Computer Ethics and Neoplatonic Virtue

Author(s):  
Giannis Stamatellos

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication.

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giannis Stamatellos

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Herman T. Tavani

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton

The Introduction summarizes the basic tenets of Target Centred Virtue Ethics. It begins with an account of the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in general and shows that virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theory with several genera and species. The target-centred version of virtue ethics developed in the book is one species of virtue ethics opposed to the orthodox neo-Aristotelian version in many respects. Central to all forms of virtue ethics is ‘Thick Concept Centralism’, and the ‘Centrality of Virtuousness’, whether the notion of virtuousness is applied to character, actions, rules or motives. The Introduction outlines these theses, and the notion of the targets of virtues, before summarizing the contents of the book, including the metaphysics of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, the nature of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, and broad issues surrounding the application of Target Centred Virtue Ethics.


Author(s):  
Thomas Søbirk Petersen ◽  
Jesper Ryberg

Applied ethics is a branch of ethics devoted to the treatment of moral problems, practices, and policies in personal life, professions, technology, and government. In contrast to traditional ethical theory—concerned with purely theoretical problems such as, for example, the development of a general criterion of rightness—applied ethics takes its point of departure in practical normative challenges. Along with general overviews and journals, nine central branches of applied ethics are added, with six to eight references in connection to each branch. It should be noted that these branches constitute only a selection among the plethora of disciplines within applied ethics. Moreover, some overlap is found among the different areas.


1996 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 202-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lützén ◽  
António Barbosa da Silva

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the place of the ethics of virtues and char acter in nursing and health care in general, and in psychiatric nursing in particular. To attain this goal, the relationship between the ethics of duty (i.e. rule based ethics) and the ethics of virtue and character will be clarified in order to defend our main hypothe sis that these two types of ethics should complement each other, since both are necessary but neither by itself is sufficient for nursing. This means that any applied ethics, as in nursing, should consider the importance of the agent's moral character. To support our arguments, we shall use cases from the empirical reality of psychiatric and mental health care.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Bellino

La bioetica clinica è etica applicata e si occupa dei problemi morali che sorgono al “letto del malato” e nella pratica clinica. Il consulente bioetico deve essere in possesso di una duplice competenza, quella specifica (expertise) in etica applicata e quella più generale di tipo relazionale (counseling). Oltre a svolgere funzioni deliberative o di supporto tecnico alle questioni morali in rapporto ai casi clinici e funzioni di informazione, documentazione e formazione nell’ambito della comunità socio-sanitaria, il Sevizio di bioetica dovrebbe prendersi cura (counseling) delle singole persone coinvolte, dei loro dilemmi morali, del disagio esistenziale e dei problemi di senso. Deve aiutare il paziente a concettualizzare il dolore. Il consulente bioetico può offrire il supporto tecnico, valoriale, relazionale, perché i diretti interessati possano prendere le opportune decisioni morali. Il counselling etico-filosofico può operare una svolta culturale profonda, perché pone la persona malata al centro dell’impegno socio-sanitario. ---------- Clinical ethics is mainly applied ethics. It deals with moral problems, rising at the bedside and in a real-life ethical practice. The bioethical consultant should possess two main competences: one competence is specific, and we may define it “expertise”; the other one is more broad in scope and it shows an intrinsic relational nature, and we will refer to it as “counselling”. Bioethical Consultation in the NHS (National Health System) should take care by counselling the individual persons involved about their moral dilemmas, their existential malaise, and their questions over the sense of life. Bioethical consultation should help patients to conceptualize their suffering. The bioethical consultant, as a consequence, could offer technical (meaning ethical), value-based, and relational support, in order to allow people to take decisions in life, that is, being more conscious of the sense that these decisions will take in their life as a whole. Philosophical-ethical counselling could provide a radical cultural change in the way medical care is conceptualized in health systems, in so far as persons are the centre of the engagement of the NHS.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Helenka Mannering

Ethics of care is a relatively new approach to morality, first developed as a feminist ethical theory in the 1980s by Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, and Nel Noddings. It is based on the experience and responsibility of providing care and is distinct from other popular moral philosophies including Kantian moral theory, utilitarianism, or virtue ethics, although it has some similarities to virtue ethics. Founded on a relational ontology, it offers a deeply incisive critique of liberal individualism through ethical reflection. It is also committed to a particularism which recognises the importance of addressing moral problems in the context of lived experience. In this article, after an analysis of the foundational perspectives of care ethics, it will be contended that its central tenets tie in with contemporary approaches in theology, particularly those expressed in the writings of St John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the anthropological and moral insights of these theologians can offer the ethics of care a deeper ontological and epistemological grounding, hence strengthening its viability and existential appeal.


Author(s):  
Stephen Finlay

A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the possible kinds of metaethical questions other than their relation to the subject of morality. One central kind of question is semantic, concerning the meaning of moral language. For example, what do we mean by saying that something is ‘right’ or ‘good’? Another central kind of question is metaphysical. For example, what kind of property is moral goodness, and does such a thing exist? A third central kind of question is epistemological, concerning how we might come to know moral truths. Some of the many other kinds of metaethical questions are psychological (concerned with the mental attitudes we call ‘moral judgments’ and how they motivate us to action), logical (concerning the inferences we can legitimately draw between different moral claims), sociobiological (concerning how humans may have evolved as beings with a moral sense), and – although it may blur the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics – normative (concerning the rational justification for acting morally). The boundaries of metaethics are vague. For example, just as normative ethics on a broader conception concerns itself not merely with morality narrowly construed but with all practical or normative questions about how to act, choose and live, so too metaethics on a broader conception asks nonnormative questions about normativity more generally.


Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
Jerome E. Bickenbach

For several years philosophy departments across this continent have offered undergraduate philosophy courses designed to acquaint students with philosophical techniques and fundamental ethical theories in the context of concrete moral problems. These “applied ethics” courses go by various names: “Contemporary Moral Issues”, “Practical Ethics”, “Social Ethics”, “Issues in Applied Ethics”, “Current Moral and Legal Problems”, “Moral Philosophy and Medicine”, “Biomedical Ethics”, and so on. I have taught several versions of applied ethics courses many times and have always enjoyed them. Typically they are popular courses, drawing students from many disciplines and backgrounds, most of whom have never taken philosophy before. The range of possible “applied ethics” topics available is limited only by the instructor's imagination, although there is a fascination for the thanatological—hence the pride of place usually given to discussions of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, world starvation, war, and capital punishment.


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