scholarly journals MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

Author(s):  
Robert VINTEN (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie.

2020 ◽  
pp. 9-30
Author(s):  
Larry R. Churchill

Moral perplexities are not of a single type; they take a variety of forms. They need to be appreciated before trying to resolve them through ethical systems or theories. Ethics begins in curiosity about why we think and feel as we do and why we differ from others. Everyone is engaged in ethics, and everyone can learn to exercise the skills that will make for a meaningful moral life. Engaging in moral dialogue is a humanizing activity; it requires suspension of judgment and respectful exploration of our own values and those of others. Three obstacles to ethics are defined: moral arbitrariness, absolute certainty, and perfectionism. Four aims of ethics are explored: discovering and claiming the moral values that define us; identifying the values of others; achieving consonance between internal values and external actions; and solving problems. The final section considers whether and how ethics can be taught and learned.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-29
Author(s):  
Luke Taylor

Abstract Mackie (Ethics: inventing right and wrong, Penguin Books, London, 1977) famously argued for a moral error theory on the basis that objective moral values, if they existed, would be very queer entities. Unfortunately, his argument is very brief and it is not totally obvious from what he says exactly where the queerness of moral values is supposed to lie. In this paper I will firstly show why a typical interpretation of Mackie is problematic and secondly offer a new interpretation. I will argue that, whether or not we have reason to live in the morally correct way, what seems queer about moral properties is that there is a morally correct way in which to live in the first place. This interpretation makes sense of Mackie’s claim that theism might be able to solve the queerness problem; the notion of an objectively correct way to live may make sense if theism is true, but not otherwise.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich H. Witte ◽  
Frank Zenker

Standardized effect size measures (e.g., Cohen’s d) state the observed mean difference, m1-m0, relative to the observed standard deviation, s. These measures are commonly used in behavioral science today in meta-analytical research to quantify the observed m1-m0 across object-level studies that use different measurement-scales, as well as in theory-construction research to point-specify m1-m0 as a theoretically predicted parameter. Since standardization conceptually relates to the quality of measurement, m1-m0 can be interpreted fully only relative to whichever error-theory determines s. The error-theory, however, is what behavioral scientists must typically choose freely, because a theoretically motivated measurement-scale is normally unavailable. Using a thought-experiment, we show that differentially sophisticated error-theories let the observed m1-m0 vary massively given identical observations. This lets the common praxis of publishing m1-m0 “nakedly”—without a transparent error-theory—appear problematic, because it undermines the goals of a cumulative science of human behavior. We advocate reporting standardized effect sizes along with a transparent error-theory.


Conatus ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Alexander Nehamas

In September 2017 Alexander Nehamas kindly accepted our invitation to have a meeting in Athens in order to discuss several issues of philosophical interest; with his latest publication On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016) as a starting point we soon moved over to a multitude of topics Nehamas has so far dealt with. The whole conversation spirals around the probably most challenging and demanding issue as far as practical philosophy is concerned – yet one every moral agent needs to provide an adequate answer to during his lifetime: Values. Do they exclusively belong to the domain of morality? Nehamas claims that “although moral values […] are important […], they are not the only values that determine whether a life is or is not worthwhile”. This view inevitably shifts the focus from individual values - even fundamental ones such as friendship, art and truth- to the real issue: What is a good life, after all?


1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 413-413
Author(s):  
Seymour Fisher
Keyword(s):  
The Real ◽  

1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (03) ◽  
pp. 125-132
Author(s):  
G. S. Lodwick ◽  
C. R. Wickizer ◽  
E. Dickhaus

The Missouri Automated Radiology System recently passed its tenth year of clinical operation at the University of Missouri. This article presents the views of a radiologist who has been instrumental in the conceptual development and administrative support of MARS for most of this period, an economist who evaluated MARS from 1972 to 1974 as part of her doctoral dissertation, and a computer scientist who has worked for two years in the development of a Standard MUMPS version of MARS. The first section provides a historical perspective. The second deals with economic considerations of the present MARS system, and suggests those improvements which offer the greatest economic benefits. The final section discusses the new approaches employed in the latest version of MARS, as well as areas for further application in the overall radiology and hospital environment. A complete bibliography on MARS is provided for further reading.


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