scholarly journals Visual Experiences without Presentational Phenomenology

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kengo Miyazono
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Subjective Impression ◽  
Subjective Reports

A number of philosophers claim that visual experiences have a peculiar phenomenal character that is “presentational”. According to what I call the “Visual Presentationality Thesis”, this peculiar phenomenal character, presentational phenomenology, is not merely a contingent feature but is a necessary feature of visual experiences. Necessarily, visual experiences have presentational phenomenology. The main aim of this paper is to argue against the Visual Presentationality Thesis. I refute the Visual Presentationality Thesis by giving some counterexamples to it. In particular, I give counterexamples from derealization, which is a psychopathological condition that is characterized by the subjective impression of unreality or detachment from one’s surroundings. Derealization is a condition in which patients have visual experiences without presentational phenomenology. I defend this hypothesis about derealization on the basis of an inference to the best explanation; this hypothesis provides the best explanation of (otherwise puzzling) subjective reports by patients with derealization.

Obstacles to Claiming Permanence and Injury-Relatedness for “Posttraumatic” Headache

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
Robert J. Barth
Keyword(s):  
Complete Recovery ◽  
World Health ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
Posttraumatic Headache ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Causative Relationship ◽  
Short Period ◽  
The One ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
Subjective Reports

Abstract “Posttraumatic” headaches claims are controversial because they are subjective reports often provided in the complex of litigation, and the underlying pathogenesis is not defined. This article reviews principles and scientific considerations in the AMAGuides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) that should be noted by evaluators who examine such cases. Some examples in the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, may seem to imply that mild head trauma can cause permanent impairment due to headache. The author examines scientific findings that present obstacles to claiming that concussion or mild traumatic brain injury is a cause of permanent headache. The World Health Organization, for example, found a favorable prognosis for posttraumatic headache, and complete recovery over a short period of time was the norm. Other studies have highlighted the lack of a dose-response correlation between trauma and prolonged headache complaints, both in terms of the frequency and the severity of trauma. On the one hand, scientific studies have failed to support the hypothesis of a causative relationship between trauma and permanent or prolonged headaches; on the other hand, non–trauma-related factors are strongly associated with complaints of prolonged headache.

Two-Point Discrimination in the Use of Upper Extremity Nerve Function in the AMA Guides

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Richard Katz
Keyword(s):  
Case Report ◽  
Sensory Function ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Steel Manufacturing ◽  
Nerve Recovery ◽  
Nervous System Function ◽  
Tunnel Syndrome ◽  
Nocturnal Awakening ◽  
Subjective Reports ◽  
Obese Male

Abstract This article presents a case report regarding a 34-year-old obese male who works as a chipper and grinder at a steel manufacturing mill and uses high-frequency vibratory power tools. He presents with typical complaints of carpal tunnel syndrome, including numbness in all five digits, wrist pain, nocturnal awakening/numbness, and others. Two-point discrimination (2PD) using a caliper was tested in the digits of the upper extremities and was 5 mm throughout. 2PD first appeared in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), Fifth Edition, and the Sixth Edition states, “sensory deficits can be challenging to grade, since the clinical examination is based on subjective reports by the patient. Grading is based on the results of sensibility testing and two-point discrimination, to improve inter-rater reliability.” The discussion of “sensibility” involves a concept of sensory perception that is more appropriate in surgery literature than neurological literature, and the discussion of the case report in this article reflects the recent literature regarding 2PD as a measure of sensibility. The authors report that sensibility is not a simple recovery of sensory function following nerve injury but rather is a complex interaction between nerve recovery and modulation of central nervous system function in spinal cord, subcortical, and cortical structures. The authors ask if the value of 2PD in the clinical assessment of impairment has been overrated within the AMA Guides, as was range of motion in the assessment of spine impairment.

Are Subjective Reports of Conscious Recollection Valid? Evidence from Think Aloud Protocols

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey K. Boman ◽  
David P. McCabe ◽  
Amanda E. Sensenig ◽  
Matthew G. Rhodes ◽  
Meghan T. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Think Aloud ◽  
Think Aloud Protocols ◽  
Conscious Recollection ◽  
Valid Evidence ◽  
Subjective Reports

Dual Aspect Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Normal Variation ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Management Conflicts ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.

Higher Order Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Order State

Rosenthal's rendition of representationalism denies intentionalism. His higher order theory instead asserts that a perceptual state's phenomenal character is set by that state's being related to, because represented by, another, but higher order, cognitive state. The theory arises from the doubtful supposition of unconscious perception and mistakenly construes intrinsic phenomenal character extrinsically, as one state's serving as the content of another. Yet it remains mysterious how and why a higher order state might be so potent as to determine phenomenal character at all. Better to resist higher order theory’s embrace of dubious unconscious perceptual states and account for states so-called simply in terms of humdrum mnemonic malfeasance. Moreover, since the suspect theory allows higher order misrepresentation, it implies sufferance of impossible phenomenal character. Equally problematic, representationalism pitched at the higher order entails the existence of bogus phenomenal character when upstairs states represent downstairs nonperceptual states.

Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual State ◽  
Content Of Experience

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.

Perceptual Attention

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Perceptual Attention ◽  
Conscious Attention

Conscious attention performs two distinct roles in experience, a role of placing and a role of focusing, roles which match a distinction between selection and access endorsed in recent theories of attention. The intentionality of conscious experience consists in two sorts of attentional action, a focusing at and a placing on, the first lending to experience a perspectival categorical content and the second structuring its phenomenal character. Placing should be thought of more like opening a window for consciousness than as shining a spotlight, and focusing has to do with accessing the properties of whatever the window opens onto. A window is an aperture whose boundaries are defined by what is excluded—in this case, distractors.

Quality and Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Demonstrative Thought ◽  
Naturalistic Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy ◽  
The One

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.

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