accepted solution concept for games in which any cooperation among the players must be self-enforcing (non-cooperative games) is represented by the Nash equilibrium. However, even in the two players case, the best algorithm known for computing Nash equilibria has an exponential worst-case running time; furthermore, if the computation of equilibria with simple additional properties is required, the problem becomes NP-hard. The paper aims to provide a solution for efficiently computing the Nash equilibria of a game as the result of the evolution of a system composed by interacting agents playing the game.

Evaluation of Non-Cooperative Games as a Tool for Analyzing Political and Policy Behaviors

2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-73
Author(s):  
Sung-bok Park
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Actual Behavior ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Non Cooperative Games ◽  
Existence Of Equilibria

This study evaluates the limitations and relevance of non-cooperative games as a tool for analyzing political and policy behavior. It aims to answer the questions, “for what situations are such non-cooperative games appropriate, and for what do they fail to predict actual behavior?” To answer these questions, we are going to look into the assumptions underlying the existence of equilibria developed by this non-cooperative game model. This model uses two types of situations: extensive form and normal form. Each of them is evaluated in terms of its underlying assumptions and their relevance to real behaviors in the public sector. The several theorems concerning non-cooperative game are introduced and evaluated in terms of its meaning and relevance to the real public arena. In particular, we see that the zero sum assumption is a restriction that precludes modeling many other situations central to politics and public administration, and that the prisoner dilemma models important processes, including collective action problem.

scholarly journals Liberalism, rationality, and Pareto optimality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Hargreaves Heap ◽  
Mehmet Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
No Harm Principle ◽  
First Time ◽  
Non Cooperative Games ◽  
Rational Players

Rational players in game theory are neoliberal in the sense that they can choose any available action so as to maximize their payoffs. It is well known that this can result in Pareto inferior outcomes (e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma). Classical liberalism, in contrast, argues that people should be constrained by a no-harm principle (NHP) when they act. We show, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, that rational players constrained by the NHP will produce Pareto efficient outcomes in n-person non-cooperative games. We also show that both rationality and the NHP are required for this result.

scholarly journals Modeling and simulation: social force model modified by Helbing model in fast pass system

2022 ◽  
Vol 355 ◽  
pp. 02041
Author(s):  
Ruiqi Zhang ◽  
Yuting Cao ◽  
Yuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Modeling And Simulation ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Social Force ◽  
Social Force Model ◽  
Pass System ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

This paper introduced Helbing’s social force model, modified it with game theory. Then how individuals in the space behave in dynamic non-cooperative games was described, different macro grouping characteristics were obtained. Individual behaviours at the micro level were simulated. Setting different parameters and conditions of the model, the macro effects of individual behaviours were observed. The overall behaviour of the system was studied. It could be used to guide the allocation of public resources.

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