Sovereign Debt Management During Debt Distress Periods

Sound public debt-management policies during sovereign debt distress periods are key to efficiently resolving a debt crisis and regaining market access. In addition to understanding the causes, processes, and outcomes of sovereign debt restructurings, this article analyzes the role of the debt manager along with determinants and strategies to maintain/regain market access. The sovereign’s debt sustainability analysis and determination of loss of market access are two crucial elements in the IMF’s lending decisions to countries in debt distress. Various indicators used in assessing whether the sovereign can tap international capital on a sustained basis are discussed. When a sovereign debt restructuring needs to be undertaken, it is necessary to determine the financial terms of the debt operation. Some key principles in designing sovereign debt restructuring scenarios and ways in securing full-financing of the economic program and regaining market access are presented. We conclude by offering a few best practices on preventing and managing sovereign debt restructurings.

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky ◽  
Kunibert Raffer

AbstractThis piece tackles Barrio Arleo and Lienau’s comments on Sovereign Debt Crises: What Have We Learned? while tries to further develop some ideas and discussions proposed in the book. This piece deals with existing alternatives to overcome debt crises, the link between sovereign policy space and the principle of creditors’ equal treatment, who the target of the book is (and should be), whether “learning is enough”, and the potential policy and legal role of human rights law in debt restructurings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 227-238

227State immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Exceptions — Acta jure gestionis — Acta jure imperii — Once a trader always a trader — State of emergency — Law-making — Legislature regulating legal relations initially established by acta jure gestionis qualifying as acta jure imperiiEconomics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Hellenic Republic — Public debt — Bonds — Greek sovereign debt crisis — Sovereign debt restructuring — Collective Action Clauses — Secondary market — Bond exchange — Financial stabilityRelationship of international law and municipal law — Compatibility with Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany — General principle of international law — Article 25 of German Basic Law — Right to a lawful judge — The law of Germany


Author(s):  
Claire Kilpatrick ◽  
Joanne Scott

This introduction explores what we mean when we talk about contemporary challenges to EU legality. Broadly, these involve actions or activities that cast doubt on the premises, principles, and norms that underpin the EU’s legal order as shaped by the Treaties and the judgments of the European Court. The chapter provides an initial taxonomy based on examples from the sovereign debt crisis and considers how the other contributions in the volume adjust or amplify that taxonomy. It shows that by looking at both ‘standard legality’ and legality exceptionalism in relation to EU legality, we can shed light both on the nature of the EU as a political organization and more specifically on the nature and role of law within it.


Author(s):  
Friedrich Schneider

The chapter first considers the role of politics on the size of the shadow economy and how it is affected by political institutions. Second, it investigates the role of the informal sector on direct investment and public debt markets in the “official” economy. The informal sector has significant adverse effects on credit ratings, lending costs, and investment decisions. This has policy implications, especially in the context of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, since it suggests that, if politics succeed in reducing the informal sector of financially challenged countries, this is likely to reduce credit risk concerns, cutting down lending costs, and stimulating investment.


Policy Papers ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (67) ◽  
Author(s):  

Background: As a follow-up to the May 2013 Executive Board’s discussion of the paper on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework (hereinafter, the “2013 Paper“), this paper proposes a reform to the Fund’s policy on non-toleration of arrears owed to official bilateral creditors (“NTP”) with a view to addressing the major issues related to official sector involvement (OSI) discussed in the 2013 Paper. Unlike the Fund’s lending-into-arrears (“LIA”) policy for private creditors, the NTP prevents Fund lending to countries if they owe unresolved arrears to official bilateral creditors, unless the arrears are covered by a Paris Club agreement or the creditor consents to the Fund providing financing. Nature of the problem: As staff foreshadowed in the 2013 Paper, several aspects of the current NTP present challenges in a changing and increasingly diverse landscape for official bilateral finance. For example, the NTP’s reliance on the practices and conventions of the Paris Club creates challenges in an environment where a growing number of creditors are non-Paris Club members. In particular, the NTP’s dependence on the Paris Club’s comparability of treatment principle to deem away arrears to non-Paris Club bilateral creditors is difficult to justify in circumstances where a Paris Club agreement is not sufficiently representative and the bulk of official bilateral claims are held by non-Paris Club creditors. Further, where there is no Paris Club agreement, the current policy can give individual official bilateral creditors a veto over Fund lending decisions, drawing no distinction between creditors that are contributing to the financing requirements of the program and those that are not, thus leaving the system vulnerable to holdouts. Proposed modification: Staff’s proposal envisages a two-step process: in the first step, all creditors would be encouraged to reach a consensus. While the Paris Club is currently a well-established forum for OSI, the Fund would also recognize agreements among creditors reached in other representative fora, should such fora emerge. If an agreement is reached through the Paris Club and the creditor group so formed represents a significant portion of total official bilateral claims, the Fund would rely on its current practices and deem away arrears to nonparticipating creditors based on the Club’s comparability of treatment principle. Only when an agreement cannot be reached (i) with a representative group of creditors in the Paris Club, or (ii) with each creditor in an alternative grouping or bilaterally, would the Fund consider lending into arrears owed to official bilateral creditors in carefully circumscribed circumstances. The decision to lend in these situations would be subject to a need for prompt Fund assistance, an assessment that the debtor is making good faith efforts to reach an agreement and that the absence of a debt restructuring is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to reach an agreement consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program, and a judgment on whether the decision to lend could negatively affect the Fund’s ability to mobilize official financing packages in the future. Likely impact: Staff’s proposal will strengthen incentives for collective action among official bilateral creditors in situations where OSI is necessary. The two-step process encourages individual official bilateral creditors to be part of a multilateral agreement, thus reducing the risk that the Fund would be prevented from assisting a member in need because certain official bilateral creditors are seeking more favorable treatment of their claims at the expense of other contributing creditors. Importantly, the policy will continue to protect official bilateral creditors, as any decision to lend into arrears will be subject to the debtor’s good faith efforts, will be applied in a way that preserves the Fund’s ability to mobilize official financing packages in future, and be subject to the Board’s approval. Next steps: If the Board supports the proposed modification, the new policy will apply immediately to all future Fund disbursements (including under existing arrangements) with respect to existing and future arrears owed to official bilateral creditors.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (79) ◽  
pp. 495-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Steinkamp ◽  
Frank Westermann

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-16
Author(s):  
Eric Joshi ◽  
Amogh Joshi

This paper provides a comprehensive breakdown of the ongoing economic crisis in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. It explores the backdrop of the crisis by analyzing Puerto Rico’s relationship with the U.S., macroeconomic indicators and pertinent legislations. It’s entirely unique contribution is the analysis of the newly introduced act- PROMESA, which enables Puerto Rico to restructure its debt. We have provided an explanation of the important sections of this legislation which govern the debt negotiation process. The PROMESA act has been extended to apply to other unincorporated territories of the United States as well should they run into arrears, which broadens the scope of this paper. We have extended the findings of pre-existing body of work on sovereign debt restructuring hurdles and explained how PROMESA addresses them. We have also used previous works to suggest measures to expedite Puerto Rico’s debt restructuring process with creditors. This paper could also serve as a handbook for creditors looking to navigate through the post-PROMESA debt restructuring process.


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