scholarly journals Zakres związania państw członkowskich Kartą Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej w kontekście stosowania prawa karnego (uwagi na tle orzecznictwa TSUE)

2017 ◽  
pp. 49-79
Author(s):  
Monika Szwarc

The article focuses on the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the national criminal laws of the Member States, concerning the scope of application of the Charter. Drawing conclusions from this jurisprudence the Author answers the question when the Member State is 'implementing Union law' in the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter in the criminal law context. It is considered that Member States implement Union law when interpreting framework decisions (Lanigan, JZ, Vilkas), when assessing the conformity of the national measures with framework decisions (Jeremy F., Radu), when executing judgements in the framework of the mutual recognition (Aranyosi and Caldararu) and when assuring the effectiveness of EU law by enacting criminal sanctions (Tarrico). In addition, in some situations Member States may be considered to be implementing Union law while enacting national measures which may affect the rights derived from Union law (Delvigne). It is assumed in the article that CJEU is often called to strike the fair balance between the different (and sometimes diverging) interests of three categories of actors: interests of individuals (to have their fundamental rights protected), interests of Member States (to exercise ius puniendi) and interests of the European Union as a whole (to ensure effectivess of EU law).

Author(s):  
Alessandra Silveira ◽  
Sophie Perez Fernandes

A SAGA TARICCO CONTINUA: ENTRE IDENTIDADE CONSTITUCIONAL DO ESTADO-MEMBRO E NÍVEL MAIS ELEVADO DE PROTEÇÃO DOS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS – ONDE FICA A EFETIVIDADE DO DIREITO DA UE?  THE TARICCO SAGA CONTINUES – BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL NATIONAL IDENTITY AND HIGHEST LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, WHERE DOES EFFECTIVENESS OF EU LAW STAND?  Alessandra Silveira*Vivian Lacerda Moraes**  RESUMO: Em setembro de 2015, o Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia detalhou, no acórdão Taricco, o alcance das obrigações dos Estados-Membros no combate à fraude fiscal lesiva dos interesses financeiros da União. Aquele Tribunal voltará brevemente a pronunciar-se sobre a interpretação firmada no referido acórdão, pois a compatibilidade da solução aí fixada foi questionada à luz de um princípio supremo da ordem jurídico-constitucional de um Estado-Membro – no caso, o princípio da legalidade dos delitos e das penas, cuja desconsideração seria suscetível de vulnerar a identidade constitucional da República Italiana. Neste contexto, importa aferir: i) o que integra a identidade constitucional dos Estados-Membros, ii) quem tem competência para a definir, ii) qual o alcance dessa definição para o direito da União Europeia. É o que as Autoras pretendem desvendar neste texto, a partir de um caso de estudo pendente no Tribunal de Justiça – qual seja, o caso M.A.S. e M.B. – no âmbito do qual o referido Tribunal foi chamado a esclarecer as implicações jurídico-constitucionais do caso Taricco.  PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Interconstitucionalidade. Identidade Constitucional. Nível de Proteção mais Elevado dos Direitos Fundamentais. Efetividade do Direito da UE. ABSTRACT: In September 2015 the Court of Justice of the European Union detailed the scope of the obligations of the Member States in combating tax fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union in the Taricco judgment. The Court will briefly rule again on the interpretation given in that judgment, since the compatibility of the solution set out therein was called into question in the light of a supreme principle of the legal and constitutional order of a Member State - in this case, the principle of legality in criminal matters, the disregard of which would allegedly be liable to infringe the constitutional identity of the Italian Republic. In that context, it is important to assess: i) what constitutes the constitutional identity of the Member States, ii) who is competent to define it, ii) what is the scope of that definition in the light of European Union law. This is what the Authors intend to unveil in this text, from a case study pending before the Court of Justice - that is, the case M.A.S. and M.B. - in which the Court was called upon to clarify the legal and constitutional implications of the Taricco case. KEYWORDS: Interconstitutionality. Constitutional Identity. Highest Level of Protection of Fundamental Rights. Effectiveness of EU Law.  SUMÁRIO: Notas Introdutórias. 1 O caso Taricco – ou em que medida o combate à fraude fiscal ajusta a proteção dos direitos fundamentais num contexto de interconstitucionalidade. 2 O caso M.A.S. e M.B. – ou da necessária separação de águas entre identidade constitucional e nível mais elevado de proteção dos direitos fundamentais no sistema jurídico da União Europeia. Notas Conclusivas. Referências. * Doutora em Direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. Professora da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, Portugal. Diretora do Mestrado em Direito da União Europeia da Universidade do Minho, Portugal. Diretora do Centro de Estudos em Direito da União Europeia (CEDU) da Universidade do Minho, Portugal. ** Mestre em Direito da União Europeia pela Universidade do Minho, Portugal. Professora da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, Portugal. Investigadora do Centro de Estudos em Direito da União Europeia (CEDU) da Universidade do Minho, Portugal. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 139-167
Author(s):  
Ester Herlin-Karnell ◽  
Theodore Konstadinides

Abstract The principle of consistency has a prominent place in EU law. In the Treaty of Lisbon, it constitutes an umbrella under which a number of legal principles of EU law follow as corollaries. Consistency manifests itself within both horizontal and vertical levels of governance. This chapter will unpack this principle and will focus on the broader implications of consistency for the division of powers in EU law. In doing so, the authors aim to discuss the rise of consistency in EU law and decrypt its various constitutional expressions in order to determine its scope of application. Two notions of consistency are presented: a formal one that appears in the Treaty of Lisbon and a strategic one, prominent in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that consistency is relevant to both traditional (integrationist) and alternative (differentiated) routes to European integration. The chapter concludes by discussing whether the undefined nature of ‘consistency’ puts it at risk of becoming an empty vessel.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234 EC) gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of EU law. The primary purpose of Article 267 is to ensure that EU law has the same meaning and effect in all the Member States. Where it considers a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable it to give judgment, any court may refer that question to the Court of Justice (the discretion to refer). Where a question of EU law is raised before a national court of last resort, that court must refer it to the Court of Justice (the obligation to refer).


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-176
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the Court of Justice (CJEU). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties. This ensures legal unity.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-131
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lim

On April 30, 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered Opinion 1/17 on the compatibility with European Union (EU) law of the Investment Court System (ICS) under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its member states (CETA). In a momentous decision that is likely to have consequences beyond the CETA, a full court of the CJEU held that the ICS provisions were compatible with EU law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 694-707
Author(s):  
Justine N. Stefanelli

In its preliminary ruling in Haqbin, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) ruled for the first time on whether the EU Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (RCD) prohibits Member States from withdrawing material reception conditions in the event of a breach of the rules of accommodation centers, or in the context of violent behavior within those centers. In holding in the negative, the CJEU affirmed the important role played by fundamental rights in the EU's asylum system.


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