Chapter 5. From the Bali Roadmap to the Copenhagen Accord (2007–2009): EU Influence on the Post-2012 Global Climate Negotiations

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOSEF BHATTI ◽  
KASPER LINDSKOW ◽  
LENE HOLM PEDERSEN

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Aamodt

With the 2015 Paris Agreement, global climate governance increasingly depends on domestic climate policy ambitions, also in large developing countries such as Brazil and India, which are prominent representatives for developing countries in the international climate negotiations. Although the environmental policy literature expects ministries of environment to be important drivers of domestic climate policy, studies find that the climate policy ambitions of the Brazilian and Indian environmental ministries differ considerably. With a long-term analytical approach building on historical institutionalism, this article analyses and compares the climate policy roles of the Brazilian and Indian ministries of environment. The comparative analysis finds that three factors in particular influence the environmental ministries' climate policy ambitions: first, the historical view of environmental policy as a domestic or an international issue; second, the ministry's formal role in international climate negotiations; and third, the subsequent development of institutional climate logics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Federica Genovese

Abstract International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.


Subject France's new government. Significance President Francois Hollande has kept Prime Minister Manuel Valls and Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron while letting Green party members back into government. The change appears more a matter of electoral politics than substance: it tries to cement a coalition on the left to help Hollande pass the first round of the 2017 presidential election without altering the government's economic or political orientation. Such a tactical manoeuvre is neither likely to allow France to exit its current predicament nor Hollande to recover from his deep unpopularity. Impacts With this reshuffle, Hollande may have consolidated his majority enough for it to hold until the presidential election of April-May 2017. It will certainly guarantee that he will be the only candidate from the executive -- neither Valls nor Macron will stand against him. By sticking with a 'social-liberal' line, Hollande is fostering alternative candidates, both within and without the Socialist Party. Fabius's departure is likely to muffle even more France's voice on the European and international scene, and in global climate negotiations.


Energy Policy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 1191-1199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Steiner Brandt ◽  
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

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