New Zealand and the Regional Security Architecture of the Asia-Pacific

Outre-Terre ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol N°58-59 (1) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Mark G. Rolls
2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhexin Zhang

Facing increasing challenges to regional peace and stability, yet feeling isolated in several key security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific, China has been taking active measures to improve its security environment and to foster a new regional security architecture based on the “New Asian Security Concept,” in order to achieve a lasting and commonly beneficial collective security order in the region. Though no official blueprint has been established by the Chinese government, one can expect China to push forward an all-inclusive and comprehensive platform as the core of the new architecture which features collective security driven by major powers based on their consulted consensus. Yet China will not seek to build a completely new Asia-Pacific security architecture to replace the old one. Instead, it is taking a pragmatic and incremental approach to shape the necessary environment for the evolution of the old architecture into a more inclusive and balanced one. If Sino-U.S. relations can be well managed and China continues to project its growing power in a refrained and contributive way to provide more public goods for regional peace and development, then it is hopeful that a new regional security architecture will take shape in the coming decades.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Mitchell

<p>Since the end of the Cold War New Zealand has participated in numerous international interventions, both within the Asia-Pacific region and further afield. As a small state with limited resources and influence what have been the primary motivating factors that have influenced New Zealand’s decisions to intervene? Can the decisions to intervene be best explained by realism, liberalism, constructivism, or a combination of these theories? This essay will assess the motivating factors for New Zealand’s involvement in international interventions by analysing four case studies where New Zealand participated in an intervention – Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. This essay will also assess whether the motivating factors for intervening within New Zealand’s geographic region differ from those outside its region, and whether there is a difference in approach taken by the two main political parties in New Zealand – Labour and National. The essay concludes that while there were elements of realism and constructivism in the decisions to intervene, liberalism provides that best explanation for the decision to intervene in three of the four case studies. The fourth case study, the Solomon Islands, is best explained by the realist factors of regional security and upholding New Zealand’s relationship with Australia. The essay finds that while the motivations for intervening in three of the four case studies were similar, the motivations for intervening within the Asia-Pacific region were slightly more realist. The motivations to intervene were similar regardless if National or Labour were in government.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Mitchell

<p>Since the end of the Cold War New Zealand has participated in numerous international interventions, both within the Asia-Pacific region and further afield. As a small state with limited resources and influence what have been the primary motivating factors that have influenced New Zealand’s decisions to intervene? Can the decisions to intervene be best explained by realism, liberalism, constructivism, or a combination of these theories? This essay will assess the motivating factors for New Zealand’s involvement in international interventions by analysing four case studies where New Zealand participated in an intervention – Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. This essay will also assess whether the motivating factors for intervening within New Zealand’s geographic region differ from those outside its region, and whether there is a difference in approach taken by the two main political parties in New Zealand – Labour and National. The essay concludes that while there were elements of realism and constructivism in the decisions to intervene, liberalism provides that best explanation for the decision to intervene in three of the four case studies. The fourth case study, the Solomon Islands, is best explained by the realist factors of regional security and upholding New Zealand’s relationship with Australia. The essay finds that while the motivations for intervening in three of the four case studies were similar, the motivations for intervening within the Asia-Pacific region were slightly more realist. The motivations to intervene were similar regardless if National or Labour were in government.</p>


Author(s):  
Thomas K Robb ◽  
David James Gill

By directly challenging existing accounts of post-World War II relations among the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, this book is a significant contribution to transnational and diplomatic history. At its heart, the book examines why strategic cooperation among these closely allied Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region was limited during the early Cold War. The book probes the difficulties of security cooperation as the leadership of these four states balanced intramural competition with the need to develop a common strategy against the Soviet Union and the new communist power, the People's Republic of China. It exposes contention and disorganization among non-communist allies in the early phase of containment strategy in Asia-Pacific. In particular, it notes the significance of economic, racial, and cultural elements to planning for regional security and highlights how these domestic matters resulted in international disorganization. The book shows that, amidst these contentious relations, the antipodean powers Australia and New Zealand occupied an important role in the region and successfully utilized quadrilateral diplomacy to advance their own national interests, such as the crafting of the 1951 ANZUS collective security treaty. As fractious as were allied relations in the early days of NATO, the book demonstrates that the post-World War II Asia-Pacific was as contentious, and that Britain and the commonwealth nations were necessary partners in the development of early global Cold War strategy.


Author(s):  
S. Starkin ◽  
I. Ryzhov

The purpose of current article is to analyze current foreign policy of USA in Asian region, which are widely defined by US politicians as the “reversal” to Asia. The key-elements of this strategy include noticeable military presence, regular military exercises, geopolitical expansion from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, as well as preservation of American leadership and containment of growing China`s influence inside the region. Later the policy transformed into the so-called Pivot, which means a significant increase in diplomatic, economic and strategic U.S. investment in Asia Pacific. While conducting its new political line Barack Obama`s administration initiated U.S. participation in different geopolitical issues of the Asia-Pacific region, such as the issue of the South China Sea, dispute over Chinese dams on Mekong River and so on. Obama’s initiatives are considered by China as U.S. interference into regional affairs. Moreover, many politicians and experts predict that "Georgian scenario" could repeat in the region. This will lead to deterioration of multilateral relations due to increased presence of USA inside Asia-Pacific. Analyzing the American approaches to formation of the regional security architecture the authors come to the conclusion that US administration aims to contain China in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic area. In mid-term, this policy provokes aggravation of a number of disturbing trends in the region. Basically, it becomes less stable and integrated. Apparently, US policy will lead to further deterioration of relations between USA and China. Under such circumstances, Russia should conduct cautious maneuvering between the two poles of power and stick to a policy of non-interference.


Author(s):  
Monika Jain

India dropped out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan and Australia, after negotiating for almost seven years in November 2018 on the grounds of national interest and also that free trade agreements (FTAs) did not amount to free trade and led to more trade diversion than trade creation. The cost and benefit of a regional agreement depend on the amount of trade creation with respect to trade diversion (Panagriya, 2000). This study tries to examine India’s concerns and at the same time, highlights the cost of not joining RCEP. India’s trade deficit with 11 out of the 15 RCEP nations has been a major cause of concern. Unfavourable trade balance, concerns about the impact on dairy sector, economic slowdown, past experience with FTA’s, China factor, data localisation, rules of origin, the experience of ASEAN countries with Sino-FTA have been some of the reasons behind India’s decision to opt-out of this mega multilateral agreement. Also, bilateral trade agreements with some RCEP countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea were operational. A multilateral trade agreement with ASEAN countries was very much in place. So, trade between India and 12 of the RCEP member countries would not have changed much after India’s inclusion in RCEP. The impact of lower tariffs would have been evident for the remaining three countries: China, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, there was fear of a massive surge in imports of manufactures from China, dairy imports from Australia and New Zealand. This study also examines the long term impact of this decision and if India has missed out on becoming a part of the global value chain and gaining greater market access in the Asia Pacific region. India’s policy of import substitution and protectionism did not capitulate desired results in the past. Hence, a critical evaluation of India’s decision and some validation on her concerns and fears have been done.


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