scholarly journals When Courts Run Amuck: A Book Review of Unequal

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-404
Author(s):  
Theresa M. Beiner

In Unequal: How America’s Courts Undermine Discrimination Law (“Unequal”), law professors Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas provide a point-by-point analysis of how the federal courts’ interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws have undermined their efficacy to provide relief to workers whose employers have allegedly engaged in discrimination. The cases’ results are consistently pro-employer, even while the Supreme Court of the United States—a court not known for being particularly pro-plaintiff—has occasionally ruled in favor of plaintiff employees. The authors suggest some reasons for this apparent anti-plaintiff bias among the federal courts, although they do not settle on a particular reason for the courts’ frequent dismissal of these claims. Instead, the book seeks to expose how these seemingly erroneous dismissals occur and suggest avenues for reforming these legal standards. This Review begins by describing the book’s main arguments. Throughout this description, the Review supports and at times challenges some of the authors’ positions. In particular, this Review examines arguments regarding the role politics play in the courts’ decisionmaking in employment discrimination cases. It also explores the ironic result that the courts’ approaches to these cases actually may lead to more discrimination in the workplace and therefore more cases. Finally, this Review describes the authors’ suggestions for reform and proposes that changes in this area of the law are best accomplished by the entities that created the problems—the courts.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-796
Author(s):  
Edward G. Hudon

This article is in part a book review and in part a study of two institutions. In it, the author compares the origin and growth of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the Supreme Court of the United States. He uses Professors James G. Snell and Frederick Vaughan's The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution as a starting point, and he compares various aspects of the two Supreme Courts. He points out similarities in the problems that the two have confronted since the beginning, and he indicates the manner in which these problems have been resolved by each.


1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Carpenter

The intent of the framers of the judiciary act of 1801 has been to the present day a matter of some doubt. On the one hand it has been shown that alterations in the judiciary system of the United States had long been agitated before the failure of the Federalist party in the elections of 1800. Soon after the establishment of federal courts in 1789 relief had been sought by the justices of the supreme court from the arduous duties necessitated in riding the circuits. In 1799 a bill designed to establish a system of circuit courts was reported upon which action was postponed. But this later became the basis for the act of 1801. It has, therefore, been contended that, quite apart from the political advantage given the Federalists by the passage of the act of 1801, such changes in the judiciary system were warranted by necessity.At the same time it is equally clear that the amount of business before the courts of the United States, although it had been excessive, had begun to decline. No further prosecutions were to be expected under the alien and sedition acts, and a decrease in the number of suits before the federal courts involving other questions was observed even before the accession of Jefferson to the presidency.


1927 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry B. Hazard

The Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice Brandeis, recently handed down its decision in Tutun v. United States, and Neuberger v. United States. This is the latest of the important Supreme Court cases determining the law of naturalization, of citizenship, and of expatriation. During the past fifteen years they have comprised Johannessen v. United States, Mansour v. United States, Luria v. United States, Maibaum v. United States, Mackenzie v. Hare, United States v. Ginsberg, United States v. Ness, United States v. Morena, Ozawa v. United States, Yamashita v. Hinkle, United States v. Thind, Kaplan v. Tod, and Toyota v. United States.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 695-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Manuel Vázquez

A distinction has become entrenched in United States law between treaties that are “self-executing” and those that are not. The precise nature of this distinction—indeed, its very existence—is a matter of some controversy’ and much confusion. More than one lower federal court has pronounced the distinction to be the “most confounding” in the United States law of treaties. A tremendous amount of scholarship has sought to clarify this distinction, but the honest observer cannot but agree with John Jackson’s observation that “[t]he substantial volume of scholarly writing on this issue has not yet resolved the confusion” surrounding it. The continuing, and remarkably candid, judicial confusion over this issue will, I hope, excuse yet another attempt to bring some coherence to the doctrine. In this article, I argue that much of the doctrinal disarray and judicial confusion is attributable to the failure of courts and commentators to recognize that for some time four distinct “doctrines” of self-executing treaties have been masquerading as one. With a view to furthering the development of doctrine in conformity with constitutional allocations of power, I identify these four “doctrines,” as reflected in the self-execution decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and I examine the very different types of analysis that they call for.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Hugh King

Since the seminal case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala in 1980, the controversial Alien Tort Claims Act has regularly been invoked in United States federal courts to sue foreign perpetrators of international human rights violations. In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, decided in 2004, the United States Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the Act’s proper application. This article, after first identifying three different approaches taken towards the Act by federal courts over the last 25 years, examines the Supreme Court decision. While welcoming the Court’s affirmation of the Act as a mechanism for addressing certain international law violations, it critiques the Court’s conservative and problematic test to determine the extent of the international law violations falling within the Act’s ambit, and highlights many ambiguities in the decision with which lower courts will have to grapple.


Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Seabrook

This chapter examines the rise of mid-decade redistricting by focusing on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 2006 case of League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry. Both Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth v. Jubelirer approached the question of partisan gerrymandering of congressional boundaries through the framework of the so-called first-order equal protection review, assessing the direct effects of a challenged redistricting plan on voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice. The 2004 case of Cox v. Larios demonstrates an alternative conceptual approach to the issue of political gerrymandering, one that has proven considerably more successful at striking down partisan gerrymanders than the strategy of claiming equal protection relief under the Bandemer precedent. This chapter discusses Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion in LULAC vs. Perry and argues that the federal courts have failed to overturn a gerrymander because their effects are generally not that long-lasting. This conclusion is bolstered through case studies of the states of Pennsylvania and Texas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (40) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper analyses some relevant issues related to the treatment oflaw enforcement officers in the United States after a person has been taken intocustody or otherwise deprived of liberty, which requires informing that personof his/her constitutional rights. In the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States set standards for law enforcementofficers to follow when interrogating suspects held in custody.Suspects who are subject to custodial interrogation must be warned of theirright to remain silent; that any statements they make may be used as evidenceagainst them; that they have a right to an attorney; and if they cannot afford anattorney, the State will assign them one prior to any questioning, if they so wish.According to Miranda, unless those rights are not read, any evidence obtainedduring the interrogation may not be used against the defendant.Ever since Miranda was decided, state and federal courts have struggled witha number of issues with regard to its application, including the suspect’s beingin custody, which entitles the suspect to being readMiranda rights, the suspect’swaiving the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Some decisionsby the U.S. Supreme Court have attempted to answer these difficult questions.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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