11 Sandra Harding: The Less False Accounts of Feminist Standpoint Epistemology LINDA STEINER 261

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guro Parr Klyve

In this essay, I will discuss the importance of having an awareness about epistemic justice, epistemic ignorance and epistemic injustice, and why this awareness is important in connection to children and patients in mental health care. I also suggest ways to avoid epistemic injustice when working with, and doing research with, children in mental health care. In doing so, I tie this to feminist epistemology where conceptions such as knowledge, knowers and objectivity are questioned, and dominant conceptions and practices of knowledge production are perceived as a systematic disadvantage of women and other subordinated groups (Anderson, 2017). I am as well linking this to queer epistemology which differs from feminist standpoint epistemology in the idea of the identity being “a point of departure for shared consciousness” (Hall, 2017, p. 163).


Hypatia ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Patterson ◽  
Martha Satz

This essay examines the possible systematic bias against the disabled in the structure and practice of genetic counseling. Finding that the profession's “nondirective” imperative remains problematic, the authors recommend that methodology developed by feminist standpoint epistemology be used to incorporate the perspective of disabled individuals in genetic counselors' education and practice, thereby reforming society's view of the disabled and preventing possible negative effects of genetic counseling on the self-concept and material circumstance of disabled individuals.


Hypatia ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Janack

In this paper I argue that the distinction between epistemic privilege and epistemic authority is an important one for feminist epistemologists who are sympathetic to feminist standpoint theory, I argue that, while the first concept is elusive, the second is really the important one for a successful feminist standpoint project.


2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-124
Author(s):  
Heather Stewart ◽  

Though philosophers are beginning to pay attention to the phenomenon of microaggressions, they are yet to fully draw on their training and skills in conceptual analysis to help make sense of what microaggression is. In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of microaggression. I ultimately argue that ‘microaggression’ as a concept gets its meaning not by decomposing into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by means of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” That is to say, what unifies the concept of microaggression is a set of common, overlapping features that link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all cases. I identify and explain a common set of features that together form the basis for a family resemblance account of the concept. I then argue that despite the difficulty that microaggressions pose in terms of being reliably recognized and understood as such, some people, in virtue of their epistemic standpoint, are better suited to recognize these features and subsequently identify instances of micraoggression in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff, 1993; Hill Collins, 1990, 2004; hooks, 2004; Harding, 2004, 2008; Wylie, 2013).


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clio Belle Weisman

A response to the critique of where social work research currently stands, as put forth by Garrow and Hasenfeld, and their position that social work research should be undertaken from a feminist perspective. It is important to remember the origins and foundation of feminist thought and to approach research and practice with a full understanding of what both empiricist epistemology and feminist standpoint epistemology actually means. Maintaining a balanced perspective and recognizing the value in varied approaches to scientific inquiry will keep the field of social work moving toward its ultimate goal of reducing the plight of marginalized and oppressed peoples. Social work research and practice has always claimed itself to be committed to furthering social justice and equality and to building a society with a minimum of human suffering. In order to remain focused on these goals, perhaps a shift in perspective is necessary.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 503-507
Author(s):  
Richard K. Caputo

Feminist standpoint epistemology is neither a necessary nor a sufficient starting point for social work intervention research. Contemporary social scientists readily grapple with cultural, political, and/or structural aspects of social problems either in the absence of or in conjunction with an explicitly formulated feminist standpoint epistemology. The article also argues against privileging any group’s voice for purposes of social work intervention research, including the voices of marginalized and oppressed groups whose judgments, perceptions, and statement of facts are as prone to error or likely to be as mistaken as anyone else’s.


Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 125-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Rolin

ABSTRACTSandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis.


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