scholarly journals Channel Strategies for the Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain with E-Commerce

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1271
Author(s):  
Lin Zhao ◽  
Zongyu Mu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiments ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Comparison Analysis ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Second Period

The aim of this paper is to choose the effective selling channel and reverse channel for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the e-commerce. The authors formulated six single-selling and dual-selling channel two-period CLSC models in which the manufacturer manufactures new products in the first period and then collects used products by itself, outsourcing to or cooperating with the retailer in the second period. Some interesting and new insights obtained from comparison analysis and numerical experiments are as follows: (1) The leading manufacturer ought to add e-commerce channel, and customers’ e-commerce preference can increase the market demand, collecting rate, and manufacturer’s profit. (2) With the e-commerce channel and the retail channel, dual-collecting channel is the best for the manufacturer and system while the manufacturer collecting channel becomes the best when the collecting competition is relatively large. When the collecting competition exists, retailer collecting channel is the best for the retailer. (3) The market demand, collecting rate, the profits of all members and system will rise by increasing the remanufacturing level and discount coefficient.

scholarly journals Joint Advertisement and Trade-In Marketing Strategy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li ◽  
Hetian Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Social Performance ◽  
New Products ◽  
Joint Model ◽  
Partial Replacement ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Key Factor

With environmental problems becoming severe, many firms, including HP, Huawei, and Apple are simultaneously implementing trade-in programs and advertising to stimulate market demand. Offering trade-in service by the manufacturer is a method of price discrimination by providing replacement consumers with a rebate when they purchase new products. With the recycled, used products, the manufacturer can benefit through a strict series—via a remanufacturing process. Although numerous literatures have investigated the pricing strategy and advertising decisions in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), to the best of our knowledge, there is little research that analyzes and compares the economic and social performance of these two marketing strategies. To fill this gap, we establish two supply chain models with two periods, namely, an advertisement model and a joint model, while the equilibrium purchasing behavior of the replacement consumers can be characterized under three conditions: (1) all of the replacement consumers purchasing new products (ATA); (2) partial replacement consumers purchasing (PTA); (3) no replacement consumers purchasing (NTA). These three conditions are decided by the numerous relationships of the parameters. Solving the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in both models, the critical value in the joint model is higher in the advertisement model, which indicates that developing the trade-in program can enhance the robustness of the business model. Furthermore, through numerical example, we find that the market demand in the joint model is higher than in the advertisement model, and the cost of marketing strategy in the joint model is lower in the advertisement model, which means that the efficiency of the marketing strategy is higher than the single marketing strategy. As a result, comparing the economic and social performance between the two models, we conclude that the advertisement elasticity of the market demand is the key factor of the manufacturer’s profits and total social welfare.

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Fan Wang ◽  
Xiaofan Lai ◽  
Jingxian Hong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Technology Licensing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.

scholarly journals Competition and Integration in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network with Variational Inequality

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gengui Zhou ◽  
Yuxiang Yang ◽  
Jian Cao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Variational Inequality ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
And Storage

A closed-loop supply chain network involves the manufactured and remanufactured homogeneous products. It comprises operation links to represent business activities including manufacturing/remanufacturing activities, treatment activities for EOL products, transportation activities, and storage activities, which are performed by the firms. Among all closed-loop supply chain problems, the horizontal merger of oligopolistic firms is so important and attracting to both businessman and researchers. In this paper, the interaction of the competitive firms prior to horizontal merger is analyzed. Three networks including prior to horizontal merger, postpartial merger, and complete merger are studied. Simultaneously, three economical models for these networks on different conditions of mergers are established and discussed. The variational inequality formulations are used for these three models, whose solutions give out the production quantity of new products, and remanufactured products, the product flows for new products, remanufactured products and end-of-life products at every path, the demand quantity, the recovery quantity of end-of-life products and the equilibrium prices. Finally, numerical examples are tested and illustrated for the proposed models.

scholarly journals Development of cores acquisition model with two switching mechanisms in a retailer-oriented closed-loop supply chain system

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3 (110)) ◽  
pp. 6-15
Author(s):  
Evi Yuliawati ◽  
Pratikto Pratikto ◽  
Sugiono Sugiono ◽  
Oyong Novareza
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Product Returns ◽  
Fixed Rate ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Flat Rate ◽  
Taking Charge ◽  
Rate Mechanism

Retailer-Oriented Closed-Loop Supply Chain (ROCLSC) is an integration of forward and reverse supply chains with retailer taking charge of the remanufacturing, distribution, and collecting activities. This type of mechanism is quite effective, since the majority of product returns management is performed by the retailer. However, in practical industries, the implementation of ROCLSC is still limited. In this study, we investigate a ROCLSC system that involves an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer. OEM plays a role as a producer of new products, while the retailer is in charge of remanufacturing, collecting, as well as selling and distributing both newly manufactured and remanufactured products. We develop a mathematical model to maximize the profit of each party. Although several studies have developed models for cores acquisition, here we apply a different cores switching mechanism. We introduced the fixed rate and flat rate mechanisms used in the business-to-business (B2B) system, where product functions are very important to consumers. In addition, this research focuses on ROCLSC where most of the existing cores acquisition models are Manufacturer-Oriented Closed-Loop Supply Chain (MOCLSC). The result of this study shows that the retailer will get higher profits when the product returns are acquired through the fixed rate mechanism, rather than the flat rate mechanism. Therefore, determining the optimal amount of cores collected through the fixed rate mechanism will increase the retailer’s profit, as well as joint profit of both parties. From the results, we also point out an interesting note that the retailer should increase efforts to sell new products along with the increasing proportion of consumer Willingness to Pay (WTP) for remanufactured products. Hence, both OEM and retailer profits can be increased consecutively

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijun Meng ◽  
Qiang Qiang ◽  
Zuqing Huang ◽  
Baoyou Zhang ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Sustainable Manufacturing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
The Government

Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

scholarly journals Emergency Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Single Retailer Recycling under Demand Disruptions

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Lingyuan Wang ◽  
Xihui Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Emergency Decision

The uncertainty caused by emergencies will influence the normal operation of the supply chain. Considering demand disruptions, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers based on decentralized decision-making is considered. In the supply chain, one retailer recovers end-of-life products while the other does not. Analytic results show that, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the manufacturer and retailers adjust the wholesale price and retail prices of products according to the direction of the market demand disruptions. Under demand disruptions, the retailer who participates in recovering can gain more profits, especially in the case of the positive disruption. Theoretic and pragmatic references for the emergency decision-making of closed-loop supply chain enterprises are provided.

scholarly journals Optimal Manufacturing-Remanufacturing Production Policy for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Fill Rate and Budget Constraint in Bifuzzy Environments

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soumita Kundu ◽  
Tripti Chakrabarti ◽  
Dipak Kumar Jana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Raw Material ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Fill Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Manufacturing Facility ◽  
Production Policy

We study a closed-loop supply chain involving a manufacturing facility and a remanufacturing facility. The manufacturer satisfies stochastic market demand by remanufacturing the used product into “as-new” one and producing new products from raw material in the remanufacturing facility and the manufacturing facility, respectively. The remanufacturing cost depends on the quality of used product. The problem is maximizing the manufacturer’s expected profit by jointly determining the collected quantity of used product and the ordered quantity of raw material. Following that we analyze the model with a fill rate constraint and a budget constraint separately and then with both the constraints. Next, to handle the imprecise nature of some parameters of the model, we develop the model with both constraints in bifuzzy environment. Finally numerical examples are presented to illustrate the models. The sensitivity analysis is also conducted to generate managerial insight.

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