Eliminating ‘Aesthetics’ from Copyright Law: The Aftermath of Cofemel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koray Güven

Abstract The recent Cofemel judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union extended the European Union’s (EU) originality criterion (i.e. the author’s own intellectual creation) to the realm of works of applied art. The Court excluded ‘aesthetically significant visual effect’ as a condition of copyright protection. It was condemned as subjective and incompatible with the EU originality criterion. The decision may signal a shift in several national copyright laws, under which requirements relating to ‘aesthetics’ are laid down as a condition to acquire protection. This article will demonstrate that the ‘aesthetics criterion’, as it emerged historically and has been employed in national copyright laws, is associated with a different meaning than it conveys at first glance. The aesthetics criterion designates the elbow room remaining to the author after functional constraints have been taken into account, and thus represents a form of the functionality doctrine in the domain of copyright law. However, to some extent it also excludes – though not uniformly – commonplace designs from the scope of copyright protection. Against this background, this article suggests that the aesthetics criterion can arguably be reconciled with the EU originality criterion. The aesthetics criterion represents a balance struck between the need for copyright protection in the field of applied arts, on the one hand, and competition, on the other. In order not to upset this careful balance, a robust application of the EU originality criterion is advocated, precluding protection not only to functionality, but also to commonplace creations.

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-156
Author(s):  
Nuno Sousa e Silva

Copyright is a centrepiece in the ongoing construction of the digital single market. Evidently, copyright only applies to works. Thus, the definition of its scope lies in knowing what a work is. Although that was not envisioned nor intended by the lawmaker, the Court of Justice has adopted a European notion of work in its controversial decision C-5/08, Infopaq, conflating it with the one of originality. Such an approach has been confirmed and expanded by subsequent case law. The Court has already fleshed out the main criterion for a creation to enjoy copyright – it must be original in the sense of being the author’s own creation – and seems to reject any additional criteria. However, the boundaries of the European notion of work are still unknown. Some recent preliminary ruling requests will allow some clarification. One asks about the possibility of copyright protection for the taste of a specific cheese (C-310/17, Levola Hengelo). Another one deals with the protection of a fashion design for jeans (C-683/17, Cofemel) and yet another concerns a military report (C-469/17, Funke Medien). After describing the evolution of the law on the EU notion of copyright, this article frames and critically analyses the questions surrounding these cases, proposes answers thereto and makes a prediction of the outcome, i.e. the Court’s decision, in each of them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (6) ◽  
pp. 567-577
Author(s):  
Uma Suthersanen ◽  
Marc D Mimler

Abstract Exclusionary subject matter are often underpinned by public interest considerations. In the case of shapes of products, the Court of Justice of the European Union has aligned the interpretation of the relevant exclusionary provisions within design and trade mark laws. More recently, European jurisprudence within copyright law in relation to conditions of protection has imported the same considerations so as to regulate the protection of shapes of products. This article explores the multitude of doctrinal and policy reasons underpinning shape exclusions and argues that the Court is consciously creating an EU autonomous functionality doctrine within intellectual property law. We also argue that the Court is building a European macro-rationale within these laws namely to ensure that protection does not unduly restrict market freedom and competition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1187-1220
Author(s):  
Francisco de Abreu Duarte

Abstract This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU’s external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (91) ◽  
pp. 117-139
Author(s):  
Boris Tučić

As a part of its specific policies, the EU creates and implements numerous restrictive measures against different subjects. In recent years, the most interesting ones, especially from the perspective of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have been the autonomous restrictive measures against natural and legal persons and other non-state entities within the Union`s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). After years of legal wandering in this regard, the Lisbon Treaty finally offered an explicit legal basis for this kind of measures, envisaging, as well, for the first time, the CJEU`s jurisdiction in the field of CFSP in some cases, including the one related to reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council of the EU on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty of the European Union. In this regard, the subject matter of this paper are the activities of the EU courts related to the autonomous restrictive measures against individual subjects, analyzed at several relevant although inseparable levels. The first one considers the intention of the CJEU to "use" the situation regarding the autonomous restrictive measures in order to strengthen its position and competences within the CFSP. The second one is oriented to the efforts of the courts to secure the balance between the effectiveness of the CFSP instruments, on the one hand, and the protection of some of the major principles and values of the EU legal order, on the other hand, such as the rule of law, legal certainty, effective judicial protection or the protection of human rights as guaranteed by the EU Law in general. Thirdly, a very important step in this context has been the jurisprudential identification of the key procedural requirements that the Council`s decisions providing for restrictive measures must fulfill as well (aka the designation criteria, statements of reasons criteria and supporting evidence criteria). By constantly insisting on the fulfillment of these criteria, the EU courts exerted a pressure on the Council to improve its decisions providing restrictive measures in a qualitative manner. Recent jurisprudence, such as the Rosneft or Bank Refah Kargaran cases, shows that there is still enough space for the Court`s interventions in this field, and that some interesting Court`s decisions, related to its position within the CFSP or the general relation between the CFSP and other forms of Union`s external activities, could be expected in the years to come.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Vasiliki Fasoula

Case note: C-248/16 Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v Bundeskartellanwalt, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of the 7th of September 2017. Joint venture is a common business strategy that provides companies with benefits in scale economies, R&D, operational efficiencies and synergies. Joint ventures can be potentially harmful for the state of free competition in a market if they coordinate with their parent companies or if their operation can restrict access to the market for other competitors. Within the Internal Market, joint ventures fall under the scrutiny of two pieces of competition legislation in a non-cumulative way: the EU antitrust provisions and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) under Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4). Before the Austria Asphalt preliminary ruling, the Commission, despite its ambiguous decisional practice, considered those two paragraphs to constitute two different jurisdictional criteria applying to two different types of notifiable transactions. In Austria Asphalt the CJEU examined the correlation of those two paragraphs. It interpreted Article 3(4) as a restriction of Article 3(1)(b) by considering that the full-function criterion set by Article 3(4) should apply to all concentrative joint ventures: those newly created by a transaction as well as to those resulting from a change in the control of an existing company. In practice, the CJEU’s view limits the one-stop shop principle of the EUMR in favour of national competition authorities.


2021 ◽  
pp. 21-26
Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv ◽  
Andriy Kotenko

Problem setting. The modern pandemic reality makes all the citizens of the European Union vulnerable, especially in terms of employment and employment disputes. European civil service framework has been existing for more than 50 years, but until now some fundamental issues need to be tackled. Transparency is what the international community is striving for nowadays. The numerous tools for legal protection available to the EU servants offer completely different solutions to the one problem. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain the sound practice, according to the principle of sustainable development. The problems of the pre-trial administrative disputes resolution are questioning the mere ability of this mechanism to provide protection impartially and within sound terms. On the one hand, European Court of Justice stands as an effective remedy, which compensates the drawbacks of administrative way of rights protection. But on the other hand, the European Ombudsman institute shows, that both of the aforementioned remedies are not capable of giving up-to-date protection to the EU servants. That’s why substantial changes in this framework are needed, including reconsideration of the procedure of appeals prescribed under the Council of the EU Staff Regulation. Target of research is to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the remedies available to the EU servants for today in the EU acquis framework. Article’s main body. The article is devoted to the research of administrative and judicial means of remedies available to the EU servants. The analysis of the Court of Justice of the European Union case practice has been conducted. The procedure of resolution of administrative disputes between the EU servants and the EU institutions via the European Ombudsman institute has been investigated. The analysis of disputes concerning the protection of EU servants’ rights within the administrative framework within the institutions has been carried out. Conclusions. After analyzing various types of remedies on the protection of civil servants’ rights, a couple of issues to tackle has been revealed. The administrative remedies under Staff Regulations of the Council are not transparent enough to consider them sufficient for being the main way of protecting Staff rights prescribed in the Regulation. The European Ombudsman, along with judicial practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union might be the relief for the institutional mechanism of civil servants rights protection due to the strategic investigations the European Ombudsman is capable to undertake. Further recap of the administrative means of remedies available under the Staff Regulation is explicitly urgent to conduct as soon as possible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Tea Hasić

The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of “substantial value rule” as an absolute ground for trademark refusal. Originating from the US “aesthetic functionality doctrine”, the rule took a specific form in the EU. There it was incorporated in Directive (EU) 2015/2436 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks – Article 4 (1) (e) (iii), as well as in Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark - Article 7 (1) (e) (iii). Pursuant to “substantial value rule”, signs consisting exclusively of the shape that gives substantial value to the goods are not to be registered as trademarks or, if registered, are liable to be declared invalid. The objective of the paper is therefore threefold: a) to define the rationale of “substantial value rule”; b) to analyze relevant case law; c) to conclude whether a respective rule shall be abolished (providing its purpose may be achieved by other legal instruments without negative side-effects) or kept in the EU trademark law system. Bearing in mind the rationale of “substantial value rule” (on the one hand) and numerous problems that arise whenever “substantial value rule” is applied in practice (on the other hand) the paper provides guidelines for its appropriate interpretation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85
Author(s):  
Dragoş Călin

Abstract The Constitutional Court of Romania has subjected the introduction of a norm of European Union law into the constitutionality control, as an interposed norm to the standard norm. On the one hand, the norm should be sufficiently clear, precise and unequivocal in itself, or its meaning should have been clearly, precisely and unequivocally established by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and on the other hand it should be circumscribed by a certain level of constitutional relevance, so that its normative content could support the possible breach of the Constitution - the only direct standard norm within the constitutionality control - by national law. However, the experience of the Constitutional Court of Romania over the eight years (2007-2014) since the EU accession, does not seem to be very convincing, irrespective of the way in which European Union law, including the case law of the CJUE has been used: as justifying or circumstantial argument, as a mere reference or in an inadequate context.


Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


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