scholarly journals The EU Court of Justice Clarifies the Role of the Full-Function Criterion in the Interaction Between Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the EU Merger Regulation

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Vasiliki Fasoula
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Business Strategy ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
National Competition ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Case note: C-248/16 Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v Bundeskartellanwalt, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of the 7th of September 2017. Joint venture is a common business strategy that provides companies with benefits in scale economies, R&D, operational efficiencies and synergies. Joint ventures can be potentially harmful for the state of free competition in a market if they coordinate with their parent companies or if their operation can restrict access to the market for other competitors. Within the Internal Market, joint ventures fall under the scrutiny of two pieces of competition legislation in a non-cumulative way: the EU antitrust provisions and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) under Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4). Before the Austria Asphalt preliminary ruling, the Commission, despite its ambiguous decisional practice, considered those two paragraphs to constitute two different jurisdictional criteria applying to two different types of notifiable transactions. In Austria Asphalt the CJEU examined the correlation of those two paragraphs. It interpreted Article 3(4) as a restriction of Article 3(1)(b) by considering that the full-function criterion set by Article 3(4) should apply to all concentrative joint ventures: those newly created by a transaction as well as to those resulting from a change in the control of an existing company. In practice, the CJEU’s view limits the one-stop shop principle of the EUMR in favour of national competition authorities.

Eliminating ‘Aesthetics’ from Copyright Law: The Aftermath of Cofemel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koray Güven
Keyword(s):  
Copyright Protection ◽  
Copyright Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Applied Art ◽  
Copyright Laws ◽  
The One ◽  
Works Of Applied Art ◽  
Functionality Doctrine ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The recent Cofemel judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union extended the European Union’s (EU) originality criterion (i.e. the author’s own intellectual creation) to the realm of works of applied art. The Court excluded ‘aesthetically significant visual effect’ as a condition of copyright protection. It was condemned as subjective and incompatible with the EU originality criterion. The decision may signal a shift in several national copyright laws, under which requirements relating to ‘aesthetics’ are laid down as a condition to acquire protection. This article will demonstrate that the ‘aesthetics criterion’, as it emerged historically and has been employed in national copyright laws, is associated with a different meaning than it conveys at first glance. The aesthetics criterion designates the elbow room remaining to the author after functional constraints have been taken into account, and thus represents a form of the functionality doctrine in the domain of copyright law. However, to some extent it also excludes – though not uniformly – commonplace designs from the scope of copyright protection. Against this background, this article suggests that the aesthetics criterion can arguably be reconciled with the EU originality criterion. The aesthetics criterion represents a balance struck between the need for copyright protection in the field of applied arts, on the one hand, and competition, on the other. In order not to upset this careful balance, a robust application of the EU originality criterion is advocated, precluding protection not only to functionality, but also to commonplace creations.

‘But the Last Word Is Ours’: The Monopoly of Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Light of the Investment Court System

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1187-1220
Author(s):  
Francisco de Abreu Duarte
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
General Framework ◽  
External Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU’s external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.

scholarly journals The Court of Justice of the European Union and the autonomous restrictive measures against natural and legal persons and non-state entities within the EU common foreign and security policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (91) ◽  
pp. 117-139
Author(s):  
Boris Tučić
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
General Relation ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The One ◽  
Restrictive Measures ◽  
The Eu

As a part of its specific policies, the EU creates and implements numerous restrictive measures against different subjects. In recent years, the most interesting ones, especially from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have been the autonomous restrictive measures against natural and legal persons and other non-state entities within the Union`s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). After years of legal wandering in this regard, the Lisbon Treaty finally offered an explicit legal basis for this kind of measures, envisaging, as well, for the first time, the CJEU`s jurisdiction in the field of CFSP in some cases, including the one related to reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council of the EU on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty of the European Union. In this regard, the subject matter of this paper are the activities of the EU courts related to the autonomous restrictive measures against individual subjects, analyzed at several relevant although inseparable levels. The first one considers the intention of the CJEU to "use" the situation regarding the autonomous restrictive measures in order to strengthen its position and competences within the CFSP. The second one is oriented to the efforts of the courts to secure the balance between the effectiveness of the CFSP instruments, on the one hand, and the protection of some of the major principles and values of the EU legal order, on the other hand, such as the rule of law, legal certainty, effective judicial protection or the protection of human rights as guaranteed by the EU Law in general. Thirdly, a very important step in this context has been the jurisprudential identification of the key procedural requirements that the Council`s decisions providing for restrictive measures must fulfill as well (aka the designation criteria, statements of reasons criteria and supporting evidence criteria). By constantly insisting on the fulfillment of these criteria, the EU courts exerted a pressure on the Council to improve its decisions providing restrictive measures in a qualitative manner. Recent jurisprudence, such as the Rosneft or Bank Refah Kargaran cases, shows that there is still enough space for the Court`s interventions in this field, and that some interesting Court`s decisions, related to its position within the CFSP or the general relation between the CFSP and other forms of Union`s external activities, could be expected in the years to come.

Administrative and judicial remedies of EU on civil servants’ rights protection

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv ◽  
Andriy Kotenko
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Main Body ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
Effective Remedy ◽  
The Eu

Problem setting. The modern pandemic reality makes all the citizens of the European Union vulnerable, especially in terms of employment and employment disputes. European civil service framework has been existing for more than 50 years, but until now some fundamental issues need to be tackled. Transparency is what the international community is striving for nowadays. The numerous tools for legal protection available to the EU servants offer completely different solutions to the one problem. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain the sound practice, according to the principle of sustainable development. The problems of the pre-trial administrative disputes resolution are questioning the mere ability of this mechanism to provide protection impartially and within sound terms. On the one hand, European Court of Justice stands as an effective remedy, which compensates the drawbacks of administrative way of rights protection. But on the other hand, the European Ombudsman institute shows, that both of the aforementioned remedies are not capable of giving up-to-date protection to the EU servants. That’s why substantial changes in this framework are needed, including reconsideration of the procedure of appeals prescribed under the Council of the EU Staff Regulation. Target of research is to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the remedies available to the EU servants for today in the EU acquis framework. Article’s main body. The article is devoted to the research of administrative and judicial means of remedies available to the EU servants. The analysis of the Court of Justice of the European Union case practice has been conducted. The procedure of resolution of administrative disputes between the EU servants and the EU institutions via the European Ombudsman institute has been investigated. The analysis of disputes concerning the protection of EU servants’ rights within the administrative framework within the institutions has been carried out. Conclusions. After analyzing various types of remedies on the protection of civil servants’ rights, a couple of issues to tackle has been revealed. The administrative remedies under Staff Regulations of the Council are not transparent enough to consider them sufficient for being the main way of protecting Staff rights prescribed in the Regulation. The European Ombudsman, along with judicial practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union might be the relief for the institutional mechanism of civil servants rights protection due to the strategic investigations the European Ombudsman is capable to undertake. Further recap of the administrative means of remedies available under the Staff Regulation is explicitly urgent to conduct as soon as possible.

scholarly journals The Constitutional Court of Romania and European Union Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85
Author(s):  
Dragoş Călin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
Normative Content ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The Constitutional Court of Romania has subjected the introduction of a norm of European Union law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm. On the one hand, the norm should be sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution - the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control - by national law. However, the experience of the Constitutional Court of Romania over the eight years (2007-2014) since the EU accession, does not seem to be very convincing, irrespective of the way in which European Union law, including the case law of the CJUE has been used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context.

scholarly journals Exploring the Autonomy of the European Union Legal Order

2021 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-88
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Building Walls ◽  
The Eu

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

The preliminary ruling procedure at the court of justice of the European Union and transformation of European anti-discrimination law

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-72
Author(s):  
Elena Sorokina
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Eu

The preliminary ruling procedure is an essential feature of the EU legal system, which is a unique cooperation tool as part of the dialogue between the Court of Justice of the EU and national courts of the Member States. Its main purpose is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all Member States and to preserve the uniformity of the European legal system. The continuous use by national courts of the Member States of the mechanism of preliminary ruling and constructive inter-judicial cooperation, the Court of Justice has developed an extremely extensive case law on the prohibition of discrimination and with the result to introduce substantial changes in European anti-discrimination law.The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have shown its inclination to expand notions of what constitutes discrimination and in most cases the Court prompt by the desire to interpret the provisions of European law so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the law, as well as a willingness to promote and strengthen protection against discrimination in Europe. While the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others, however, the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice are important contribution to the transformation of anti-discrimination law, promote change in the national legislation of the Member States and provide the more effective protection of human rights in general.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

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