scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijun Meng ◽  
Qiang Qiang ◽  
Zuqing Huang ◽  
Baoyou Zhang ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Sustainable Manufacturing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
The Government

Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

scholarly journals How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Fan Wang ◽  
Xiaofan Lai ◽  
Jingxian Hong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Technology Licensing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.

Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategic Alliance Considering the Quality Level of Remanufactured Products and Patent Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050021
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Hui Wu ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Kebing Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Alliance Structure

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer responsible for collecting used products and remanufacturing is constructed. Considering the quality level of remanufactured products, four kinds of closed-loop supply chain alliance structure models are constructed. The optimal equilibrium decisions of these four models are compared and analyzed. The optimal decisions of the models are verified by numerical analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of the quality of remanufactured products and the decision influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance on the remanufacturer’s decision are further analyzed. The results show that remanufactured products are competitive with new products, and the improvement of the remanufactured product quality will reduce the market demand of new products. The equilibrium decision of the closed-loop supply chain is affected by the alliance behavior of members in the closed-loop supply chain and the quality level of remanufactured products. The higher the decision concentration of the closed-loop supply chain is, the more favorable the supply chain is; the higher the remanufacturing quality level is, the more favorable the supply chain is, and the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer is affected by the quality level of remanufactured products and the decision-making influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance structure. We find that the improvement of the concentration degree of closed-loop supply chain decision can benefit the supply chain by improving the remanufacturing quality level, which has direct effect on the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer. In most cases, the choice of the alliance is the dominant decision of the third-party remanufacturer.

scholarly journals A mathematical model for designing a reliable cellular hybrid manufacturing-remanufacturing system considering alternative and contingency process routings

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amirreza Hooshyar Telegraphi ◽  
Akif Asil Bulgak
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Manufacturing Systems ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Sustainable Manufacturing ◽  
Critical Issue ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Hybrid Manufacturing ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

AbstractDue to the stringent awareness toward the preservation and resuscitation of natural resources and the potential economic benefits, designing sustainable manufacturing enterprises has become a critical issue in recent years. This presents different challenges in coordinating the activities inside the manufacturing systems with the entire closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, a mixed-integer mathematical model for designing a hybrid-manufacturing-remanufacturing system in a closed-loop supply chain is presented. Noteworthy, the operational planning of a cellular hybrid manufacturing-remanufacturing system is coordinated with the tactical planning of a closed-loop supply chain. To improve the flexibility and reliability in the cellular hybrid manufacturing-remanufacturing system, alternative process routings and contingency process routings are considered. The mathematical model in this paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first integrated model in the design of hybrid cellular manufacturing systems which considers main and contingency process routings as well as reliability of the manufacturing system.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Product Resynthesis as a Reverse Logistics Strategy for an Optimal Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinmay Sane ◽  
Conrad S. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Strategy ◽  
Logistics Strategy ◽  
Original Product

With continued emphasis on sustainability-driven design, reverse logistics is emerging as a vital competitive supply chain strategy for many of the global high-tech manufacturing firms. Various original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and multi-product manufacturing firms are enhancing their reverse logistics strategies in order to establish an optimal closed-loop supply chain through which they can introduce refurbished variants of their products back into the market. While a refurbished product strategy helps to mitigate environmental impact challenges as well as provide additional economic benefits, it is limited to an existing product market, possibly a subset of the existing market, and fails to commercialize/target new markets. In addition to refurbishing, the alternatives available for utilizing End-Of-Life (EOL) products are currently restricted to recycling and permanent disposal. In this work, the authors propose employing a new EOL option called “resynthesis” that utilizes existing waste from EOL products in a novel way. This is achieved through the synthesis of assemblies/subassemblies across multiple domains. The “newly” synthesized product can then be incorporated into the dynamics of a closed-loop supply chain. The proposed methodology enables OEMs to not only offer refurbished products as part of their reverse logistics strategy, but also provide them with resynthesized product concepts that can be used to expand to new/emerging markets. The proposed methodology provides a general framework that includes OEMs (manufacturers of the original product), retailers (distributors of the original product and collectors of the EOL products) and third-party firms (managers of the EOL products) as part of a closed-loop supply chain strategy. The proposed methodology is compared with the existing methodologies in the literature wherein a third-party supplies the OEM only with refurbished products and supplies products unsuitable for refurbishing to another firm(s) for recycling/disposal. A case study involving a multi-product electronics manufacturer is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology.

scholarly journals Controlling Waste and Carbon Emission for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management under a Cap-and-Trade Strategy

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mowmita Mishra ◽  
Soumya Kanti Hota ◽  
Santanu Kumar Ghosh ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading

Considering the increasing number of end-of-life goods in the context of improving the ambience and health of a population and their destructive impacts, recycling strategies are important for industries and organizations. In this article, a closed-loop supply chain management containing a single manufacturer, a single retailer, and a third party is introduced in which the manufacturer first propagates newly finished goods and then dispatches some of the finished goods to the retailer considering a single-setup multi-delivery policy. Due to shipping, carbon emission is taken into account as well as a carbon emission trading mechanism to curb the amount of carbon emissions by the retailer. For recycling through collection, inspection, remanufacturing, and landfill, the third party collects the end-of-life goods from its customers and ships perfect products to the manufacturer after a two-stage inspection. In this model, major sources of emissions such as shipping, replenishment orders, and inventory have been taken care of. The minimizing of the total cost relating to the container capacity, shipment numbers, and replenishment cycle length is the main objective of the closed-loop supply chain management for making the system more profitable. Expository numerical explorations, analysis, and graphic representations are conferred to elucidate this model, and it is observed that this model saves some percentage of the cost compared to the existing literature.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

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