The Problem of Unfairness

In this chapter, a significant objection to contextualist theories of moral responsibility is examined, ‘the problem of unfairness’. After outlining the problem, reasons are offered to support the claim that moving to an invariant analysis of moral responsibility is unwarranted. It is argued that there is good reason, independent of contextualism, to divorce the concept of moral responsibility from that of blame, when the latter is construed as entailing harmful treatment of others. Even if this is denied, however, inter-agential judgements of moral responsibility can still be rendered fair. Consequently, a contextualist theory of moral responsibility can be retained whilst avoiding the problem of unfairness. This undercuts a significant motivation for endorsing an amelioration of our concept of moral responsibility, in either the direction of invariant compatibilism or that of invariant incompatibilism.

A Contextualist Account of Moral Responsibility

If the ability analysis of control is correct, it demonstrates that abilities are pivotal to an account of the control required for moral responsibility. But the precise details do not matter for the argument of the last two chapters. All that requires is the much less contentious claim that abilities to do otherwise are part of an analysis of robust control. If this is so, then the issue of the consequences of a contextualist theory of agential modals for a theory of moral responsibility arises. The aim of this chapter is to begin exploring these consequences. The first four sections outline a positive case for the view that our attributions of moral responsibility have different semantic values relative to different contexts of utterance. This argument draws upon the preceding considerations, semantic evidence, the argument from manipulation, and experimental data regarding our folk intuitions. The chapter ends by contrasting the resulting contextualist analysis of moral responsibility with an alternative proposal, offered by Björnsson and Persson.

A Contextualist Account of Regulative Freedom

In this chapter, attention again turns to issues surrounding freedom. In chapter two it was argued that the dual power to do otherwise, to be able to A and to refrain from A-ing, was a necessary condition of a concept of freedom, which was named ‘regulative freedom’. In this chapter, a contextualist analysis of regulative freedom is proposed. The chapter begins by considering different possible formulations of a contextualist account of freedom, after which, semantic evidence both for and against the view is examined. Next, two significant advantages of the contextualist theory are outlined, namely, a response to the (reformulated) consequence argument and the argument from manipulation. Finally, objections to a contextualist account of regulative freedom are answered.

The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy

This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses? contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called ?abominable conjunction?. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose?s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick?s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black?s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.

Normativity in Language and Law

This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a general framework for implementing a contextualist theory, called Discourse Contextualism (Silk 2015a, 2016, 2017). The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the apparent normativity of claims of law from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. Though the semantics is descriptivist, it avoids Dworkin’s influential criticism of so-called “semantic theories of law,” and elucidates the nature of “theoretical disagreements” about the criteria of legal validity. The account sheds light on the social, interpersonal function of normative uses of language in legal discourse. It also gives precise expression to Hart’s and Raz’s intuitive distinctions among types of legal claims (internal/external, committed/detached). The proposed semantics and pragmatics of legal claims provides a fruitful framework for further theorizing about the nature and metaphysics of law, the relation between law and morality, and the apparent practical character of legal language and judgment. Discourse Contextualism provides a solid linguistic basis for a broader account of legal discourse and practice.

Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law

Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement-based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at.

Categories We Live By

In the book’s conclusion, the question is discussed how the radically contextualist theory of social features of individuals offered in this book can ground claims of solidarity across place and time and account for the systematicity of oppression. How can women in the US ground their claim to solidarity with women in Bangladesh or Syria? How can LGBTQ individuals ground their solidarity with oppressed sexual minorities in a faraway time or place? The author offers two suggestions. The first one is to focus on fact that certain features of individuals, such as genitalia, serve as base features for differential treatment in many, many contexts. The second is to notice similar constraints and enablements across contexts. Both of these, and a combination of them, can ground claims to solidarity and systematicity.

Pragmatic indexicals

In this chapter Kasia M. Jaszczolt offers a pragmatic, contextualist account of the meaning of devices used for first-person reference that makes use of the post-Gricean idea of top-down modification of truth-conditional content. On this view, the indexical/non-indexical distinction becomes blurred because expressions on each side of the dichotomy can have indexical as well as non-indexical functions. She demonstrates how indexicality can be ‘pragmaticized’, and how the resulting ‘functional indexicals’ can be represented in her radical contextualist theory of Default Semantics.

Contextualism and externalism in Michael Williams’ epistemological theory

In this paper I shall deal with the relation between the contextualist and externalist elements in the epistemological theory of Michael Williams. I shall claim that Williams did not clearly explicate the true nature of that relation. Firstly, I shall briefly present Williams? contextualist theory. Then I shall expose Brian Ribeiro?s objection to Williams according to which externalism, and not contextualism, plays a key role in his theory. I shall argue against this objection. On the other hand, contrary to Williams, I shall claim that externalism is not a necessary consequence of contextualism. Williams? theory is just an externalist version of the basic contextualist standpoint. Another, Wittgensteinian version is also possible. Finally, I shall show that Williams? theory is not obviously better then Wittgensteinian one.