scholarly journals The Optimal Production Decision of Competing Supply Chains When Considering Green Degree: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7413
Author(s):  
Jiguang Wang ◽  
Jianhong Chang ◽  
Yucai Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Difference

Nowadays, the green supply chain has become an exciting concept in academic societies. This paper focuses on the optimal production decisions of two competing supply chains from the perspective of green degree. The manufacturers in each supply chain have two options—producing a green product or a non-green product. Game theory is applied to study four decision scenarios, which are derived from the difference in the products of the two supply chains. This study investigates the influence of inter-supply-chain competition on the wholesale price, green degree, and profits of the supply chain members. The results indicate that the inter-supply-chain competition has a negative correlation with the wholesale price. The inter-supply-chain competition has a significant impact on green degree in the four decision scenarios. In addition, green products are not always the dominant strategy of manufacturers. Both the competitors’ product decisions and the degree of inter-supply-chain competition should be considered. Finally, weak inter-supply-chain competition is beneficial to the leader supply chain, while strong competition is beneficial to the follower supply chain.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5648-5664 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Local Supply ◽  
Buyer Power

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

scholarly journals The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musen Xue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Developing Fair Investment Plans to Enhance Supply Chain Visibility Using Cooperative Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 3209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changhyun Kim ◽  
KwangSup Shin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Information Communication ◽  
Collaborative Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Feasible Solutions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact

As supply chains become more complex and globalized, the individual participants of the supply chains should invest in systems based on information communication technologies (ICT) such as the remote frequency identification device (RFID) with tags that secure the visibility of the entire supply chain. In addition, the level of visibility, such as the container, pallet, carton, and box, should be determined for each participant to optimize its own profit function. By using a collaborative game scheme, the present study illustrates the relationships among participants who invest to a certain level of visibility, and then how much value each participant gets. To find feasible solutions, a genetic algorithm-based mechanism is devised for modeling various fitness functions considering the total profit and benefit to cost (B/C) ratio. The proposed framework considers the relationship among participants, as well as the impact from the enhanced visibility, and it may be possible to make fair and rational decisions for all participants based on the quantitative metrics such as the B/C ratio. In this paper, we propose a novel method based on the game-theoretic approach where the enhanced visibility prevents a certain participant from taking most of the benefit. It seems possible to establish a long-term sustainable supply chain visibility by distributing profit fairly to all participants in the supply chain.

scholarly journals Supply chain collaboration: A Game-theoretic approach to profit allocation

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 1020
Author(s):  
Borja Ponte ◽  
Isabel Fernández ◽  
Rafael Rosillo ◽  
José Parreño ◽  
Nazario García
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Classical Solutions ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The One

Purpose: This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework for profit allocation, as a mechanism for aligning incentives, in collaborative supply chains.Design/methodology/approach: The issue of profit distribution is approached from a game-theoretic perspective. We use the nucleolus concept. The framework is illustrated through a numerical example based on the Beer Game scenario.Findings: The nucleolus offers a powerful perspective to tackle this problem, as it takes into consideration the bargaining power of the different echelons. We show that this framework outperforms classical alternatives.Research limitations/implications: The allocation of the overall supply chain profit is analyzed from a static perspective. Considering the dynamic nature of the problem would be an interesting next step. Practical implications: We provide evidence of drawbacks derived from classical solutions to the profit allocation problem. Real-world collaborative supply chains need of robust mechanisms like the one tackled in this work to align incentives from the various actors.Originality/value: Adopting an efficient collaborative solution is a major challenge for supply chains, since it is a wide and complex process that requires an appropriate scheme. Within this framework, profit allocation is essential.

scholarly journals The bases of coordination development as the emergent quality of investment goods supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-152
Author(s):  
V. Falovych ◽  
N. Falovych ◽  
S. Semeniuk
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Production System ◽  
Current Time ◽  
Common Information ◽  
Working Together ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Internal Stakeholders

In this paper article the authors point out the importance of actions aimed at reducing waste, increasing productivity and reducing costs in the supply chain, which will ensure the development of coordination as an emergent function of the supply chain and contribute to the formation of responsibility to internal stakeholders; they also note the difference between logistics and supply chain management (SCM), which, primarily, is that logistics usually refers to the activities taking place within one organization, and supply chains belong to the network of companies working together and coordinate their actions to product supply to the market. The authors point out that the development of partnership in supply chains makes it possible to perform collaborative planning on a common information base, collective management of stocks, risks and all this provides reasons to coordinate activities in the supply chain, i.e. the dependence of «exit» on «entry» becomes homogeneous. Particular attention is paid to the ways of improvement the supply chain functioning, which is proposed to carry out at three levels. The highest level includes the processes taking place throughout the supply chain, and concerns the relationship between all participants [10]. At the operational level (the second level), the constraint theory recommends to use the LPS (Logical Product Structure) method. At the current actions level (the third level) TOC proposes to use the concept of management of the production system DBR (English: Drum – Buffer – Rope), the application of which enables to increase the capacity of the production system. In order to identify the area of necessary changes, the authors propose to build a detailed flowchart of processes, actions and functions from receiving the order from the customer (either external or internal) up to the moment of order fulfilment and delivery to the customer, which makes it possible to analyze sequentially the system operation in the current time and identify the areas of necessary changes, as well as to increase the level of meeting the customer needs, ensuring the efficiency of material and information flows, strengthening the manufacturer status in the market.

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