BRICs in the Global Climate Regime: Rapidly Industrializing Countries and International Climate Negotiations

2012 ◽  
pp. 38-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Davenport
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Climate Regime ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

Environmental Ministries as Climate Policy Drivers: Comparing Brazil and India

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Aamodt
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Subsequent Development ◽  
Institutional Climate ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Historical View ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

With the 2015 Paris Agreement, global climate governance increasingly depends on domestic climate policy ambitions, also in large developing countries such as Brazil and India, which are prominent representatives for developing countries in the international climate negotiations. Although the environmental policy literature expects ministries of environment to be important drivers of domestic climate policy, studies find that the climate policy ambitions of the Brazilian and Indian environmental ministries differ considerably. With a long-term analytical approach building on historical institutionalism, this article analyses and compares the climate policy roles of the Brazilian and Indian ministries of environment. The comparative analysis finds that three factors in particular influence the environmental ministries' climate policy ambitions: first, the historical view of environmental policy as a domestic or an international issue; second, the ministry's formal role in international climate negotiations; and third, the subsequent development of institutional climate logics.

scholarly journals Market responses to global governance: International climate cooperation and Europe's carbon trading

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Federica Genovese
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Environmental Cooperation ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

Abstract International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.

scholarly journals The Implementation of the Western Climate Initiative: How North American States and Provinces Lead International Climate Negotiations

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annie Chaloux
Keyword(s):  
North American ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Environmental Regimes ◽  
The Face ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Canadian Provinces ◽  
Combat Climate Change ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

The Western Climate Initiative is internationally recognized as a success story in global climate negotiations. However, between the first expression of the idea of a cap-and-trade system in 2007 and the launch of carbon trading in 2013, the number of participating Canadian provinces and us states fell from 11 to 2, and important hurdles risked derailing the project completely. The trajectory of this innovative cross-boundary policy holds important lessons for the prospects and pitfalls of green paradiplomacy in North America. This paper examines the impetus for subnational efforts to combat climate change in the face of federal inaction, and, through detailed examination of the wci, looks at jurisdictional, administrative, legal, political, social and economic factors that complicate the implementation of these initiatives. The analysis enables a better understanding of prospects for the establishment of norms, rules and institutions among North American federated states that can provide durable environmental regimes.

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

Simulating International Climate Negotiations in Classrooms

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-30
Author(s):  
Thomas Hickmann ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Study Programs ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

A simulation of the international climate negotiations was designed for more than 50 students of political science and other study programs dealing with sustainability. A key advantage of such simulations is that they are highly adaptable to groups of different sizes, academic backgrounds, or learning levels and can be used to teach a number of major concepts within the same framework.. the primary objective of such simulations is that students grasp the difficulties to achieve collective action

International Climate Negotiations

Green Capital ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 137-151
Author(s):  
Christian de Perthuis ◽  
Pierre-André Jouvet ◽  
Michael Westlake
Keyword(s):  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations
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